

**The spatialisation of an ethno-political migrant identity:
appropriation, adaptation, and contestation of *Muhajir* space in
Karachi.**

by

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"I Sadaf Sultan Khan confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in this thesis."

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Sadaf Sultan Khan." The signature is written in a cursive style with a horizontal line underlining the name.

Abstract

Karachi today, is a city of migrants where both space and ethnicity are politicised and contested. The *Muhajir* community is the city's largest and politically most significant migrant group. The development of community identity and their political trajectory has been extensively documented but little has been written about the spatialisation of this ethno-political identity and its impact on the city. This study endeavours to analyse the settlement patterns of the *Muhajir* community from their arrival in the city in 1947 to the present and how political mobilisation and subsequent access to power has shaped their post-colonial identity, their spaces and, their interactions with the city today.

Due to the dearth of ethnographic data, this multi-scalar, diachronic, socio-spatial investigation of *Muhajir* presence in Karachi uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative data sources. Master-plans, urban planning documents, historical and journalistic accounts were used to build space syntax models of the city, combining this information with open-content collaborative mapping sources, on-site interviews, questionnaires and observations to build a picture of the community's socio-spatial behaviour and their patterns of occupation.

The study shows that whilst the *Muhajir* community clusters and that these clusters have persisted and aided their political re-imagining which in turn has enabled them to influence urban development in the city to their strategic spatial advantage, the community is in fact not completely introverted and does engage and overlap with Karachi's diverse array of communities through their socio-economic interactions. And, that the term *Muhajir* encompasses a myriad of identities; a homogenous political block offset at the neighbourhood scale by spatial clustering determined by place-based, linguistic and religious solidarities. This socio-spatial analysis shows this to be a complex community identity that engages with the urban environment at varying degrees of definition to preserve and secure the rights of its members.

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"Then which of the blessings of your Lord will you both deny."

Ar-Rehman (55.16)

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Glossary

<i>Barelvi</i>	A sect of Sunni Islam that emerged in Northern India in the early 20th century
<i>Chai-khana</i>	<i>South Asian</i> Tea house
<i>Imambargah</i>	Shi'a community centre, often with an associated prayer space/mosque
<i>Jama Masjid</i>	Friday mosque
<i>Muhajir</i>	Migrant/refugee, commonly used to identify Urdu-speaking communities resident in Urban Sindh
<i>Muhajireen</i>	Plural of <i>Muhajir</i>

1. ■ Introduction

1.0 Introduction

This study began as a result of an interest in migration and the impact the convergence of multiple communities on one city has on the spaces they occupy. An earlier study conducted by the researcher explored the definition and settlement patterns of the South Asian diaspora in London and concluded that Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis exhibited both distinct patterns of integration as well as occupying discrete spatial clusters (Khan, 2003). But, in the context of London, to be South Asian is to be visibly different and the host community occupies the position of the majority. Being from Karachi, this led the author of this study to question whether this occupation of space would differ in the context of Karachi, Pakistan, where the visible difference is minimal and most of its population of 24 million today identify as migrants of one sort or another. It is important to note that whilst Karachi and its migrant population is unique in many respects, the issues of contested space, migration and politics this study investigates are features common to the urban experience of emergent post-Colonial megacities, a discourse that this study hopes to engage with and add to.

Karachi today is Pakistan's premier economic hub and home to myriad migrant communities of both 'native' as well as international origin. This is the result of numerous waves of in-migration triggered by, as this thesis argues, political events and the implementation of development policies that were designed to benefit Pakistan's agriculture-based economy. Possibly the most significant of these events were the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 and the

arrival of over a million refugees in the city. This has become the turning point in Karachi's socio-spatial history whereby a previously small vibrant colonial port of 450,000 people was transformed into a megacity of over 24 million in just under 70 years. This accelerated growth, both in terms of space and population, has resulted in the city being labelled an 'instant city' (Inskeep, 2012). Simultaneously, as a result of its vast and diverse migrant population, it has also been referred to as 'the most dangerous megacity' (Khan, 2013). This latter title is often attributed to the violent encounters between migrant groups resident in the city, the outcome of the politicisation of ethno-religious migrant identities and the associated contest for electoral votes and land.

In the context of Karachi's violent ethno-political narrative, the lynchpin is most often considered to be the *Muhajir* community and their dominant political representatives, the *Muttahida Quami Movement* (MQM). The term *muhajir* literally means migrant or refugee in the Urdu language but in the context of Karachi it refers primarily to first wave Urdu-speaking migrants from urban centres in the north Indian provinces of Uttar Pradesh (UP), Central Provinces (CP & Berar), Hyderabad Deccan, Rajputana and Gujrat, and their descendants, i.e. the Muslim refugees who arrived in the city shortly after Partition and their descendants. It was the arrival of these refugees in 1947 that initiated a demographic shift in the city, transforming it irreversibly ethnically, culturally and politically. The ethno-linguistic definition of the city has diversified since through subsequent waves of migration and over time, ethno-linguistic solidarities have evolved into ethno-political identities with socio-spatial implications on the city.

It is within this context of a city divided by politicised ethno-religious identities and the resultant contestation of space that this study is placed and, in which it attempts to answer the question **'What has been the nature and dynamics of spatial, social and political interactions between the *Muhajir* community and the city in Karachi?'**. The hypothesis in this case being that the spatialisation of political agendas and the promulgation of specific ethno-political policies by the state over time have influenced the establishment and development of *Muhajir* identity. This identity in turn has, over the last 65 years, concretised and politicised to further appropriate and adapt the space of the city

to the community's advantage whilst simultaneously giving their spaces an identifiable *Muhajir* character thereby suggesting a reciprocity in the manner by which *Muhajir* presence and urban form interact in Karachi. Therefore the key elements of this study are ethnicity, politics and how these play out in the context of what may be termed as *Muhajir* space.

In order to investigate the spatial, social and political impacts the *Muhajir* community has had on the city and vice versa, there was a need to firstly understand the processes by which both the city and the community have developed in Karachi's post-Partition environment. This led to the development of a diachronic approach to this study. Secondly, in order to study *Muhajir* space, there was a need to establish that there are in fact *Muhajir* spaces in the city to be studied. It should be noted as stated earlier that the *Muhajir* community was originally conceived as an amalgamation of Urdu-speaking migrant communities that has over time become synonymous with the MQM, one of Karachi's primary political players. As a result of this transformation from migrant classification to political presence, the *Muhajir* identity today is often projected or perceived as being synonymous with an ethnic identity. This study seeks to investigate whether this perceived/projected ethno-political *Muhajir* identity persists at all scales of community presence and interaction with the city thereby superseding all other current ethno-religious affiliations or, if the nature of community identity, how it manifests in space and how the community then engages with their urban environment changes from the public scale of the city to the intimate scale of the individual settlements. The notion that community identity could manifest differently in space across the scales at which a city functions resulted in a multi-scalar spatial analysis. This intention to analyse the evolution and range of *Muhajir* presence across the changing scales of the urban environment of the city and the decision to apply a diachronic, multi-scalar approach to understanding the spatial, social and political interaction of the community and the city resulted in the development of a series of sub-questions that address diminishing scales of space, and the changing definition of what constitutes *Muhajir* space and identity and their interface with the city.

These questions are as follows:

- Are the *Muhajir* community clustering, as minority communities tend to do, in Karachi? If so, is there any significance to where they are clustering? And, how have these spaces and the community's identity been transformed through time and their changing socio-political and socio-economic circumstances?
- How has continued spatial clustering in the localities that the community has claimed impacted their relationship with the city? And, as these *Muhajir* areas of influence interface with the city, what form do these spaces of interface take and are there identifiable socio-spatial characteristics to the spaces beyond these interfaces that the community occupy that defines them as *Muhajir*?
- How are the various groups that comprise *Muhajir* majority settlements organised spatially? Are the various ethno-political entities spatially identifiable? What kind of spaces form the interface where these identities overlap and interact as well as help to build and maintain these discrete ethno-political identities, solidarities and divisions within the context of the *Muhajir* settlement?

The assumption being that the *Muhajir* community does cluster and that this clustering has persisted from their earliest settlements established in Karachi shortly after Partition. Secondly, this thesis hypothesises that as the *Muhajir* community has become more politically dominant within the city, the MQM (the *Muhajir* community's dominant political representative) has exercised its ability to influence infrastructure and urban development in the city so as to pursue a *Muhajir*-centric spatio-political agenda that impacts the manner in which the community interface with both the city and its other residents. Additionally, this thesis proposes that there is a specificity to the economic and spatial definition to a politically active, *Muhajir* dominant settlement. And finally, that upon closer analysis of individual settlements, despite majority *Muhajir* presence, each settlement is a microcosm of the city; a socio-spatial patchwork of communities both *Muhajir* as well as non-*Muhajir*, where some communal spaces define and segregate, maintaining sub-community boundaries, whilst others play the role of

an interface, allowing for the various communities to come together as spaces of dialogue.

Previous research has found that particularly in large cosmopolitan cities that migrant groups that share an ethnic background tend to cluster and adapt the space around them to cater to the speciality needs of their culture, often organising themselves around religious/communal institutions and speciality markets (Waterman and Kosmin, 1988, 1987). It has also been seen that a people that had the bare minimum in common, when forced into close proximity in difficult socio-spatial circumstances, have developed a form of group identity in order to engage with greater parity with the host community (Sennett, 1996). This study posits that in the context of the *Muhajir* community, a group identity that has evolved as a result of various socio-spatial reasons that will be discussed further in this thesis, the spatial manifestation of this manufactured ethno-political identity is similar to those of established ethnic communities that cluster, establish communal institutions and mobilise politically to preserve and protect their cultural practices.

This introductory chapter begins by articulating the anomalous nature of the *Muhajir* community within Karachi's migrant milieu and why this uniqueness makes them an appropriate subject for a study on the interface of space, society and politics. This is followed by the rationale for why this particular study should be considered a valid investigation outlining the key areas that previous studies on the community and Karachi have failed to address through an overview of studies undertaken on the *Muhajireen* thus far. The chapter concludes with a brief outline of the contents of each of the following chapters of this thesis, providing an overview of how the project has been undertaken.

1.1 The *Muhajireen* as an anomalous migrant community.

The selection of the *Muhajir* community as the primary subject of this study was in part due to their role as the supposed instigators of the socio-spatial transformation of the city but also the fact that within the spectrum of migrant communities resident in Karachi they are unique. Their social profile, patterns and processes of migration and resettlement and subsequent trajectory of post-

Partition social transformation within the city's ethno-spatial environment has also been quite dissimilar to their non-*Muhajir* counterparts. Hence, this section gives a brief overview of the fundamental differences between the *Muhajir* community and other migrant groups which has formed the basis of their selection and makes them an appropriate indicator of an enquiry into the mutual impact of ethno-politics and space in a post-Colonial, South Asian megacity.

1.1.1 Community profile

With regard to the community's socio-economic profile, it may be posited that the *Muhajir* identity is the post-Partition evolution of the politicised Indian Muslim identity, mobilised by the All-India Muslim League to petition the British government for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India in 1940. It should be noted that the land mass that makes up Pakistan today was delimited on the grounds that these Indian provinces had Muslim majority populations, whilst many of those who migrated to Karachi were Indian Muslims from cities in an array of Hindu majority provinces in India. Hence whilst these migrant communities shared religious and political solidarities, they were essentially from geographically diverse urban backgrounds. Thus *Muhajir* identity is inherently political, urban and an union of various smaller sub-groups making it anomalous in its very inception within the migrant environment of Karachi where subsequent migrant groups were native to the wider area, rural with clear broad ethno-territorial identities.

Additionally a by-product of being long-term city dwellers, at Partition the community professed to being better educated than their rural counterparts and engaged in professional occupations (doctors, lawyers, engineers, clerks and civil servants). Those from lower income groups were often skilled labour (weavers, cobblers, embroiderers) and/or small business owners (shopkeepers etc.). Hence, upon arrival in Pakistan, many of the *Muhajireen* had the necessary education and skills for white collar occupations. This was the primary reason behind them taking up 20% of all civil service positions in the early years whilst making up only 8% of the then population (Wright, 1991). On the other hand, most rural migrants had little or no education, thus taking on blue collar jobs as daily wage earners on construction sites and factories.

1.1.2 Processes of migration and resettlement: en masse family relocation

Urban industrialisation and rural mechanisation has resulted in migration from rural communities, these communities still have strong ties to ancestral villages and lands in the Punjab, Khyber Pakhtun Khwah, Baluchistan and interior Sindh which has given rise to several differences beyond a simple urban/rural distinction between *Muhajir* and non-*Muhajir* migrant groups in the city. Initial migration from rural areas was primarily of single men that subsequently led to chain migration processes within their kinship systems and finally the establishment of complete family units. But the intent at the outset often has been to earn in the city and send remittances home with the hope of returning to farm their lands at some later date once a small fortune had been earned. This has resulted in initial settlements of just single men, in some cases sleeping under the open sky giving the impression of a population in transit in makeshift spaces, encouraging no sense of belonging or ownership of the city in this section of the migrant populace.

Conversely, the *Muhajir* experience was on the whole neither incremental nor built around the hope of returning to a distant homeland once an individual's fortune had been built. Migration was much more akin to refugee movements and consisted of the relocation of the whole family (rather than just the male adults) which were often multi-generational units and it was a one-way process with many families giving up or losing their ancestral homes and fortunes as a result of their intention to not return home.

This willingness to relinquish ancestral lands and wealth for a political cause has been viewed with great suspicion by the native communities of Pakistan for whom to be landless people who have forsaken their roots is a dishonourable situation. This resulted in a plethora of derogatory nicknames for the community including *panahgir*, *Hindustani*, and *tiliyar*¹, the use of which was to identify them as not of *this* land, bringing into question both their sense of loyalty and

¹ Whilst *Panahgir* –Asylum/refuge seeker- *Hindustani*- an Indian national – and *tiliyar* – a small migratory bird - were all considered derogatory labels, *panahgir* implying that one in need of asylum is in need of pity, *Hindustani* implied that the migrants' loyalties actually laid with India, and *tiliyar* suggested that this was not a place of permanent residence (Siddiqi, 2008). The term *Muhajir* on the other hand, whilst still a term for 'migrant', drew religious parallels to the migration of Meccans to Medina so as to avoid religious persecution in 632 AD. Their counterparts in Medina were given the title of *ansar* meaning "friend".

belonging. This was in stark contrast to their self-image as a people who saw themselves as being on an ideological quest, undertaking great loss and sacrifice in order to make their new homeland a reality and therefore the rightful inheritors of this “promised land” for the Muslims of India (Verkaaik, 1994).

An interesting dichotomy exists within the *Muhajir* phenomenon resulting in a split personality of sorts; the community today makes up just under 50% of the population of Sindh’s major urban centres of Karachi and Hyderabad, whilst at the same time their numbers comprise of only 6% of the total population of Pakistan, all concentrated in a few urban centres in Sindh. This awareness of being a highly localised majority with limited access to ancestral homes has had far reaching effects on their self-image, political outlook and association with Karachi. They claim to represent the urban underdog in a political environment controlled by feudal landlords and is also reflected in the vehemence with which they claim Karachi as theirs, with graffiti across the city proclaiming it to be *shehr-e-Altaf* (the city of Altaf), Altaf Hussain being the chairman of the MQM. Therein lays the importance of public space or the physical possession of land for the *Muhajireen*: the fact that space and belonging are for them fundamentally tied to land and power. The placelessness of their initial years as an actual physical phenomenon may no longer exist but the resultant sense of insecurity persists even today despite the community being physically entrenched in Sindh’s urban culture for more than 60 years.

1.1.3 Post-Partition social transformation

The *Muhajir* community describes themselves as a very specific section of Pakistani society; primarily middle-income, Urdu-speaking, first wave migrants from India and their descendants. The last 60 years have seen the evolution of their circumstance from one of plight; a people in need of charity thus playing on the religious connotations of the word *muhajir* as ‘refugee’, correspondingly elevating the position of the host community to that of *ansar*²- to that of demanding what they perceive as their right as citizens of Pakistan where *muhajir* implied ‘migrant’ (Saigol and (SDPI) 2002), to one where they govern

² ‘Friends’ or helpers of the migrants. A term used to describe the people of Medina who took in people who migrated with the Prophet Mohammad from Mecca in 622 CE

Sindh's urban centres and have even been known to lobby for a separate province for the *Muhajir* people (*Jinnahpur* in the early 1990s³ and again in 2011 along with the call for a separate Saraiki-speaking province). In light of this last development, it could be argued that the term now connotes a new ethnicity akin to a nation where the status of nationhood, in their view, implies a certain degree of ethno-geographic sovereignty.

This transition from a refugee community to an ethnic group may be seen as a means of re-imagining themselves so as to alter public perception of the community, there have been changes within the community of what it means to be *Muhajir* too. Whilst most 'native' communities reverted to their ethno-religious solidarities shortly after Partition, the *Muhajir* community remained the greatest proponents of the Pakistani nation state, voting for the pan-ethnic, religious parties in the early years. The implementation of various pro-Sindhi and Pakhtun policies in Sindh by various governments eventually resulted in the emergence of a *Muhajir*-centric political movement and a generational schism within the community; the older generation continuing to support an all-Pakistan ideology whilst second generation *Muhajireen* were advocating various *Muhajir*-centric political groups (Hasan, 1999; Verkaaik, 1994).

Verkaaik (1994) argues that urbanism is a fundamental element of *Muhajir* identity and as already discussed this is a critical feature that differentiates them from most other migrant groups in the city. But this notion has had an impact on the socio-economic definition of the community. At partition the *Muhajir* community consisted of civil servants, professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc.), the literati, small traders, and artisans and craftsmen. Whilst many of these may be considered distinctly urban middle-class professions, today the number of *Muhajir* practitioners of craft-based and artisanal trades, skills that are often passed down through generations, are rapidly declining. In many cases, these have been discarded and replaced with professions that second and third generation *Muhajireen* consider to be more in keeping with

³ "Jinnahpur" was the name given to the *Muhajir* state, the call for which started appearing as graffiti in the early 1990s in Karachi and Hyderabad. This is an aspect of the *Muhajir* movement that is more frequently patronised by the *Muhajir diaspora* as opposed to that resident in the city of Karachi.

being an urbanite, i.e. clerical or office-based occupations. This phenomenon is seen especially in the case of blue collar jobs, where an added motivation behind this change in profession has often been the fact that migrants from rural areas have taken on these jobs and pushed the *Muhajirs* out of the market. The higher income rate afforded by salaried professions as well as the dying out of certain arts/crafts/skills has potentially resulted in both a reorganisation of the layout of these earlier settlements as well as investment by the community into and the development of these areas. Hence, it has been suggested that, what may have originally been low and lower-middle income areas housing primarily working class citizens, today house doctors, engineers, college and school teachers (many of them women), IT professionals, bank managers, etc. (Hasan, 2007) giving the impression of being middle-class neighbourhoods.

Many *Muhajir*-centric studies explore the role of young men in defining the ethno-political identity of this community, and the use of violence and gang mentality as a means of acquiring respect as well as material wealth (Khan 2011; Khan 2007; Ahmad 2011). But perhaps the best measure of the changing urban character of the community is the increased public presence of the women of this community in both political and professional spheres. The presence and movement of women in the public realm from other communities is generally rare and restricted if these women have accompanied their menfolk to the city. On the other hand, a growing number of *Muhajir* women are working in white collar positions or as skilled labour in the leather and tailoring industries. This venturing out has often led to them being accosted and reprimanded in public spaces, especially on public transport - the transport industry being dominated by the Pakhtun community (Ali, 2011).

Rapid urban development, the rising cost of urban living and the appearance of women in the workplace have resulted in both the possibility and the need for more than one breadwinner per family. This in turn has led to a shift in family structure, and with the emergence of Karachi's flat culture - the preference of middle-income families to live in high-density, medium-rise apartment complexes - that offers a more affordable means of home ownership. This has been accompanied by a shift away from the more traditional multi-generational family structure - often referred to as the 'joint family' system - towards a

preference for the nuclear family unit. It can thus be hypothesised that the increased visibility and participation of women in the public realm is an indication of a number of shifts within the dynamics of the community as well as a transformation of the use of public spaces.

1.2 Problem definition

This thesis argues that space, society and ethnic politics have a synergistic relationship in the context of Karachi. Simultaneously, the investigation attempts to provide an insight into the manner that numerous post-Colonial megacities, magnets for post-industrial in-migration, function.

In the case of the *Muhajir* community and Karachi, a lot has been written about the community and its politics, but very little literature speaks of the relevance and the role played by space in the emergence and development of their community identity or the impact their presence and particular brand of ethno-politics has had on the growth and development of the city.

Literature pertaining to the *Muhajir* community in Karachi seems to overlook three key aspects of the community's presence and relationship with the city. Firstly how the community manifests itself in the spaces they occupy on a day-to-day basis and the manner in which they engage with the spaces and residents of the city in both a political and non-political manner. Secondly, while ethno-political upheavals in the city have regularly been attributed to the political exploits of the *Muhajir* community, no study lays out the relationship between the politics of community and the politics of urban development. Finally, the community is regularly portrayed as a homogenous political entity with very little discourse related to the fact that it is in fact an amalgamation of multiple post-Partition, Urdu-speaking migrant groups. Thus very little academic discourse is found on the internal socio-spatial nuances and hierarchies of *Muhajir* space and identity.

As has been stated previously, in the context of Karachi, the *Muhajir* community is best known for its engagement in the political arena but it should be noted that, prior to the emergence of any kind of *Muhajir*-centric political movement, a distinct *Muhajir* cultural existed (Samad, 2002) based in a commonality of

language and literature, religious beliefs and practices and an urban outlook. The overwhelming and transformative nature of their urban material culture were aspects of *Muhajir* occupation that historians and memoirists like Vazira F-Y Zamindar, Sarah Ansari and A.R.Siddiqi touched upon in their accounts of a fledgling post-Partition Karachi where streets selling north Indian delicacies emerged, the Urdu press became a civic voice to be contended with and downtown Karachi began to resemble neighbourhoods in Lucknow and Agra, cities from whence they came. Unfortunately such accounts and spatial references to *Muhajir* culture and occupation are found primarily for the early years of their occupation, shortly after Partition.

In more recent times studies have focused on very specific localities such as Liaquatabad and Golimar, Baldia, Korangi, Lines Area and Khokrapar (Baig, 2008; Dowall, 1991, 1989; Mahmood, 1999) to analyse the emergence of violent ethno-political *Muhajir* culture and/or the State's motivation behind development in the city. A departure from the above trend is seen in the work of Laurent Gayer (2014, 2007, and 2003) who focuses on the use of violence in the political arena and illustrates this through his documentation of the *hungamay* or troubles between the Pakhtun and *Muhajireen* in the mid-1980s and again in 2010-2011. In this case, his work begins to engage with space through the mapping of troubled hotspots and broad ethno-political clusters to demonstrate the relationship between ethnic violence and political control. But here too, references to space and mapping are broad and only at the city scale.

Academics such as Feroz Ahmed (1998) and Korejo (2002) place the emergence and politicisation of *Muhajir* identity and the community's contentious relationship with the State in the context of Pakistan's long history of ethno-political, separatist and labour movements dating as far back as 1952 with the instigation of the Bengali Language movement shortly after Partition. This seems to suggest that in the context of Pakistan, political awareness and protest has been a fundamental part of civic life and that the forced union of the various ethno-religious entities that comprise Pakistani society today has always been a tenuous one. The works of local journalists too have focused primarily on the political life of this community and their impact on issues of urban conflict, turf war and extortion motivated by a need to build a vote bank

which in turn feeds into their popularly perceived role in recent times as Karachi's political lynchpin and the kingmakers of provincial politics. But yet again there is only a passing reference to the spaces they occupy and control and the impact this spatial occupation has on the politics and mechanics of urban development and the growth of the city.

As discussed earlier, the *Muhajir* community is in essence an amalgamation of multiple, primarily Urdu-speaking, migrant communities coming from a diverse array of geographical and sectarian backgrounds. Whilst a fair amount of anthropological research and documentation has been carried out within the private spaces and settlements of the *Muhajir* community in both Karachi and Hyderabad, such as the works of Oskar Verkaaik, Laurent Gayer, Nicola Khan, and Laura Ring, focusing primarily on the politicization and the emergence of paramilitary culture amongst *Muhajir* youths in the 1980s and 1990s within *Muhajir* settlements. These studies argue that the emergence of this form of masculine bravado was in part a reaction to the limited access to public sector jobs and education facilities given to many second generation *Muhajireen* – a situation created by the promulgation of various state sponsored policies - but was also a response to the popularly held stereotype of the supposedly effeminate Urdu-speaking male (Verkaaik 1994; Khan 2012). Yet, despite the intimacy of access to *Muhajir* settlements and apartment complexes, these studies focussed on the political and treated the community as a homogenous unit, which politically they may be, but culturally, religiously and of course spatially this thesis posits, more nuanced identities and solidarities persist that have not been spatially explored.

It should be noted too that, perhaps due to this lack of interest in the spatial aspect of community and identity building, there is a notable lack of published ethnographic spatial data on the location of this community within the city. This study therefore has attempted to develop alternative methodologies of mapping communities through the use of religious, political and cultural spatial proxies in an environment where data is limited and/or out dated.

1.3 Structure of this thesis

The segregation of migrant communities in the urban context is both a social and a spatial phenomenon; Chapter 2 highlights and discusses literature pertaining to issues of identity and community building through commonalities of language, ethnicity and politics. It goes on to discuss how often this leads to spatial clustering of those viewed as the 'other' and how hyper segregation results in the politicisation of space and urban conflict. It discusses how traditional tribal/feudal systems of hierarchy commonly found in Pakistan's rural societies have been translated into political powerbases, how these differ from those of urban based communities and how these political affiliations have manifested in the urban context of Karachi. The chapter concludes by discussing literature on the clash of urban and rural ethno-political structures resulting in a militarisation of identity and, from a spatial point of view, in the transformation of the urban character of the city.

Chapter 3 lays out the methodology for this multi-scalar diachronic study. The chapter begins by providing a brief overview of where and how space syntax methodologies have been used in previous studies of urban segregation, showing how these methodologies are appropriate for the study of urban segregation across changing scales. It goes on to describe and justify the proxies or surrogate data used in this investigation as a result of conducting a study in an environment where there is a severe dearth of detailed, up-to-date ethnographic data. It details how both quantitative as well as qualitative data sources have been used to describe and analyse how the *Muhajir* community appropriate, adapt and contest space in Karachi from the scale of the city to that of their settlements.

Chapter 4 addresses the historical development of the city and the evolution of *Muhajir* identity from a small colonial port town in 1947 to the megacity it is today. The analysis highlights the synergistic relationship between major political events, plans and policies for urban growth and infrastructure development and the political affiliations of the city's residents and its administrators. Through a series of spatial network maps charting the chronological growth of the city, the analysis then goes on to focus on both the

urban development of the city and the initial settlement patterns of the *Muhajir* community. Using proxy data sources, the chapter concludes with the identification of *Muhajir* clusters in the city.

Whilst chapter 4 focused on the evolution of the city and the identification of *Muhajir* spaces, the discussion in chapter 5 attempts to analyse the impact that the political dominance of the community in recent times has had on the spatial development of the city and *Muhajir* space. As stated above, this is a multi-scalar study and whilst the previous chapter dealt with the city-wide presence of the community, chapter 5 investigates the nature of the interface between *Muhajir* space and the city. The chapter concludes with a deconstruction and socio-spatial description of the *Muhajir* settlement.

The last of the analysis chapters examines the socio-spatial role that communally shared public spaces such as markets, *chai-khanas*, and communal institutions play in community and identity building and what a *Muhajir* settlement actually looks like socio-spatially from the inside out. This chapter studies the notion of boundaries and what this means in the context of the *Muhajir* settlement. Whilst politically the *Muhajireen* argue that they are the 'fifth ethnicity' of Pakistan, due to the circumstances under which this identity emerged, the community is actually an amalgam of displaced ethnic identities. Through a detailed analysis of the case studies, the discussion in chapter 6 shows that in many cases subgroups maintain discrete sub-settlements within the larger *Muhajir* settlement/cluster. This has been investigated through the demarcation of the catchment of communal institutions and the mapping of various types of political propaganda.

The discussion section of this study presented in Chapter 7 combines correlates and presents the findings of the investigation and responds to the question stated in the introduction. It attempts to show how a spatial approach to an issue of identity and politics in a complex, migrant-based urban environment provides insights into planning decisions, inter-community relationships and intra-community hierarchical structures. The concluding remarks of this chapter present a summation of the findings, the conclusions drawn and potential further work this study may contribute to.

This document includes three appendices: Appendix A providing additional map related data including masterplan maps, guide maps, maps sourced from various newspaper articles, and municipal maps of the case study areas, Appendix B contains copies of the questionnaires and interviews forms as well as information retrieved from the interviews and questionnaires completed on site and examples of images of on-site documentation carried out during the fieldwork period and Appendix C is a detailed historical timeline.




Fig. 1.01. Map of Karachi 2007-09 showing streets and areas relevant to this study.

2.

Literature Review

2.0. Introduction

The *Muhajir* community of Karachi has been resident in the city for over 60 years. Many of the earliest settlers now have at least three generations born and bred in the city and since 1947, this community has greatly outnumbered both the indigenous population as well as other, more recent migrant groups moving in. This trend has only recently begun to shift with the permanent settlement of various domestic, labour related migrants in the city. Hence, this is a study of the processes and spatial impacts of the migration and resettlement of an urban migrant community.

Historical accounts suggest that the decision by the majority of Urdu-speaking Indian Muslim refugee communities to settle in Sindh's urban centres was less a choice and more a compulsion. Settlement of non-Punjabi refugees in the Punjab – the largest province and most able to absorb the influx of migrants – was actively discouraged by the Punjabi oligarchy (Alavi, 2011). Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (today Khyber Pakhtun Khwah), the underdeveloped frontiers of the empire had limited appeal for an urban population and, whilst Biharis like their eastern Punjabi counterparts due to their underlying similarity in culture and language, moved and were absorbed into East Bengal (East Pakistan), the bulk of Urdu-speaking refugees were, through a process of elimination left with limited choices and were thus encouraged to settle in Sindh (Siddiqi, 2008). This seems to illustrate that from the out-set, the *Muhajir* narrative has been coloured by processes of State sponsored

segregation, and hence another key aspect of this study is the spatial segregation of a community.

As discussed in the introduction, the *Muhajir* identity is a composite entity; whilst the term literally means migrant or refugee, in today's ethno-politically charged Karachi it specifically refers to first wave Urdu-speaking Indian Muslim migrants and their descendants (Siddiqi, 2008). This definition is often expanded to include the assumption that they align themselves politically with the *Muttahida Quami Movement* (MQM) and therefore this is a community defined primarily by a shared language, a degree of religiosity and a political affiliation. These features of their ethno-political identity in turn imply some shared cultural and religious practices and a shared history of political participation ranging from pre to post Partition through to the modern day and become the social elements of their identity around which this enquiry is built. Hence this chapter will engage with some of the key discourse surrounding the socio-spatial processes of migration and resettlement, the spatial segregation of migrant groups and the evolution of migrant identities and spaces in an urban environment. These are processes that are both social and spatial in nature and therefore the discussion will be divided in this manner for the purposes of this discussion.

Additionally, as stated above, the *Muhajir* identity is an ethno-political entity that is situated within a much wider, varied migrant environment where structures are radically different from one another and political expression is fervent and often volatile. Hence the final section of this review engages with literature pertaining to the physical expression that communal appropriation and contestation of space takes in the context of complex urban situations like Karachi.

2.1. Social process of identity formation

Segregation, as an urban phenomenon, is the outcome of various socio-economic factors. It may be the result of forced separation of a minority from the majority so as to maintain the majority's sense of superiority and a preservation of 'purity' of both self and space (Sibley, 1992). Often it is a chosen separation by a minority community for the purposes of preserving and perpetuating their

distinctive culture in a new environment, or also be the outcome of the land and housing markets that render certain sections of the city inaccessible to those of a lower-income bracket (Johnston, Forrest and Poulson, 1996). This is often the economic bracket that many migrants or refugees fit into in their initial stages of urban settlement. Whatever the reason may be, the practice has a way of labelling or identifying the residents of these *ghettoes*, *enclaves* or *colonies* as different from the majority; native vs. colonial, Jew vs. gentile, blue-collar vs. white-collar, thereby giving rise to a collective identity shared by all the inhabitants. Thus it can be said that whilst urban segregation manifests itself as a spatial phenomenon, it is in most circumstances, a socially motivated occurrence.

Notions of both identity and community, like the city, comprise of varying scales - from concepts of what defines a nation or nationality that speak of geographical borders and territoriality (Ahmed, 1998), through to local solidarities and affiliations of religion, trade, caste, etc. Whilst the individual may experience simultaneous solidarities and associations and belong to several communities across these scales of identity, this particular discussion will focus on notions of ethnic identities and communities hence the following sections discuss the elements that build this kind of communal identity.

2.1.1 Language, Ethnicity, Nationalism and ‘the other’

When addressing issues of urban segregation and group identity, one of the key factors is the definition of the community being studied. Whilst a community may be defined by a myriad of shared associations, the focus of this study is a community defined by its ethno-politics. Whilst ethnicity may be considered in terms “of relationships between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive” (Eriksen 2002, p. 7), it is further defined as “a social group ... set apart or bound together by common ties of race, language, nationality or culture” (Ahmed, 1998). Therefore, not only is it a perception of self, but also a solidarity built around tangible commonalities. In the case of the *Muhajir* community, as discussed earlier, this was the label given to primarily Urdu-speaking, Indian Muslim migrants and their descendants who today are often associated with the MQM, the key shared elements of this particular group are

religion, language and political affiliation, all features that in light of the above definition, may define an ethnic group. Interestingly, the definition of ethnicity makes no reference to a shared territorial association.

Whilst religion may be one of the broadest forms of social solidarities – Anderson states that “The great sacral cultures incorporated conceptions of immense communities” (Anderson, 2006, p. 12), these trans-ethnic religious solidarities have through history often proven to be tenuous; once the need for such solidarities has been removed members often revert to previously held dynastic fealties and tribal and kinship loyalties. Each of these came with its own perception of who was part of the in-group and who, of their previous compatriots were to be classified as *the other*, and this process of categorisation was often based on their ethnic biases. Benedict Anderson (2006) argues that the persistence of religious solidarities for as long as they lasted was due to the control exerted by religious communities and institutions over knowledge and written material. With the advent of the printing press and the increased accessibility of written material, these monopolies and solidarities were dismantled to be replaced by linguistic nationalism. This suggests that language has played a pivotal role in the emergence of nationalism and nationalistic identities. It is the interaction of people that creates a sense of identity (Reetz, 1993), this interaction in the modern world has been primarily through oral and printed media, thus language, after religion, appears to become one of the most important factor in the formation of any identity(Rahman, 1997).

Language is often used as the lowest common denominator around which to build an ethnic identity as it is assumed that it is demonstrative of shared cultures and traditions which in turn may connect people from similar geographical backgrounds. Yet this is not always the case. Some languages have been used to facilitate larger political agendas more far reaching than simple ethnicity. This has been the case with the revival of Hebrew for Israelis and the Jewish Diaspora, Urdu for the Indian Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent, the development of Afrikaans in what is today South Africa, and the promotion of minority languages as a part of an ethno-political identity in the case of Welsh, Basque etc. Hence Rahman’s (1997) suggestion in his text

charting the various ethno-political movements in post Partition Pakistan, that the association of language and identity has been used as a means of political mobilization seems valid. He goes on to suggest that this kind of ethno-linguistic nationalism is a modern phenomenon. William Safran (2005) expresses this association of language and politics quite succinctly:

“Languages are not only tools of nation-building but also means of political control. That is why ethnic minorities use language - for example, the demand for bilingualism - as a political strategy - as ‘a form of protest against political domination.’” (Safran and Laponce, 2008, p. 4)

Benedict Anderson (1983) argues that nationalism itself is a modern phenomenon as it is a significant departure from the dynastic, tribal, kinship and religious solidarities that predated this kind of ethno-nationalistic community. Though these solidarities may not necessarily be organic, he argues that most successful revolutions since World War II have defined themselves in “national terms”, the overarching factor being a commonality of language. Safran (2005) suggests that these new, language-centric solidarities have, in a few cases, led to the emergence of wholly new ethnicities as in the case of Afrikaners in South Africa, Bosnians in the former Yugoslavia and the *Muhajirs* in Pakistan.

The possible reasons for socio-spatial segregation outlined at the beginning of this discussion as well as the political implications of linguistic solidarities suggest that certain social hierarchies and power structures come into play when analysing the structure - both social and physical - of multi-ethnic societies. These will often be relationships of domination of an in-group or a majority over a minority group which will be viewed or termed as *the other*. Where different communities have distinctive physical appearances, those who do not fit a specific physical description are easily identified as the other, but often, in multi-ethnic societies where most inhabitants ‘appear’ to be the same, language or accent become the differentiating factors thus the notion of the “visible” and “non-visible” other (Walter, 2000).

What makes the idea of *the other*, both visible and non-visible, relevant to this particular study of migrant settlement patterns is that the group under study – the *Muhajir* community - may have arrived as a migrant population hence they

should have traditionally inhabited the minority category but, due to their large numbers (over a million arrivals from 1947-51), they took up the role of the majority in a few select cities. This was a social shift; from being a Muslim minority in Hindu majority areas this community suddenly became a migrant majority in an already established city, and thus changed the cultural face of the city. Yet despite their numeric and cultural majority presence, the settlement process was very much that of a migrant population; occupation of peripheral areas of the city and infill and vacant sites in inner city areas (Hasan, 1999).

Eriksen (1994) provides an explanation for this phenomenon; the transformation of ethnic identities into political ones,

“Research on ethnic identity formation and boundary maintenance has indicated that ethnic identities tend to attain their greatest importance in situations of flux, change, resource competition and threat against boundaries. It is not surprising therefore, that political movements based on cultural identity are strong in societies undergoing modernisation” (Eriksen, 1994, p. 99)

This suggests that the spatial aspect of identity plays out not only in the initial clustering of a community, but the subsequent consolidation of this clustering upon the realisation of this ethno-political identity through processes of challenging and defending both identity and space. So through a process of shared language and shared experiences and identity, the migrant community despite its majority presence, ends up establishing enclaves; a sharing and consolidation of space.

2.1.2 Promised Land to Homeland: the transition from Nationalism to ethno-nationalism

In many processes of migration, the destination often assumes a paradisiacal status, embodying all the characteristics that are diametrically opposite to those of the place from which the migrant community is leaving. The ‘Promised Land’ is conceived as a place of abundance and opportunity or place of purity and hence where ideals and values held dear by the migrant community are safeguarded and upheld. The reality of the new homeland often falls short and

thus arises the clash between myth and reality. This encounter of the perceived and the real shapes not only the psyche of the migrant community but also the built environment they inhabit.

“The myth of a promised land is a fundamental narrative in many identity constructs. Whether it be an imaginary place or a real country, a mythic elsewhere always presents itself in the image of a lost paradise, a land of abundance and a better world.” (Anteby-Yemini, 2004, p.)

These disparities between the *notional* and the *physical* realisation of this ideal state, can be best described in the case of two migration processes dealing specifically with a migrant population ‘returning’ to a promised home land; the Jewish Diaspora’s ‘return’ to Israel and the migration of Muslims and Hindus from India to Pakistan and vice versa, after the Partition of the Indian Subcontinent. In both cases, history shows how upon arrival, the migrants found that the host community was far less awed by the appeal of a Promised Land; the day-to-day realities of life and the state - provision and management of infrastructure, security and safety of the populace, etc. - very quickly overshadowed the achievements of various Independence movements for the host communities. And, especially in the case of Israel previously central religious texts and ideals were relegated to become issues of lesser importance; despite the fact that these had been anticipated by the migrants to be key points of reference within governance. This shift from the religious to the secular added to the deconstruction of the notion of the ideal state (Safran, 2005).

In the case of Pakistan, this shift between secular and the religious may have worked in reverse; whilst the state may have been envisioned as a homeland for the Indian Muslim, it was perhaps never intended as an Islamic state. Its political imagining was conceived as more of a federation of nations similar to the Soviet Union or the United States, with the aim of acknowledging the different peoples that made up the territory that was to become Pakistan whilst limiting their right to territorial sovereignty (Devji, 2013). In his first address to the constituent assembly of Pakistan, M.A. Jinnah – Pakistan’s first Governor General - stated that “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are

free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the State.” Yet despite this, Pakistan’s constitution of 1956 proclaims it as the ‘*Islamic Republic of Pakistan*’ illustrating the schism between the notional homeland for the Indian Muslim where due to their experience as a persecuted minority all were free of religious persecution and the physical realisation of it, where definitions of identity were sharpened and took on an orthodox interpretation.

To add to this idea of actualisation of identity, whilst the *Muhajireen* saw themselves as the only true Pakistanis due to their often traumatic migration and sacrifices for Muslim independence, thus theirs was a community to be celebrated yet, their experience upon arrival was quite different (Verkaaik, 1994; Zamindar, 2010). In this case, though religion may have been a uniting factor and suggested a natural solidarity between all adherents to the belief but, upon arrival, the diasporic communities were considered as migrants or viewed as the *other* by the host communities due to linguistic or ethnic distinctions.

“They came to the promised land torn and broken in body and soul but still hoping for a secure future. Treated and accepted as a refugee at the outset, they earned a variety of brand names - *panahgir* [asylum seeker], *mohajir* [refugee/migrant], *tilyar* [a small migratory bird], *makkar* [locust], *Hindustani* - each carrying a different shade of commiseration or pity or scorn if only by way of a joke.” (Siddiqi, 2008, p.119)

Thus, this sense of disillusionment and a betrayal of sorts experienced by the new arrivals, coupled with the host community’s desire to distinguish between the so called *sons of the soil* and migrants who were often economically weakened due to the processes of migration they experienced, has been pivotal in the isolation - both cultural and physical - of migrant communities in their respective Promised Lands. Hence, despite the proposition in the opening of this review that ethnic segregation is primarily of three distinct types: forced due to externally applied social prejudices, chosen by the minority community for cultural preservation and a default outcome due to economic limitations of the

migrant group, it seems that often, segregation is a combination of all three factors.

To assume that the only party affected by this migration is the migrant community seems simplistic, there are expectations on the part of both migrants as well as their host community. This sense of expectation is summed up below;

“Because both migrants and hosts anticipate that the diasporic return of co-ethnics will be less problematic than other types of immigration, the mutual ethnic and social alienation that results is all the more disorienting, forcing both migrants and hosts to fundamentally reconsider their ethnic identities.”(Tsuda, 2009, p. 7).

The hosts often expect an immediate assimilation or at least a conformist approach to life on the part of the new migrants, sometimes going as far as to provide services - language classes and equivalency training for professionals - to facilitate this transition (Remennick, 2009). Yet despite this desire to have migrants assimilate, often, as has been the case with both Jewish returnees and Indian Muslim refugees, due to their large numbers, concentrated in a few urban centres, migrants have gone through a process of restricted assimilation. This resistance to assimilation is possibly due to their numeric strength, the establishment of institutions within their settlements to safeguard their cultural identity and liaise where necessary with the state, and the degree to which they consider themselves to be distinct from the host community (Safran, 2005).

Their reluctance to assimilate and in fact the emergence of a parallel ethno-nationalism different to that of the state has often resulted in a certain degree of resentment on the part of many host communities. The outcome of the rise of migrant ethno-nationalism, especially in the case of the host population of Sindh, Pakistan who received the *Muhajir* settlers at Partition, has been reactionary ethno-nationalistic movements of their own that are often (but not always), if not instigated, then at least supported by the state. The above mentioned political reactions are often seen by migrants as lopsided state policies. These coupled with the above mentioned occurrences of numeric strength concentrated in a few localities, Coakley (2003) suggests, are key in a

community going from asking for their rights and an acknowledgement of their distinctness as a community from the host population to demarcating a territory of their own whether that is in the form of enclaves, ghettos or actual sovereignty.

2.1.3 Postcolonial identity and the city

Whilst both Karachi and the *Muhajir* community are unique in the manner in which they have grown and engaged with the various migrant communities present, there is a need to acknowledge that the case under study shares certain characteristics that can be attributed to the processes of postcolonial urban development found in many postcolonial cities in Africa and South Asia. For the purposes of this study it is important to identify what these are so as to be able to systematically differentiate between the unique features of city development and identity and those that are similar as a result of a shared postcolonial trajectory.

In many cases, cities in Africa and South Asia had been used as colonial administrative hubs and therefore had a significant military presence, developed as composite entity exhibiting what may be described as the 'Dual city' phenomenon (Lari and Lari, 1998). These 'dual cities' showed two distinct urban fabrics developing simultaneously, one usually the grid-iron 'European' city comprised of the Civil Lines, Saddar (cantonment) bazaar and barracks area, whilst the other consisted of a system of narrow, congested, meandering streets favoured in the 'native' city (Lari and Lari, 1998). Additionally, as the description above suggests, the 'European' city was laid out in distinct functional districts – administrative, commercial, communal/recreational and residential – with limited overlap between functions. The 'native' city on the other hand was often organised into neighbourhoods defined by the trades of their residents (Lowder, 1986) where marketplaces, communal spaces and residential areas overlapped creating a vibrant 24 hour environment. It should be noted that the two parts of the city would typically be highly segregated from one another, stemming from a desire to separate 'native' and ruling populations (Nightingale, 2012). Added to this spatial diversity was an additional layer of social diversity often associated with colonisation; many colonial towns were strategic administrative and trade

hubs within the various colonial networks and thus attracted various domestic - and in some cases international - communities related to the services and business sectors thus making these towns reasonably diverse ethnically, at the time of their independence. Karachi was no different, annexed in 1839 as a means to transport agricultural goods from the Punjab in the north via the railway to the port and outwards across the empire thus making it a small but diverse and vital colonial centre (Hasan, 1999).

Post-independence, most of these cities have grown exponentially both in terms of land area and population. In most cases, this mushrooming can be attributed to administrative drives towards agricultural mechanisation and nationwide industrialisation with old colonial centres being the epicentre of this industrial development due to the availability of an established trade and transport infrastructures. Postcolonial administrations undertook these monumental development projects from a desire to modernise and have these cities become national economic hubs whilst simultaneously rebranding the city, and by extension the nation, as postcolonial powerhouses of development, throwing off the yoke of their old imperial masters. The quote below encapsulates this ethos of iconic postcolonial development and the emergence of new national identities;

“In much of the postcolonial literature following the departure of colonial rule, a moment of euphoria among postcolonial elites who had hoped that colonial cities in Africa would be transformed into engines of national development, not just for the individual countries but for the continent as a whole. Modernisation projects such as airports, universities, hospitals, expansion of highways, hydroelectric projects, the construction of new civic buildings, new apartment buildings, banks, insurance companies as well as national theatres were undertaken by the postcolonial states and private individuals as markers of modernity and modernisation.”(Demissie, 2007, p. 2)

Additionally, in many cases, grand new capital cities were designed and built at a distance from the existing centres of colonial rule. The planning of these cities was in keeping with the *perceived* postcolonial identity of these new nations, with broad boulevards named after heroes of the various independence

movements and grand governmental buildings, whilst in the older parts of the city, administrations renamed streets, almost as if they were giving space a duality of identity (King, 2006).

The simultaneous State-sponsored processes of mechanisation and industrialisation resulted in the push/pull factors that have become so familiar to the narratives of postcolonial development today: mechanisation of landholdings meant fewer jobs in rural areas pushing the rural populace off of the land whilst industrialisation in urban centres has produced a need for cheap labour thus creating a pull towards the cities. As Demissie states above, projects undertaken were primarily of a civic scale and thus, in the case of many major postcolonial centres, limited provision was made for the resultant migrant influx into these cities. Lack of housing and infrastructure to manage this deluge of people led to overcrowding of existing housing and the establishment and growth of the informal housing sector. This has often led to the development of two parallel forms of development and governance: large scale formal sector projects sponsored by the state and the informal sector stepping in to bridge the gap between demand and supply of everyday services and facilities often functioning through a form of shadow administration with back alley deals and kickbacks which in turn has become the foundation of the complex relationship between land, voter base and political power in many developing urban centres.

2.2. Spatial aspects of community building.

Coakley (2003) suggests most ethno-nationalistic movements go through three phases; asking for the rights of the individual 'other', followed by an official acknowledgement of the distinctiveness of the group from the majority and finally the right to territory. This section of the review will look at literature associated with that appropriation, adaptation and contestation of a territory associated with a particular community. The discussion will also look at the socio-spatial implications of ethnic segregation - both good and bad - that are often the outcome of location within the city fabric and their spatial configuration.

Space syntax – a theory of space and society developed at the Bartlett - research suggests that most people belong to communities that are both spatial and transpatial in nature (Hanson & Hillier, 1987); inhabitants of an area are bound to the people, spaces and places that they physically inhabit whilst simultaneously being part of a larger network that is independent of the immediate physical context. The city-wide spatial structure of an organically developed city enables not only the cultivation of a sense of community where one lives but also allows for chance encounters with a larger virtual community⁴ thereby ensuring variety and security. Whilst this may be true of the spatial structure of the city and its general population, the focus of this study is specifically on what may be termed as the ‘urban ethnic enclave’ hence, the interest of this study lies primarily in communities that share both social as well as spatial solidarities. It will be seen through the process of the literature reviewed here, that despite a working correspondence between social and spatial solidarities, marginalised communities and locations often experience isolation that triggers discontent and conflict with the state, other communities as well as within the community itself.

2.2.1 Territoriality: Appropriation, adaptation and contestation of a space.

As stated earlier, the segregation of a community from the majority may be the result of force, choice or economic constraints. In the case of both forced segregation or segregation of choice, separation of a community is often the outcome of concerns of purity and contamination of space whether it is the case of purging the spaces of the majority by expelling or containing *the other* or the avoidance of contamination and dilution of one’s culture by distancing the group from the majority culture. These notions of forced or chosen separation appear to have nuances of positive and negative features to them; Peach (1996) suggests that there may be positive processes to be found in what is often seen as forced segregation as well as drawbacks to a segregation by choice. For example, what may have started out as a “fear of touching” and thus resulted in confining the Jewish community in Venice to the Ghetto, transformed into a

⁴ The virtual community is “the pattern of natural co-presence brought about through the influence of spatial design on movement and other related aspects of space use. (Hillier, 1996 2007, p. 141)

place where the community realised their uninhibited self with a degree of externally provided protection and without fear of persecution within the confines of the ghetto. The community established the very first permanent synagogues in Europe here where people dressed, interacted and worshipped as they pleased (Sennett, 1996).

Shirlow and Murtagh (2006), like Sennett, suggest that spatial segregation helps to manifest with greater clarity belief structures and other such cultural solidarities. In fact Sennett seems to posit that it was the physical proximity provided by the Jewish Ghetto that was instrumental in consolidating the Jewish identity of otherwise disparate groups whose only commonality was their Jewish faith in its broadest and most varied definition. This issue of proximity as a key factor in the emergence of identity seems to apply to the *Muhajir* community. As discussed earlier, this is a community formed of an amalgamation of refugee groups from diverse geographical backgrounds brought together under extenuating circumstances in a few choice locations, the socio-spatial outcome of which will be analysed and discussed further in this study. It should also be noted at this stage that this discussion does not claim that all proximities in a closed system will result in a natural sense of community. In fact, the literature seems to suggest that it simply facilitates a consolidation of ideas and values that the community in question already have in common; as in the case of both Catholic and Protestant communities in Belfast and the Jewish and German communities in Venice, thereby manifesting an apparent correspondence between social and spatial structures, which is only there by virtue of circumstance (or conflict, or force).

Communities where both social and spatial structures coincide are perhaps what has given rise to the misconception that placing people within a closed system will automatically give rise to a 'community' that will live and socialise together, coming together to defend their territory should they be threatened by an external force. Oscar Newman goes as far as to suggest that where society and space do not correspond, society deteriorates into a combative environment. Conversely, it has been argued that territorial warfare is a social issue of perceptions of difference, and not one of non-correspondence of space and society; "Thus segregated spaces are representational and designed

through exaggerated notions of social difference and complex patterns of exclusion that are tied to those who conform to defined symbolic and cultural codes within the 'home' territory." (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006), thus suggesting that spatial segregation is in fact the outcome of a social desire to maintain a distinct identity.

Whilst language, religion, politics etc., may give a community an ideology to band around, where numbers reach a critical mass, communities may establish and commandeer institutions and spaces to safeguard and perpetuate the above mentioned commonalities of culture and ideological thought as well as anchor them in and to a space, as these institutions now become viable and sustainable entities (Waterman and Kosmin, 1987). These communal institutions may include religious and political institutions, places of commerce - shops catering to specific cultural needs - places of recreation such as playing fields, local 'hang-outs' etc. - and educational institutions (Suttles, 1968). In fact, Vertovec (1995) argues, as seen in the case of Indian migrants to the Caribbean, the establishment of communal institutions for the preservation and perpetuation of a community's culture is a critical part of the resettlement process and becomes a stepping stone to the self-actualisation of the community both spatially and politically within the host environment. These institutions become critical to the maintenance of perceived differences; often facilities not available within the enclave, residents will either forgo or seek out in locations similar or sympathetic to the ideology of the user or in neutral territory (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). This preference of patronage is often driven by a fear of being confronted by an opposing group and in so doing; residents consolidate this sense of segregation and in turn, establish the edges of the group's territory whilst this quest for resources raises an awareness of their larger trans-spatial community.

Whilst Newman's 'theory of defensible space' may not apply to all communities, those communities tied together through affiliations of ethnicity, language, religion and/or politics may be seen to demarcate and protect their spaces. This may be through both physical markers such as flags, murals and graffiti, boundary walls, as well as rituals and traditions in the form of parades and processions. Like institutions, these are 'events' around which the community is

seen to rally and build its identity (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). Where numbers allow - and where both political and economic power lie in the hands of the community in question - transpatial ties of sympathetic communities may be further consolidated through various forms of media; newspaper, electronic media networks etc. The ability of any community to be able to establish these transpatial institutions ties back to Coakley's initial claim that any community will go from identification of the self as different, to the collective's demand for official acknowledgement of their distinctiveness from those that may be considered the 'norm'.

Through a process of 'chain migration'; a process of kinship based in-migration, segregated ethnic enclaves become self-sustaining systems where, even if the community is losing members through assimilation or out-migration, newer members of the community are being periodically inducted (Ballard, 2003). The enclave may serve as a place of acclimatisation where new-comers can find their feet yet have the advantage of doing so in a sympathetic environment. Seeing as chain migration is facilitated through kinship ties established in the homeland, often the spatial outcome of this process within the enclave is a replication of spatial proximities 'at home'. Over time, these self-sustaining systems have been seen to densify both spatially and population wise, but this periodic influx is only partially responsible for the densification and persistence of many migrant enclaves. In many cases these enclaves are densifying due to the low income jobs and poor living conditions of inhabitants of these settlements. These aspects that are linked to the spatial configuration of the area as well as an informal bias applied to the housing market make the ethnic enclave increasingly difficult to leave for older residents (Phillips, 2006).

Although the beginning of such an ethno-religious enclave may lie in the commonality of some fundamental ideas for the inhabitants, Shirlow and Murtagh (2006) suggest that this sense of spatial enclosure facilitates a conceptual control of ideas. They posit that a closed system used by a fixed group of people, means that surveillance becomes easier, facilitating the monitoring and removal of strangers. This in turn becomes the perfect environment for the cultivation of a paramilitary culture; domestic security groups take on the task of safeguarding ideologies under the pretext of ensuring

the safety of their fellow residents. Despite this policing of ideology and space, this does not imply that culture, identity and space are immutable and fixed. In fact Werbner (2005) suggests that herein lies the paradox; whilst new migrants feel the need to set themselves apart from their host community for the purposes of preservation of their culture, the definition of culture within these communities is fluid and constantly undergoing additions and amendments. In the case of the *Muhajireen*, this fluidity of migrant identities and ethnic definition is a feature that they use to their political advantage. The term generally applies to the Urdu-speaking city dweller but may just as easily be applicable to the 'oppressed middle-class' or anyone who has sacrificed "blood and lives for the sake of Muslim unity" (Verkaaik, 1994) thereby allowing for inclusions and exclusions at the whim of the minority group in question.

2.2.2 Ethnic enclaves: Location, Structure, and other such relationship.

The reasons for urban segregation of a particular kind and the socio-spatial outcomes have been discussed in the previous section. This section will discuss literature that looks at the physical form that segregation may take. This entails looking at the location at which these systems are often established within the urban fabric, their structure and finally the kind of relationships both of these factors perpetuate.

In the 1920s, Robert Park of the Chicago School of Sociology proposed that migrant communities undergo a three-phase, three generational process of assimilation; ghetto to enclave and finally out to the suburbs. The argument being that, with their upwardly mobile outlook to migration, within a few generations, migrant communities become 100% assimilated, and thus difficult to identify, within the host community. The persistence of various ethnic enclaves - Chinatowns, Little Italys, *Bradistan*⁵, etc. - and particularly the apparent permanence and preference of the African-American ghetto has, Peach suggests, resulted in a serious need to re-evaluate theories of assimilation and urban segregation (Peach, 2005).

⁵ This is a colloquial term for Bradford, a city in West Yorkshire, so named due to the concentration of a large number of residents of Pakistani descent.

The physical presence of an enclave can be said to potentially be the manifestation of a power relationship. Sibley (1995) states that the marginalised are often pushed to the peripheries or residual spaces of society, Madanipour (2004) similarly argues that whilst the rich can live wherever they choose, having access to all kinds of resources and services, the poor are compelled to live together in the marginal spaces available to them. Such spaces often but not always, seem to manifest themselves in the kind of marginalised locations in which one finds enclaves and ghettos that often house the poor (Vaughan and Geddes, 2009); isolated inner city sites that have been vacated by the native population for whatever reasons and/or at the city's periphery. Both of these seem to exemplify spaces and places where the majority will not be forced into a chance encounter with *the other* essentially making them invisible to the host community or quite literally occupying the peripheries of the host communities consciousness. It should be noted again that the process of spatial segregation is a complex issue with many variables.

As stated earlier, whilst the will of the majority may be one of the reasons that determine the location of ethnic enclaves, market forces too are often partially responsible for the location migrants may decide to settle in. As migration is often a search for better opportunities, migrant communities often gravitate towards established employment centres, hence the high migrant populations in various industrial and commercial cities. Resources are often limited, so accommodation is sought in locations that are both cheap and in close proximity to their place of employ so as to save on transport costs (Charalambous & Hadjichristos, 2011). This often has given rise to the establishment of migrant communities in inner city locations and/or at the periphery of the city, often in close proximity to industrial sites.

Vaughan & Geddes note that Charles Booth in his research on the East End of London often mentions that "larger scale obstacles in the urban fabric" (2009, p.7) such as railway lines impeded the movement of people through the city creating isolated pockets of settlement. This isolation gave rise to varying levels of social and economic well-being. This was further substantiated through spatial analysis carried out (Vaughan et al., 2005; Vaughan, 2007) that concluded that "interruptions in the grid structure significantly influence the

spatial configuration of a poverty area, giving rise to condition of spatial and social segregation” (Vaughan and Geddes, 2009, p. 10). Legeby (2009) in her work on the distribution of public facilities and shared public resources states that spatially segregated localities often have limited resources provided to them and concludes from this that, due to the lack of accessibility; the only users of these facilities are the residents of the area and not a mix of residents and visitors one would find in more integrated areas of the city. It appears that due to the finite nature of the users, the state often sees no reason to invest in the provision of public facilities, thus suggesting that urban segregation is further compounded by the unequal distribution of state provided resources, thereby assisting in the perpetuation of poverty in many migrant localities.

2.2.3 Role of public space in the ethnic enclave

Legeby's work took into account the location of the residents' work place and the 'urban life' of the area; the interaction of people in public spaces, which suggests that segregation is so much more than simply residential separation. As stated above, it appeared that the people frequenting and penetrating the area were primarily residents of the area. This suggests that similar to Hanson and Hillier's (1987) critique of the modern European housing estate, the segregated nature of these areas did not lend itself to the movement through these areas of non-residents. Thus the urban life of the area was dependent almost holistically - and insufficiently so - on the presence and movement into the area of only the residents thereby further segregating the inhabitants and heightening the sense of isolation of the residential community.

As Legeby states, segregation is not simply associated with the residential zone, public spaces within an enclave become important too as this is where the public cultural life of the community is enacted. Madanipour (2004) suggests that this may be simply because the community's own residences are small; hence the public domain is seen as an extension of their homes. Or conversely, it may be a space or means of showing dominance, or defiance, with regard to either the host community or other communities in proximity that may be vying for the same space (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006). Often, where public spaces are used by multiple communities, there is a spacio-temporal partitioning of 'shared'

space and its use (Charalambous & Hadjichristos, 2011). Additionally public spaces or publicly accessed functions within the enclave become pivotal to the sense of community that pervades an enclave. This is applicable to the role played by the eruv and synagogue in the case of Jewish quarters, the role of the church for the Italian, Puerto Rican and Irish enclaves in Chicago of the 1950s, the Gurdwara in Southall or a football pitch in Karachi's football crazed Lyari district. These spaces become repositories of collective memory and places for the re-enactment of myths and rituals important to the community, possessing a history unto themselves (Rossi, 1984).

As distance from these key communal spaces increases, it seems reasonable to posit that the influence of community identity should wane unless of course the community is spatially bound by a tangible urban edge such as a wall, railway, motorway, sea-front, etc. Where 'edges' between areas are not so well defined, one could speculate that ideology will dissipate, and there will be greater mixing of inhabitants. These ambiguous edges have the potential to become spaces of both dialogue between communities as well as a spaces of maximum vulnerability. It is here that maximum aggression against the other is prone to happen as these are spaces of minimum policing by the home community.

2.2.4 Militarisation of identity and space: Ethnic conflict and communal policing

The multiple features that result in socio-spatial segregation often lead to competition between minority groups for a finite set of resources. This competition may in turn lead to aggression between communities.

“Often forgotten, however, are the public spaces on the margins of the European city, on the urban periphery or the inner city. In poorer neighbourhoods, problems of living together in extremely difficult circumstances bring to the surface the harshness of disadvantage and difference. Here the inability of the residents to live together peacefully, and the failure of public organisations to deliver the necessary services, mean public spaces are at times major battlegrounds ...” (Madanipour, 2004, p 267)

The intention of this section is to build on social theories already touched upon regarding ethnic conflict and to now address the spatial aspects of this kind of combative urban encounter and the features of the configuration of the space that make policing by outsiders difficult. It should be noted here that ethnic conflict and urban violence are neither synonymous nor is the latter an escalation of the former, in fact, urban violence is a different mode of agitation altogether (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998). The widespread escalation in recent times of ethnic conflict and urban violence may be attributed to a number of factors; the politicisation of ethnic identities, the weakening and fragmentation of many states in a postcolonial world and thus their inability to maintain order through the legitimate use of force and the emerging spatiality of some ethno-political organisations - such as Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland and the MQM in Pakistan - to protect the rights of their people.

Whilst traditionally enclaves or ghettos are often the physical manifestation of a power relationship between communities as stated earlier, whether it is a majority vs. a minority or between two or more dissimilar communities, the above factors seem to suggest that a slow inversion of this power relation is taking place in certain environments. Often, within the enclave with the increased numbers and thus densities of occupants, politicisation of the ethnic identity due to hostility from either a majority group or other groups vying for the same resources, there is a militarisation of both identity and space. When this happens, the power relationship of majority to minority group is often inverted within the confines of the enclave where, in times of heightened agitation, state security forces can do little more than police the peripheries of the enclave - as was seen in the case of the Bradford riots in 2001. In that particular case, police were barred from entering British Asian majority areas in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley by rioting Muslim youths. As Peach states, "Segregation also provides a defensive protection from attack and it reverses the power structure of outside authority." (Peach, 1996, p. 267). Madanipour (2004) suggests that this is the result of a "sense of entrapment" in an environment that is limited both spatially - congested and with high densities - as well as with regard to the resources available to the inhabitants of the area. Shirlow and Murtagh (2006) argue that

in an ever changing urban context, ethnic violence is often a tool in the maintenance of communal differences and spatial segregation.

“Ultimately, division is not static but is being maintained within a world that constantly alters. Similarly, finding new ways in which to offend and be offended is crucial for the survival of disconnection between oppositional groups.”

(Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006, p.)

Whilst images one associates with ethnic conflict are often those of riots and petrol bomb wielding youths in Belfast, Bradford, the West Bank etc., ethnically charged aggression is far more varied as a socio-spatial event (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998). The nature of the act i.e. riots, targeted attacks, suicide bombings, rallies and parades etc. are as diverse as the groups they target. These may include the state or an opposing community or even turned inwards towards one's own community in an act of rabble rousing or disciplining deviant members. These, like all other aspects of a community's public life, take place in the public domain, and like all other social behaviours, it seems reasonable to suggest that the nature of the act would respond to the configuration of the space in which it is to take place. For instance political rallies may take place in parks and squares so as to accommodate larger groups of people, processions and riots are associated with the streets so as to allow for mobility and hit and runs and target killings are occurrences often associated with the narrow, winding alleyways of slum areas where a perpetrator can disappear, as was in the case of the rookeries of 19th century London (Evans 1996). These brief examples suggest that scale, accessibility, the ease, speed and means of movement within the space would be some of the factors that determine the kind of event that would play out in a public space.

As these are often acts of political intimidation, often against the state, one can speculate that they may occur in spaces that would be internally reasonably accessible, whilst being just out of the reach of official security forces. This could, in theory, be similar to the locations identified in housing estates in London frequented by teenaged youths for the purposes of intimidation and anti-social behaviour (Hillier, 1996).

As stated earlier, one of the features that further isolate migrant communities is the fact that both movement *through* and *to* these locations is interrupted, thus giving rise to spatially segregated pockets within the urban fabric. This seems to imply that there are a limited number of connections or means *into* and subsequently through the enclave. This impediment to accessibility would hinder the ease with which external security forces may be able to police an area. Thus, whilst these locations may be advantageous in hiding the other from the gaze of the majority, the same features afford protection and enable aggression that cannot be policed.

Often ethnic conflict and violence is a process of power politics over land and votes; land is real estate for development and the community occupying the area are a potential vote bank. Where possible, depending upon the strength of the community in question, the value of the land they occupy or the need for votes, political/community leaders will assist a community in acquiring public services and infrastructure.

2.3 Spatialisation of ethno-political identities

“Cities were often shaped by a survival instinct resulting in a tendency to exclude weak minorities, a need to reinforce group identity, and a desire for collective, passive defence.” (Calame and Charlesworth 2009)

The above quote seems to suggest that most communities that consider themselves distinct in some regard will project a sense of solidarity for the purposes of protection and as a show of some kind of power or control. As has already been discussed, in the urban context, this display of power politics often unfolds in the use, appropriation and manipulation of public space. This unspoken interplay between built/designed form and the manner in which people use these spaces can be described by distinguishing between the *social production of space* and the *social construction of space*, where the former is the material production of the space, i.e. the design of the built form, and the latter, the transformation of the space through people’s interaction and exchange which attribute the space with symbolic meaning (Low, 2000). This *transformation* of space in the realm of urban segregation and political

expression is often in the form of appropriation of space and the marking of the limits of a group's influence/jurisdiction. This may be achieved through a number of tangible means within the built environment, a few of which may include the above mentioned institutions and their built form, walls, gates and barricades, rituals and processions, and monuments and iconography.

Institutions, as discussed above, are fundamental to the development and perpetuation of a community's identity and are both notional as well as occupy physical space within the built environment of any community; a location from which they operate and from which they impact both the spatial and trans-spatial communities associated with them. Rossi refers to this physicality of architecture and space as the 'urban artefact' and suggests that through it the relationship of space and society is a didactic one. Whilst the urban artefact is an object designed and formed by communities for their use, its permanent presence within the physical environment of the community ensures that it impacts the manner in which its users perceive and encounter both it, the space around it, and the happenings within it. These institutions may be as diverse as religious or political beliefs or events, a preferred newspaper, a community sports team, dietary needs and speciality food stores etc. When these occupy space, this spatial dimension, it could be argued is as important a manifestation of identities and their boundaries as the notion itself. They may provide a connection between the diaspora and the community at 'home' - a cultural and religious connection between the centre and the periphery so to speak (Eade and Garbin 2007) . They often provide charitable support to both older, needy members of the community as well as familiarising new arrivals with their new environment (Kershen and Vaughan, 2013). In many situations, they take on the role of articulating and securing the rights of their members within their host environment. Their presence on the ground often becomes the physical centre for the community to congregate whether it is in the form of a religious building or community centre or a specialised market/cafe, depending on the nature of the community (Suttles, 1970; Vaughan, 2015).

In Karachi, the locations in which members of the community gather are often determined by age and gender; most public spaces are commandeered by men with limited spaces for women. The daily communal life of men will play out in

places such as the mosque, the local tea house - the eastern equivalent of the local pub, and/or spaces appropriated for local party meetings. Due to the density of the built environment and limited access to public open spaces, the street often plays the role of the playground where, after school, one often finds games of *gully* cricket being played by the neighbourhood children whilst, during the day especially in lower income communities, this space becomes an extension of the domestic domain.

Walls, gates and barricades are a physical means of segregating and defining the “other”. These may take on the form of the “freedom walls” found in Belfast, designed and erected for the purposes of limiting interaction and thereby preventing violent clashes between communities or, as in the case of Johannesburg as described by Dawson (2006) of the “militarised laagerisation⁶” of affluent, white, suburban communities. In both cases, the erection of walls or “urban fortification” demarcate territory and boundaries often with the intention of safeguarding residents, taking on the task of “urban policing” but unconsciously physically reinforcing notions of social and psychological segregation (Calame and Charlesworth 2009).

The idea of the gated community as well as the erection of gates and barricades around ‘sensitive’ sites is familiar in the context of a politically and religiously charged city like Karachi; due to ethnic and sectarian tension in the city, barricades and cordons can be found around *imambargahs*, mosques, and shrines, particularly during high religious occasions where large crowds are anticipated - *majalis*⁷ during the first ten days of the month of Muharram, large congregational prayers including the Friday prayers, *urs*⁸ celebrations held at significant shrines - military offices, the homes and offices of political figures, and the gated communities of the elite.

Rituals and processions may be either civic or religious in nature but in both circumstances they are a public expression of a group identity irrespective of

⁶ A *laager* is an Afrikaans term for a defensive encampment encircled by armoured vehicles, thus this term in the modern context refers to the excessive securitisation of affluent gated communities in South Africa.

⁷ A gathering to remember Imam Hussain and the Ahl al-Bayt (family of the Prophet Muhammad) especially during Muharram.

⁸ Feast day or festival commemorating a saint.

whether they are to encourage participation such as a carnival parade or induce a sense of submissiveness and awe as is often the intent of a military parade. In the case of migrant communities, these may be rituals or processions in some way associated with the country of origin or a display showing a conscious break from old traditions as in the case Polish, Congolese and Bangladeshi migrants in London (Eade and Garbin 2007; Garbin 2005). This public display in space is a projection of a collective identity in a public arena and is often used for the purpose of community building and generating a sense of solidarity. Simultaneously, appropriation of space in the public domain is a show of power or, as in the case of migrant communities, a momentary inversion of an established power structure, where the community in question has tacit permission to commandeer a public space for the purposes of their ritual (Turner, 1995). Whilst in some cases this appropriation may be considered a challenge or a threat, Madanipour (2004) suggests that when public spaces are used as sites of display and performance and allow for the simultaneous and public display of difference, they provide for the well-being of the resident population of the area.

The Muharram processions in both Karachi and Mumbai are good examples of a situation where a minority is given precedence in a space; both processions take place in the inner city areas of both cities, main thoroughfares are cordoned off and public access to non-participants is limited. City officials provide security so as to allow the procession the right of passage. These processions are held primarily by the various Shiite communities of the city with limited participation by other religious sects as a mark of respect (Inskeep 2011, Masoudi). Similarly, the commandeering of streets and parks for the purposes of political rallies and meetings are a common occurrence where the scale of such meetings range from the neighbourhood level, where the street is the only option for public gathering as the domestic space is limited, to a city level where party leaders address large crowds of followers. The use of significant public spaces in Karachi such as Jinnah Park, Nishtar Park, the grounds of the Quaid's Mazaar and M.A. Jinnah Road - one of the city's main thoroughfares leading to the port - for the purposes of rallies, is a means of not only making one's presence felt, but also a show of strength - a means of saying "we can

occupy this space if we wish to". The use of the grounds of Mohummad Ali Jinnah⁹'s shrine - also known as *Quaid-i-Azam ka Mazaar*¹⁰ - being particularly significant in the political context as this becomes a means of establishing a sense of continuity with the original political cause. This gives weight to the notion that spaces like parks and recreational grounds, locations that are perhaps not as well integrated as the market place, become ideal ceremonial locations, providing the perfect platform for spectacle and the development of a socio-cultural identity.

Monuments and iconography may be associated with religious events or political jurisdiction in the form of flags and banners, the appearance of graffiti and the display of other forms of political propaganda incorporating recognisable party imagery, and commemorative landmarks in the urban landscape. Often a greater concentration of such interventions implies a similar concentration of adherents to the cause and as such reflects readable shifts in power as one moves through the urban environment.

Again in the context of the commemorative events associated with Muhharam, Masoudi refers to the increased use of flags, decorations, and *sabils* - refreshment stands - the closer one gets to the ceremonial centres of the Dongri area in Bombay. This is the area where most Shiite rituals are carried out commemorating the massacre of Imam Hussain and his family at Kerbala during the month of Muharram. Similarly, especially during election time and significant dates within a party's own calendar, one finds loyal localities decked out in party colours and billboards depicting party leaders in inspirational poses.

In light of the above discussion, one may posit that political expression in space may be divided into a few broad actions; a physical political presence as part of the built environment in the form of offices, barricades and other security measures, political propaganda in the form of flags, banners and iconography, and a political activity within the built environment in the form of meetings, rallies, and "patrols" by armed youths – often found in low income neighbourhoods - that make a show of safeguarding a neighbourhood as a form

⁹ Considered the founder of the nation and Pakistan's first Governor General after Partition.

¹⁰ "The tomb of the great leader"

of vigilante justice (Smith and Low 2006) whilst the intent may be more in the way of discouraging behaviour that may in anyway undermine the supremacy of the local authority (Brubaker and Laitin 1998), whatever form that authority may take be it secular or religious.

As has been seen by this review, the spatial clustering of a community is a multifaceted urban phenomenon where the establishment, maintenance and persistence of the ghetto, ethnic enclave and the gated community have as much to do with socio-cultural and socio-economic reasons as they do with space. The inherent qualities of these spaces and how they relate to the city as a whole are critical to the 'where' and the 'how' of the processes of establishment and persistence of spatial clusters, and proximities, densities and separations in and of space bare an impact on community identity. Space syntax as a theory attempts to objectively and mathematically describe and analyse these inherent characteristics of spatial patterns in a system independently of any other variables such as economics or culture, viewing the system as a set of relationships between all spaces and all other spaces.

Space syntax is a theory and a set of tools developed to describe and analyse architectural and urban space by modelling spatial relationships as a continuous spatial network in the form of the fewest and longest intersecting lines of visibility and permeability. This means of modelling spatial networks facilitates a mathematical analysis of the relative accessibility between all spaces and all other spaces within a system. Those with the highest accessibility are termed as being highly integrated whilst those with the lowest accessibility are regarded as segregated. For the purposes of graphic representation, these mathematical values have been placed within a colour spectrum of red to blue where highly accessible or integrated line segments appear as red and those that are segregated appear as blue.

Space syntax research has shown that spatial configuration has had an impact on a wide array of urban phenomenon; urban segregation and deprivation in the East End of London (Vaughan et al, 2005, Vaughan and Geddes, 2009), unequal urban development and the lack of co-presence in public space in migrant localities in Stockholm (Legeby, 2010), the distribution of landuses in

informal settlements and spatial distinctions between co-present ethnic communities (Khan, 2003; Raman, 2003, Charalambous and Hadjichristos, 2011). This shows how social phenomena can be investigated through space and be analysed as spatial phenomena. In this study too, space syntax has played a key role in deconstructing the relationship between the social behaviours and spatial patterns of *Muhajir* presence in Karachi.

3.

Methodology: data, mapping and process

3.0 Introduction

In the case of this study, it is important to keep in mind that this research was being conducted on and in an environment where up-to-date ethnographic data is limited. Hence, alternative methods of describing and analysing the mutual spatial, social and political impact the *Muhajir* community and the city have had on each other had to be devised. In a sense, this study may be considered an exercise in mapping the spatial identity of a community and understanding the implications of this spatialisation on urban form and vice versa. It should be noted that the city's history of ethnic politics and violence and the increasing securitisation of urban space especially in and around the MQM's headquarters suggests that this is a community that believes itself to be under threat. Where an urban environment is divided along ethno-political fault lines and social differences are exploited by political players, it seems reasonable to suggest that urban features that assist in the building and maintenance of identities and notions of jurisdiction, catchment, boundaries and disputed territories become significant features of both the social and spatial landscape. It is these aspects of the space-society relationship that this study has focused on in order to compensate for the lack of comprehensive, conventional ethnographic data sets, thus developing a methodology that layered different categories of information to present as complete a spatial picture of *Muhajir* presence and activity as was possible.

The interdependent nature of the relationship between space and society in a study on contested space and spatialised ethno-political identities lends itself to a space syntax approach, where the methods developed make it possible to

correlate social data with spatial configuration. Simultaneously space syntax tools allow for the analysis and identification of the inherent qualities of spatial configuration that make one space more attractive to certain functions and features than others. In this particular case space syntax analysis was used to analyse not only the transformation of the city but also to investigate and understand the role played by spatial configuration in the emergence of socio-spatial behaviours within the settlement.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first of these deals with the data sources used, the second describes the structuring and preparation of data and the third describes the analyses used. Table 3.1 shows this process and how it relates to the questions posed in each chapter of this study.

3.0.1 Socio-political background to the methodology

Before engaging with the methodological choices made in this study, it is important to provide some socio-political background on both the structure of Pakistan's several major ethnic groups, all of which have a sizeable presence in the city, and Karachi's electoral patterns.

Whilst the idea of Pakistan has often been presented as a homeland for the 'Indian Muslim' giving a distinctly Islamic undertone but, as stated earlier, it was envisioned as a federation of multiple nations (Devji, 2013). It was composed of, at the time of Partition, four broad *nationalities* where the characteristics of a nationality are defined as "common territory, language, mentality, cultural features and customs and traditions." (Ahmed 1998). By this definition the Baluch, Pakhtun, Punjabi, and Sindhi are all to be considered nationalities and Pakistan may thus be considered a multinational state. Both Ahmed and Devji argue that ethnicity is not contingent upon an association to a territory as opposed to notions of nationality and statehood. Thus, in recent times, the *Muhajireen* have argued that there is a need to acknowledge and add the *Muhajir quam* as Pakistan's fifth ethnic group. This identity, they believe has developed on the grounds of their shared language (Urdu) and profile as middle-class, professional urbanites, and further consolidated through their

shared sense of sacrifice and subsequent victimisation as a skilled minority group¹¹, through Pakistan's short history.

On closer examination, it can be seen that Pakistan's other ethno-territorial units have historically been structured quite differently from both the *Muhajireen* as well as each other, being predominantly rural, clan/tribe-based societies. The Baluch owes ultimate loyalty to his tribal chief or *Sardar* thus making Baluchi society quite hierarchical where the final decision of all tribe related concerns lies with the *Sardar*. The Pakhtun is independent and egalitarian with decisions taken through consensus by a council of elders known as a *Jirga*. Whilst historically, the Baluch have been pastoral nomads, the Pakhtun on the other hand are farmers and are therefore tied to the lands they farm; hence the old local saying that a Pakhtun without land cannot be considered a true Pakhtun (Titus 1998). Feudalism has been the dominant structure in rural Sindh, where the farmer or *hari* is not only tied to the land but also bonded to his landlord or *Wadera/Jagirdaar* thus giving rise to the traditional portrayal of Sindhis as submissive, intellectually slow, and lazy (Verkaaik 2004). In addition to this, in the case of the Sindhis prior to Partition, there appeared to be a rural/urban split on the grounds of religion; urban Sindh was the territory of Sindhi Hindus whilst rural areas were primarily Muslim. Hence upon Partition, the professional and cultural void left in urban society by the departing Sindhi Hindu population was filled by the already urbanised *Muhajir* population, many of whom subscribed to the Barelvi Sunni Muslim school of thought or hailed from Shiite backgrounds.

As discussed earlier, types of communal institution are pivotal in the building and/or maintaining of an identity and a community. Vertovec argues that the establishment of the Indian community in the Caribbean went through a four phase process of "social and cultural development", these were; (i) migration and settlement, (ii) the establishment of ethnic/religious institutions, (iii) the crystallisation of their aspirations in party politics and finally, (iv) after a period of decline, the identity went through a phase of rejuvenation (Vertovec, 1995) thus highlighting both the importance of the establishment of institutions to the

¹¹ *Muhajirs* make up only 6% of Pakistan's total population despite the fact that they comprise just under 50% of Karachi's current population

process of integration as well as the natural transformation of a minority identity into a political one.

In the political context, most Pakistanis use religion and ethnicity as their primary motivators of self-definition. Thus in Karachi, the major political players at the time that this project was undertaken were the *Muttehaida Quami Movement* (MQM) representing the *Muhajir* community, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) representing the Sindhi/Baluchi speaking communities and the *Awami* National Party (ANP) representing the Pakhtun community, and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) generally favoured by the Punjabi community (Hasan, 2005, Gazdar and Mallah, 2013).

Several types of parties exist; elite-based, mass-based, ethnicity-based, electoralist parties, and movement parties (Gunther and Diamond 2003). From this understanding, political parties in Pakistan can be slotted into perhaps two broad categories; mass-based parties - both religious and secular - and ethnicity-based parties. The MQM started as a secular ethnic party; i.e. where the particular concerns of a certain ethnic group are central to the interests of the party (Chandra 2011). In recent times though, MQM has attempted to make a concerted effort towards becoming a party that appeals to the underprivileged, urban masses irrespective of ethnicity but this has been to limited success. A characteristic of most mass-based parties is that the bulk of their vote bank comprises of the working class - (Gunther and Diamond, 2003) which has been important to a political group whose primary voter base is middle-income city-dwellers.

Finally it should be noted that the MQM has – until recently – a strict three-tier political hierarchy. Nine Zero, their country-wide/city-wide headquarters located in a middle-income residential neighbourhood in central Karachi, at the top of the political pyramid, under which there are twenty-six Sector office located across the city, each of which oversee up to ten Unit offices which are active at the neighbourhood scale. The sector and Unit have a physical presence within the communities they represent making them an appropriate, mappable proxy for *Muhajir* presence in an area.




Table 3.1 shows the methodological processes from data sources used to analysis performed for each set of questions posed in each of the analysis chapters of this thesis.

3.1 Data Source: shortage, scarcity and resolution of urban and socio-economic data

As stated earlier, Pakistan is a research environment in which there is a severe shortage of accurate and detailed data, as a result in order to conduct this study, the research had to bring together a diverse array of source materials, identifying and documenting a series of socio-spatial proxies as being demonstrative of *Muhajir* presence and using both quantitative and qualitative methods. These sources can broadly be placed in four categories; historical documentation, broad statistical data sources, social media and open-content mapping and on-site observations and documentation

3.1.1 Historical development related documentation

Two different kinds of historical documentation was utilised; official plans and maps and historical and anecdotal accounts. Plans and maps included documentation pertaining to four of Karachi's five masterplan proposals, municipal plans showing the location of amenities, plot sizes and street layouts, and old guide and tourist maps for the city. References to the development of places and communities were also taken from historical accounts and the personal memoirs of long-time Karachi dwellers.

3.1.2 Broad Statistical data sources

For administrative purposes, Karachi has been divided into five districts – East, West, Central, South and Malir. Electoral constituencies, both national and provincial, are determined on the basis of this delimitation which is revisited after each census and prior to each general election. Published census results for the most recent census conducted in 1998 and electoral data¹² for Karachi was aggregated and made available at the scale of these five large districts. For the purposes of this study census data pertaining to mother-tongue spoken per household has been used from both the census conducted in 1951 and 1998. Urdu as a mother-tongue has been considered indicative of a *Muhajir* household in this study. Voting in Karachi, as has been described earlier in this

¹² www.ecp.gov.pk/

study, is primarily along ethnic grounds with Sindhis and Balochis historically voting for PPP, Punjabis voting for the PML, Pakhtuns voting for ANP and *Muhajirs* voting primarily for the MQM (Hasan 2005; Gazdar 2011). In light of this distinct voting practice, electoral data for various elections, both general elections as well as local government, from 1988-2008 have been used and mapped at a district level. Table 3.2 shows the population and area break up the five districts as per the census of 1998.

District	Population	Area sq. km.
West	2,105,923	912.91
Central	2,277,931	62.862
South	1,745,000	90.788
East	2,746,014	176.153
Malir	981,000	2375.532

Table 3.2 shows the population and area break-up for the five district of Karachi. Data has been taken from the census of 1998.

3.1.3 Social media and open-content mapping

Beyond the broad categories of ethnographic data available in the form of census and electoral results, the *Muttahida Quami Movement* (MQM) has made a conscious effort to have an internet presence both on various social media sites such as facebook and twitter as well as by maintaining an up-to-date website¹³ of its own documenting the activities of most of its Sectors and broadcasting developments within the party. These have proven to be rich sources of data providing significant leads and connections in the early stages of this project when no real ethnographic data was available. Open-content collaborative mapping websites such as Wikimapia and Google Earth have been critical to the tracking and subsequent plotting of MQM Unit offices, Bareilvi mosques and Shi'a *imambargahs* the locations of which were later verified through municipal maps, on-site observations and confirmation from the MQM's HQ in Karachi.

¹³ www.allaboutmqm.org




Fig. 3.01. MQM's social media presence illustrated by the numerous facebook and twitter accounts attributed to the various committees of the party.

3.1.4 On-site documentation: questionnaires, in-depth interviews and political propaganda

Whilst the internet and the local media have been quite successful in projecting and documenting *Muhajir* identity and subsequently the MQM and its dominance as a political force and a homogenous entity, it should be noted that the community was in fact an amalgam of sub-groups that have built an identity around shared experiences and beliefs, spatial densities and proximities, and the resultant development of peer groups. To gather data on how the community functions from within as opposed to how it is perceived from the outside and to assess whether the original sub-groups still exist, on-site documentation was carried out in the form of interviews and questionnaires generating data from residents of two of the cases studies. Additionally documentation of political propaganda found in three of the cases studied was also carried. This was done by systematically moving through the settlements street by street and making a note of the kind of political propaganda; i.e. graffiti, flags, posters or billboards present as well as documenting which party these belonged to.

3.1.4.1 Interviews

The intention was to identify and interview members of the community with a long standing association with the areas under study in the hope that they would be able to provide an in-depth oral history of how the area had changed and grown. As many of these localities are amalgams of *colonies* inhabited by smaller communities, all efforts were made to ensure that the interviewees for

this purpose were representative of this sense of ‘communities within the community’. Interviewees included long established traders, local educators, and community elders - people associated with local residents’ committees and political leaders – the local ‘Sector Incharge’¹⁴ -. To provide a more holistic view of this development, the study also benefitted from an ‘outsider’ perspective; many of these settlements are bordered by different ethnic communities that in some cases are older than the settlement itself. Under the current political situation in the city, the relationships that have developed over time between these communities due to these adjacencies oscillate between mutually beneficial to all out gang warfare within a matter of days. Hence their view as an outsider provided an insight into the counter argument for the prevalent ethnic animosities in the city.

3.1.4.2 Questionnaires

The questionnaires were designed to develop a socio-spatial/socio-economic description of the study areas as they are experienced and perceived by the residents of the settlements today. This entailed respondents completing a questionnaire that provided some basic details about themselves (gender, age, educational background, etc.) as well as some spatial data related to how they perceived their environment. On a map included in the questionnaire, respondents were requested to demarcate the following a la Dalton (2007):

- Their home,
- The edge of ‘their neighbourhood’ or *mohalla*,
- Local market areas they frequent,
- Sites they socialise outside of their own homes.
- Parts of the settlement they frequent,
- Areas they feel unsafe/threatened and hence avoid,
- Institutions/places they believe to be the “centre” of community activity, if any.

For a copy of the questionnaire distributed on site and the interview questions please see Appendix B.

¹⁴ The Sector Incharge is a senior MQM activist who heads up the local Sector office and is local to the area and therefore familiar with its residents and mechanics.

The questionnaire had to be translated into Urdu for the ease of the respondents and was designed to be completed in 10-12 minutes. The questions were designed so as to help develop a spatial description of the various neighbourhoods through a consensus of perceptions of the residents that would then be analysed through a correlation of these polygons to the segment analysis of the settlement. Whilst this onsite means of mapping perceptions of space seemed innocuous to the researcher, the results of this part of the survey suggest otherwise as respondents were reluctant to answer this question.

The intention behind the use of questionnaires and interviews as a means of data collection was to address the issue of boundaries and edges between communities. This is a feature of the city, like the study itself that functions at changing scales; in this case it not only relates to zones that demarcate *Muhajir* vs. non-*Muhajir*, but also speaks to the notion of sub-communities within the larger umbrella of both *Muhajir* identity as well as *Muhajir* space. This aspect of the study was designed to not only help to begin identifying discrete socio-spatial zones but also to begin discussing whether these boundaries are absolute both socially as well as spatially or 'fuzzy' thereby giving rise to spaces of physical and ideological ambiguity and negotiation.

3.2 Data preparation

Many of these data sources were in a format that they could not provide any spatial insight into the presence and activities of the *Muhajir* community or their relationship to the city and urban form. Thus this data had to be synthesised into a mappable format (see Appendix B for examples of on-site documentation in the study areas).

3.2.1 Historical Timeline

This aspect of the study was designed to highlight the overlaps between the intangible government agencies/institutions/political entities whose decision making powers have impacted the growth and development of the city, the physical urban outcomes of these decisions and, significant ethno-political

events ranging from the local, to the internationally. In order to capture the simultaneity and reciprocity of these events, a timeline charting Karachi's ethno-political, spatial and developmental histories from Partition to the present day was developed. The choice of political events represented was determined by a process where in the case of national or international events, if it was felt that there was a knock-on effect in Karachi such as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that resulted in the arrival of Afghan refugees, such events/policies were included. With regard to Karachi's local politics, if events/policies were repeatedly referred to in literature discussing the *Muhajir* community and the emergence of this ethno-political identity such the Language Riots of 1972 or the Pakhtun/*Muhajir* clashes of 1985/86, these were included and are therefore subjective to a degree. The spatial and development aspect of this timeline includes proposed masterplans, housing policies, and the development of housing and transport projects. For complete timeline, see Appendix C

3.2.2 Diachronic Spatial network models

A diachronic approach to spatial network modelling in order to analyse the changing structure of the city as it grows over time has previously been applied to space syntax analysis of cities as diverse as New York and Barcelona (Al Sayed et al., 2009), Dhaka (Khan and Nilufar, 2007) and Izmir (Can et al., 2015). In the context of Karachi,

In order to develop a similar series of models for Karachi, at the outset of this project an extensive cache of GIS files was obtained from the Department of Geography at the University of Karachi. This included a partial road centre line map of the city in 2007-09 as well as land-use data documented at the scale of the neighbourhood block. Upon comparison of this road centre line map to images from Google Maps, it could be seen that whilst most streets in the city's centrally located planned settlements and major thoroughfares had been documented, many of the city's informal and low-income areas were missing and had to be added to the spatial network model using the accompanying land-use model and verified by satellite images of the areas. It should be noted too that upon comparing the amended spatial network model to open street map data found at the tail end of this study, it was found that the model

developed for the purpose of this study was more comprehensive than that currently available online. This completed spatial network model for Karachi 2007-09 became the basis of a subsequent series of models documenting the growth of the city from 1949 to 2009. These spatial network models were built through a subtractive process known as map regression as described by Serra (2014) to mimic the structure of the city as seen at various points in its evolution in images taken from land-use and transport network maps from Karachi's five masterplan proposals and old tourist and guide maps for the city dating back to 1949 (See Appendix A for images of the reference maps used). The presence of many of the city's areas in these models was further verified through references made to these localities in development reports and historical and anecdotal accounts.

3.2.3 GIS mapping of communal institutions

This is a study of the spatial manifestation of an ethno-political identity. Hence in order to capture the societal aspect of this community and, in the absence of detailed, accurate, up-to-date ethnographic data, the mapping of communal institutions particular to this community were seen as the best proxies for *Muhajir* presence. Waterman and Kosmin (1987) note that in the case of the migration of the Jewish community to north London, whilst the presence of a synagogue may not have been the initial catalyst for the emergence of a community cluster, once a critical mass was established, the presence of a synagogue, speciality food stores etc., became an eventuality and motivation for subsequent migration to the area and hence a means of locating a Jewish cluster. Similarly, in the case of this study, it was assumed that the presence of key communal institutions in an area were indicative of *Muhajir* presence. These institutions were identified through literature pertaining to the community and the various ideological features that make-up the community's identity; i.e. language (addressed through census data), religion and politics. Using a combination of open-content mapping sources – Google Earth and Wikimapia – as well as on-site observations, municipal maps and official sources, Barelvi mosques, Shi'a *imambargahs*, as well as MQM Sector and Unit offices were located and mapped in an effort to identify *Muhajir* areas. When using Google

Earth and Wikimapia, *imambargahs* and Barelvī mosques were identified using search terms and titles commonly associated with either of the communities being studied; i.e. the use of terms such as *imambargah* and *Barelvī* or *Barelwī* as suffixes to mosque names as well as terms such as *Qadri*, *Madani* and *Quba* as part of the name of the mosque.

A total of 98 *imambargahs*, 132 Barelvī mosques, 115 MQM units and 26 Sector offices were mapped. These were located on the street segment for which an address was available. In the absence of an official address, especially in the case of religious buildings, the institution was located on the street segment that satellite images or municipal maps of the area showed that the building appeared to be fronting on to.

In addition to the above mentioned communal institutions, it was felt that whilst the party office and religious buildings speak of institutionalised affiliations and formal interactions between ‘in-group’ members, places such as the local shopping area and the *chai-khana* or the south Asian tea-house provided spaces for social interactions of a non-institutional and informal nature. The intention was to capture the potential of such spaces for the co-presence and unmonitored interaction of both *Muhajir* and non-*Muhajir* residents in the area.

3.2.4 GIS mapping of politically motivated acts of violence

In the run up to as well as after the last general elections on the 11th of May 2013, ethno-political tensions in Karachi were high and various localities were hotly contested. As a result a number of politically motivated violent events took place with political groups targeting both individuals and institutions in an effort to gain the political advantage. This sadly is a common feature of the political process in South Asia and much has been written on the intimate connection between violence, politics and electioneering in the South Asian context where armed political activists and violent clashes between competing groups are the norm rather than an anomaly (Tambiah, 1996, Khan, 2010, Staniland, 2013). These events range from political rallies consisting of thousands of people that are monitored by riot police to *target killings* of political activists, politician and sectarian leaders - a form of drive by shooting common to the political

environment of Pakistan, to coordinated explosions at strategic urban locations. The occurrence of such events brings to light not only the relevant political actors and political rivalries but also, where these incidents take place within the physical geography of the city is of significance and the intention of plotting these occurrences was to identify potential troubled localities in the city giving political conflict a mappable spatiality.

For the purposes of this study, newspaper reports from three English dailies¹⁵ in Karachi were used to map bombings executed between 1st January 2013 to 31st December 2013 as well as shootings from 1st May 2013 to 31st July 2013. These reports included information pertaining to the type of attack, location, time and political affiliations of the victims, thereby making it possible to map with reasonable accuracy the occurrence of such events for the time period identified given.

3.2.5 Mapping ethno-political boundaries using political propaganda

Political graffiti, billboards, posters, and party colours and symbols adorning the city's thoroughfares and roundabouts are a common sight in Karachi. The paraphernalia of political campaigns in the Pakistani context is often used as a means of a party marking its constituencies or as a show of a neighbourhood's allegiance to a particular political group. The intention of including the documentation of such outward displays of political affiliation was another aspect of boundary demarcation; developing a tangible means of mapping the intangible notion of political jurisdiction of the various political groups active in areas under study. In the case of the MQM, depending on its size, settlements are often further sub-divided so that several Units are active within the same settlement but each with its own neighbourhood to manage, all in turn overseen by a Sector office.

¹⁵ The Express Tribune <http://tribune.com.pk/>, Dawn <http://www.dawn.com/> and The News <http://www.thenews.com.pk/>. The choice of these particular newspapers was due to the linguistic limitations of the research English being the researcher's first language and her grasp of written Urdu and other local languages being poor. Reference to local language papers may have further highlighted inter-group tensions and biases that English language dailies sometimes are not tuned in to.

Political propaganda was mapped at two scales; that of the city and that of the settlement. In the case of the former mapping was carried out along the city's major thoroughfares. Due to the area that needed to be covered and the pace of traffic along these thoroughfares, only broad political graffiti, major billboards and clusters of party flags were documented. On the other hand, in the case of the settlement, mapping for three of the four case studies was carried out from a street to street basis within the settlement, documenting graffiti, billboards, posters and flags. This data was then mapped in GIS softwares.

Table 3.2 summarises the main data sources used, how and where the data was gathered or accessed, and how complete and up-to-date it is.

Data Source	Where was it sourced from?	How was it captured?	How complete is it?	How up to date is it?
Digitised map of Karachi	University of Karachi – Department of Geography	GIS shapefiles that included a partial road centre line map and land use map of the city at a block level.	Partial road centre line mapped most of the city's planned areas and documented main streets in informal areas. The mapping of large informal settlements was completed by tracing over the land use map and images from Google Earth.	2007-09
Historical digital maps	Regression mapping using past masterplans and city guide maps accessed from a map archive at www.arifhasan.org See Appendix A for a complete set of images of maps referenced.	Applying a subtractive process to the 2007-09 spatial network model and using the historical/development maps as visual references, 3 additional spatial network models were developed.	Due to scaling issues related to the original maps, the use of these maps was purely visual to identify and confirm areas of development and growth in the city therefore historical spatial models may not be 100% accurate but give an idea of how the city and case study areas have developed.	1949, 1958-60, and 1972-74.
Electoral	www.ecp.gov.pk Electoral results from 1988-2008	Data aggregated at the district level.	Complete at both Federal and provincial level.	1988-2008 and now results for general elections held in 2013 are also available.
Census data	Last census conducted in 1998.	Where used, data was aggregated at the district level and normalised by population, e.g. in the case of 'mother-tongue' spoken/household.	Census data is complete but 13 years out of date at the time of initiation of this study.	Census data is complete but 13 years out of date at the time of initiation of this study.
Religious Institutions Mosques/Imambargahs	Google earth and Wikimapia	Points located as close to the location/address identified.	Case studies- Complete City-wide- Incomplete	Religious institutions and political offices plotted using online maps from 2011-2013 and verified on-site and through official sources obtain during fieldwork in 2013.
Political offices Sectors Units	www.allaboutmqm.org Party HQ and Google Earth/Wikimapia		Sectors - Complete Units, Case studies– complete City-wide – 60% complete	

Data Source	Where was it sourced from?	How was it captured?	How complete is it?	How up to date is it?
Commercial Spaces Markets Chai Khanas	On-site observations	Point features mapped on-site and subsequently digitised. See Appendix B for example of on-site mapping process.	Case studies- Complete	Fieldwork in Aug-Oct 2013 and Jan 2015
Industrial sites	Master plans – Greater Karachi Resettlement Plan (1958), Karachi Master plan 1974-85 (1965).	Industrial site polygons developed from masterplan images that can be seen in maps attached in Appendix A.	Complete	Industrial and newly commercialised sites documented up till 2010.
Commercial Streets	Report - “Land use planning for unsustainable growth: Assessing the policy to implementation cycle” (2010)		Case studies- Complete City-wide- Only those streets recently legally commercialised.	
Flyovers/underpasses	Newspapers: Express Tribune, Dawn, The News.	Point features located at the intersections these flyovers and underpasses are constructed at. See maps taken from newspaper articles in Appendix A.	All flyovers built and under construction till Jan 2015 have been included.	All flyovers built and under construction till Jan 2015 have been included.
Bombings	www.tribune.com.pk www.dawn.com www.thenews.com.pk	Points plotted from addresses found in newspapers	Bombings plotted from 1 st Jan- 31 st Dec 2013 (The year of the most recent General Election).	
Shootings			Shooting mapped from 1 st May- 31 st July 2013. During the General Election period.	
Employment		Point features.		
Social Activity	243 completed Questionnaires across two sites; PIB Colony and Shah Faisal Colony. See Appendix B for questionnaire form.	Tabulation – See Appendix B for complete tabulation. N.B. Figures presented in this thesis have been aggregated across the two case studies where questionnaires were completed.	Data taken from two case studies; PIB Colony 119 and Shah Faisal Colony 124.	Data taken from fieldwork conducted in Aug-Oct 2013.

Data Source	Where was it sourced from?	How was it captured?	How complete is it?	How up to date is it?
Political Propaganda	On-site observations	Mapping was carried out by hand along the city's main thoroughfares and the internal streets of the case study areas. See Appendix B for example of mapping process.	Case studies – street by street documentation complete for 3 out of 4 areas City-wide – Main roads only.	Data taken from fieldwork in Aug-Oct 2013 and Jan 2015

Table 3.2 summarises the main data sources used, how and where the data was gathered, and how complete and up-to-date it is.

3.3 Data Analysis

Due to the kind of data and the manner in which it was gathered, the process of pinpointing *Muhajir* presence and their socio-spatial impact was multi-tiered. This began with thematic mapping to provide the broad strokes, followed by cluster analysis to identify hotspots of *Muhajir* activity and finally establishing the centroids of these clusters to identify high concentration *Muhajir* neighbourhoods. Space syntax analysis was then carried out on selected centres to analyse spatial impacts and socio-spatial behaviours.

3.3.1 Thematic mapping

Thematic mapping was used as a first tier analysis in identifying *Muhajir* localities in Karachi. The aggregation of census and electoral data at the scale of the district lent itself to this particular kind of spatial mapping.

As stated earlier, census data was one of very few sources of ethnographic data available to the researcher at the onset of this study. For the purposes of this study, data used focused primarily on the *Muhajir* community otherwise categorised as households with Urdu as their mother-tongue, a linguistic categorisation that has been used as a proxy for ethnicity in this study. Further limitations of this data source will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

As discussed earlier in chapter 2, voting patterns in Karachi are broadly determined by ethno-linguistic affiliations and, from 1988-2013 Pakistan has had six general elections. Hence, whilst aggregation may have been broad for this particular data set, it spanned a fair amount of time and thus allowed for the identification of emergent voting patterns across the city. By generating thematic maps of electoral results for successive general and local elections across this 25 year period, it was possible to ascertain which districts exhibited a consistent or growing MQM majority.

Similar district level thematic maps were generated using the number of communal institutions per district. This process was used as a means of verifying ethnic and political spatial overlaps within the community.

3.3.2 Cluster analysis and the establishment of cluster centroids

GIS heatmaps or cluster analysis was used to articulate and examine concentrations of communal institutions. Heatmaps and hotspot analysis is often used to analyse the clustering patterns and occurrence of criminal activity and road accidents (Anderson, 2007) as well as estimating the optimum catchment for medical services etc. (Gibin, Longley, Atkinson, 2007). The heatmap feature in GIS geographically visualises densities of features/activities within a prescribed search radius. Thus this tool was used to generate a polygon that gave areas with high densities of *Muhajir* features a mappable form. Search radii tested were based upon the potential catchment and accessibility of each cluster of communal institutions, thus analysis for individual institutional types ranged in catchment from 800m in the case of religious buildings and 1500m in the case of political offices, and the final form was generated by merging all communal features. These heatmaps were then converted into contour maps where contours denoted areas of similar feature densities. This process provided a means of describing *Muhajir* clusters in the city and thus became the second tier of spatial analysis pertaining to *Muhajir* space. This was further refined to pinpoint *Muhajir* centres within this form by demarcating the centroids of the polygon where centroids are the geometric centres of the masses which in this case coincide with centres of the highest density of *Muhajir* communal institutions. Figure 3.02 and 3.03 are examples of the processes described above of using the mapping of communal institutions to generate thematic maps, cluster analysis and the establishment of centroids to describe *Muhajir* presence in the city.

A similar process was used for the mapping and identification of flashpoints of violent activity in the city for the election period in 2013. Cluster analysis was used to pinpoint high concentration areas and produce mappable outlines of troubled localities in the city.




Fig. 3.02. Left: Thematic map of Karachi's five district showing the number of *imambargahs* per district. Right: Shows a heatmap image of communal institution clusters.




Fig. 3.03. Left: A contour map generated from the clustering of communal institutions in Karachi pertaining to the *Muhajir* community overlaid on a spatial network model of the city for 2007-09. Right: Shows the outer edge of the contour map above and the centroids of polygon demarcating *Muhajir* centres within this area.

3.3.3 Space syntax analysis

As stated earlier, the use of space syntax analysis in this study is both multi-scalar and diachronic, being used to analyse both the growth and development of the city over the 65 years of its post-Partition history as well as to investigate the changing definitions, scales and relationships of *Muhajir* spaces in the city.

Through the subtractive process described above, a series of axial maps were developed documenting the growth and development of the city from 1949 to 2009. An axial map is a representation of a spatial network where intersecting axial lines - the longest and fewest lines of visibility and permeability in an urban grid - are drawn through all the spaces of the network. Using DepthMap

software, these axial models were converted into segment maps where axial lines are broken down into segments, a segment being a length of line from one intersection to the next, and a segment analysis was then run on these systems.

This analysis includes a number of space syntax measures, the most relevant to this study are Integration, Choice and step depth. Integration is the relative depth of each line segment from each other segment in the system within a prescribed radius. In simpler terms, it is the spatial accessibility of the segment, the more accessible the segment the higher the integration value and the lower the spatial depth. Choice (similar to mathematical Betweenness) is the potential of a segment to lie on the shortest and simplest path between all pairs of spaces in a system within a prescribed radius. Hence it is the 'through movement' potential of a space. Due to this, Choice often picks up the major through routes or thoroughfares in a spatial network, a feature that was frequently used in this research. The mathematical values attributed to each line segment for these measures are assigned, for the purposes of graphical representation, a colour within a spectrum from red to blue where high accessibility or integration appears as red whilst highly segregated lines appear as blue (for an example of this colour range see Fig. 3.04). In the context of this study, normalised Integration and Choice measures were used as this made it possible to compare results across spatial systems of varying size and scale. Step Depth calculates the shortest route from the selected segment to all other segments in the spatial network in terms of angular deflection of the segment – or turnings away from - where a 90 degree angular change is equal to 1. The weighting used in this measure is cumulative and therefore greater the angular change or greater the number of turnings away from the point of origin, higher the step depth value.

Space syntax analysis was used to investigate the transformation of the city; normalised Integration (NAIN) at radius 'n' (R_n) – the maximum scale of the city - was used to analyse the changing accessibility of various areas of the city over time as it grew and similarly normalised Choice (NACH), again at R_n , was used to analyse the change in the city's superstructure. At the scale of the settlement, space syntax analysis has been used to investigate the accessibility

and segregation of various sub-clusters within the settlement. For this purpose normalized Integration at smaller radii ranging from 250m to 3000m¹⁶ depending upon the density of the spatial structure and integration of the settlement within the structure of the city, was used. In this case, the average values of street segments in each sub-cluster within the individual settlements were compared with the average value of street segments in the settlement itself.




Fig. 3.04. Segment analysis, (NAIN Rn) showing city-wide accessibility in Karachi, 1949.

Similarly, normalised Choice (NACH) was used to investigate whether communal institutions were located on street segments with high through movement potential thereby beginning to address the relationship between spatial location and the social role various communal institutions play within their community. A similar process of analysis was applied to the location and occurrence of graffiti and political propaganda to assess which political player was occupying spaces with the potential for the greatest footfall.

¹⁶ In space syntax methodology network distances upto 800m are regularly used to analyse the local scale where 800m is considered a 'walkable' distance in that this is approximately a 10 minute walk. Similarly, 3000-5000m is considered to be the largest radii for which the spatial network can be considered without the impact of an edge effect (Vaughan, Dhanani and Griffiths, 2013). This range of values is regularly used in space syntax analysis.

Whilst the cluster analysis provided a means of identifying probable *Muhajir* majority areas and centres, by relating the location of the urban communal elements to the space syntax model of the city, it was also possible to study the relationship of the societal role of the type of communal institution with the spatial configuration of both the city and the settlement. This process allowed for the examination of the relevance of catchment areas, territorial demarcation, proximity and density of features and inter-feature relationships for the communal institutions studied; Bareilvi mosques, Shi'a *imambargahs*, MQM Sector and Unit offices, the local shopping street and *chai-khanas*. Hence this form of analysis enabled an objective spatial analysis of *Muhajir* space whereby underlying patterns of occupation, proximity, spatial configuration of settlements and functional distribution of land-uses were identified and explored in an attempt to describe the relationship between society and space.

3.4. Limitations of the research

During the course of this study, much of the development of the methods and data used has been the outcome of one major factor, the dearth of accurate, detailed ethnographic data. Whilst considerable information related to the initial settlement patterns of the community were found in the form of anecdotal and historical accounts and various development reports referencing the early post-Partition development of Karachi, little documentation was available on the current spatiality of the *Muhajir* community. As has been seen in the preceding discussion, some official data sources that could provide broad mappable statistical data pertaining to the *Muhajir* community were available in the form of census data and electoral results, but little else could be found. As will be illustrated in this study, these broad sources have been useful in charting and establishing changes in the city's demographic make-up and voting patterns but, due to the scale at which it was aggregated and the fact that the most recent census is quite outdated having been conducted in 1998, it was of little use in providing a detailed understanding of the spatialisation of *Muhajir* presence in the city. This resulted in the development of a methodology that identified and utilised alternative identity-markers as the primary means of tracking the *Muhajir* community. As mentioned earlier, Vertovec refers to the

establishment of socio-cultural institutions as an essential part of the process of migration and resettlement and both Vertovec and Coakley speak of the politicisation of migrant identities as a key step to resettlement. Additionally Waterman and Kosmin (1987) refer to the mapping of socio-cultural features such as synagogues and food stores particular to a minority as a means of tracking the presence of minority community as a form of 'surrogate data' or 'mappable proxies' as they will be referred to in the context of this study - to be used in lieu of detailed ethnographic data. As a result, the mapping of ethno-religious and ethno-political communal institutions became the primary means of locating the *Muhajir* community in the city today.

It should be noted that due to the processes by which these communal institutions have been mapped – using open-content data sources, on-site observations and local municipal maps – the cataloguing of institutions is unlikely to be exhaustive. Additionally this mapping should be viewed as a documentation of a snapshot in time; the establishment of communal institutions in the city is a dynamic process, new mosques etc. are set-up as the need arises, mosques change their sectarian affiliation depending upon the strength of the community resident in the area and Units may change location depending on the political stability of the locality in which they are situated. This is not to say that the use of these institutions to map the presence of the community is hugely flawed as correlations with historical data and the author's own understanding and experience of these areas suggest a reasonable accuracy to the method.

Whilst the issue of gender differences are an important topic in studying the use of public space, this thesis focuses on male-dominated space. This is due to the manner in which space is used and allocated for women's use in the context of a majority Muslim state. The spatial segregation of gender, a feature of many eastern cultures, is something that both Verkaaik (2004) and Ring (2006) refer to with regard to settlements in Karachi; men in the streets and entrance ways to the *mohalla*¹⁷ and other public spaces such as the community park or gym, whilst women inhabit spaces closer to the home; what Ring calls 'increased

¹⁷ The neighbourhood.

concerns with *pardah*¹⁸ in the city, combined with this class of women's limited geographic mobility' (Ring, 2006). Hence the presence of women in the public realm could be considered transient if at all and therefore difficult to monitor.

Issues of gender also impacted how and where the researcher was able to go in the city. Whilst being a woman made the researcher a less threatening entity in the field making conversations with most informants easier, it allowed access to environments that may otherwise have been considered off-limits to male researchers – private residences during daytime when only women are home and women only beauty salons - but simultaneously it hindered movement in male-dominated public spaces. In such cases an older male was required to escort the researcher to places like MQM HQ (Nine Zero) and other 'sensitive' areas of this study to provide a sense of protection and security.

Personal security and consequential access to fieldwork sites and informants was another unforeseen limitation to the study. In September 2013, a federal cabinet charged the Pakistan Rangers, a paramilitary force to conduct a security operation in Karachi. The rangers were to target individuals that military and civilian agencies alleged were involved in target killings, kidnappings for ransom, extortion and acts of terrorism in the city. Whilst the mandate of the operation was to target terrorists, many of the areas targeted were specifically MQM strongholds including a raid on MQM HQ Nine Zero in Azizabad resulting in the party claiming that there was a certain bias to the manner in which the operation was conducted.

One of the primary motivations behind sanctioning the operation was the rapid decline of general safety and security in the city in the months leading up to this exercise. This pervading sense of danger was to become worse once the operation was initiated especially in MQM held areas. This resulted in certain key localities for this study becoming inaccessible during the time allotted for fieldwork thereby limiting the quantity and quality of data gathered. This pervasive sense of instability was further reflected in the reluctance of respondents to answer questions pertaining to areas in their settlement that

¹⁸ Segregation of women from the public realm, both spatially where men and women will occupy the same physical space or by simply taking the veil (*hijaab*) whereby women are 'hidden' from the male view.

they considered safe and unsafe with many claiming that there was no safe space to be found outside of their own homes. Whilst observations and snapshots of public spaces in the case study areas were initially programmed, these had to be abandoned due to the volatility of the security situation in the city; a stranger taking notes in public spaces in a small settlement was liable to attract a fair degree of unwanted attention with an added threat to the safety of the researcher.

4.

The development and growth of Muhajir Karachi: A Diachronic study of the spatial distribution and the politicisation of identity and space of the Muhajir community in Karachi.

4.0 Introduction

This chapter will look at how the city has grown and developed through the last 65 years, argue that in the context of Karachi, ethnicity, politics and space are intrinsically linked and that this synergistic relationship has influenced the manner in which the city has developed and, through this process of articulating Karachi's socio-spatial and ethno-political histories, track the settlement patterns of the *Muhajir* community into and around the city so as to answer three fundamental questions about the *Muhajir* presence in the city. Are the *Muhajir* community clustering, as minority communities tend to do, in Karachi? If so, where are they clustering? And, how have these spaces and the community's identity been transformed through time and their changing socio-political and socio-economic circumstances? The hypothesis being that the *Muhajir* community does cluster and that this clustering has persisted from their earliest settlements established in Karachi shortly after Partition. And that through a combination of forced spatial proximity and real as well as perceived socio-political marginalisation by the State, this disparate group of political migrants have been able to generate and develop a cohesive ethno-political identity that today claims to be Pakistan's 'fifth ethnicity'.

This part of the study will provide an understanding of the impact the *Muhajir* community has had on the spaces and development of the city as a whole but, in order to do so, there is a need to i) provide a view of the context of the city in which they were initially located both spatially and socially, ii) appreciate the nature of the community and the various identity-markers that are unique to the community, iii) understand and track the decisions, whether political, social, or

developmental, that resulted in the city taking the form it has today and, iv) identify the role that the *Muhajir* played in this development and change.

This chapter will begin by presenting the data and methodology used for this part of the study; this section will identify and discuss the data and processes used to map and describe the evolution of the city, its people, their spaces and their politics as seen through the lens of the *Muhajir* community. The following section will describe the spatial transformation of the city and the synergistic relationship of politics and city development. The next section will elaborate on the evolution of *Muhajir* space and identity in the city since Partition. The last two sections focus on describing *Muhajir* presence in the city in its most recent iteration, attempting to define *Muhajir* majority areas and centres of *Muhajir* activity in the city today.

4.1 Data and Methodology

As stated above, this chapter is essentially divided into two sections, the first half dealing with the selection and development of appropriate spatial network models of the city and a discussion of the chronological development of both the city and its people, and the second half focuses on developing and implementing a means of mapping and describing *Muhajir* presence in the city today.

When discussing the kind of data used for the purposes of an ethno-spatial study such as this one, it is important at the outset to outline the limitations of the data available. In the case of post-Partition Karachi, despite the fact that five censuses have been carried out¹⁹ and just as many masterplan proposals have been sanctioned for which extensive background research was needed, there is still a shortage of available, up-to-date ethnographic data for the purposes of a community-based study such as this one. Census data is broad and outdated; the last census was held in 1998 and published findings of this census related to ethnicity such as mother tongue and place of birth of respondents are

¹⁹Censuses were carried out 1951, 1961, 1972 (delayed due to civil war which resulted in emergence of Bangladesh), 1981 and 1998.

presented at a district level where 'districts' are large administrative divisions²⁰ the delimitation of which is revisited after each census and before each general election often making this re-evaluation of boundaries a highly politicised process. Data aggregated at the scale of these large land parcels lacked the more nuanced communal divisions often found at smaller urban scales and that were required by this study. Hence, this had to be further supplemented with multiple alternative indicators of community presence each with varying degrees of accuracy. That being said, despite these limitations, the census data sets and administrative divisions have been used in the initial stages of this study to establish both broad cultural and electoral patterns and identify the broader regions of clustering for the *Muhajir* community. The use of spatial networks and the additional mapping of spatial identity-markers has provided a means of examining not only the city-wide distribution of the community but also a way of investigating the changing nature of their occupation as the city has grown and developed over time.

The chapter begins by looking at the chronological development of the city and argues that there is an intimate relationship between city development and national and local politics. For this purpose, data was drawn from multiple sources such as city's various masterplan proposals, development reports, newspaper articles, anthropological and historical studies, and anecdotal writings and memoirs. This data was used to develop a timeline plotting the occurrence of political events – international, national and local – as well as urban planning and development related interventions in Karachi. This helped to illustrate and identify the simultaneity and knock-on effect that political events have had on the development of the Karachi as well as identifying time periods when such events were clustering. This process became the rationale for developing a series of spatial network models of Karachi that most appropriately captured the city's growth and development from 1947-2011. The process of actually constructing the models themselves was informed by various guide maps and masterplan drawings from different periods of the city's history;

²⁰ Districts vary in area and population, the smallest, District Central being only 69 sq km and housing the largest population of over 2.25 million as per the 1998 census whilst the largest in area, District Malir is 2375 sq km and is comprised primarily of agricultural land and has a population of just over 980,000.

beginning with a GIS model of the city in its most current manifestation and working backwards through a subtractive process known as map regression, four maps showing the city at various points in its development to date were finalised. These periods are 1949, 1958-60, 1972-74, and finally 2007-09 (Fig. 4.01).

The latter half of the chapter deals specifically with the settlement patterns of the *Muhajir* community and again for this purpose, masterplan documents, historical studies, and anecdotal writings and memoirs were referenced as these showed that there was a discernible spatial pattern to the manner in which the *Muhajir* community was initially settling or being settled.

In order to gauge whether these initial clusters have persisted or if new patterns have emerged since their earliest settlements were established in the late 1940s and 50s, further analysis was required but as stated above, there is a lack of ethnographic data and whatever data is available ties ethnic-markers to large, administrative land parcels. Hence, in order to refine the definition of these clusters to smaller land parcels, reasonable 'mappable' proxies had to be identified from the community's socio-cultural practices. This approach was informed by previous research such as Vertovec's description of a four phase process of social and cultural development of Hindu migrants in Trinidad; i) migration, ii) establishment of socio-cultural institutions, iii) political mobilisation and iv) political decline and rejuvenation (Vertovec, 1995)²¹. Initial research on the *Muhajir* community suggested that this community too followed a similar process of migration and resettlement. Hence, upon further investigation through literature chronicling the community's ethno-political exploits, three such proxies were identified; language, religion and politics.

²¹ The initial phases outlined by Vertovec with regard to Indian Hindu migrant communities in the Caribbean whereby they established socio-cultural institutions are processes that Waterman and Kosmin's work shows have physical spatial manifestations in the form of religious buildings, speciality markets etc. These spatial proxies have been successfully used to identify minority community clusters.




Fig.4.01. Karachi, spatial network map, indicating four phases of major expansion after 1949. Each phase of expansion corresponds with significant social, political and economic events.

4.2.1 Spatial transformation: a historical overview of city development, migration and politics.

The city of Karachi and the *Muhajir* community have had a turbulent history over the last 65 years; both city and the community seem to fall in and out of favour with the federal government in Islamabad. As has been stated earlier, prior to its annexation by the British in 1839, Karachi was a small fishing village. Even after the patronage of its natural harbour by the British Raj, it was still only a small, cosmopolitan city of 450,000 at the time of the Partition of the Indian Sub-continent. The city at the time of Partition consisted of 4 distinct quarters: i) the “native town”, ii) the Saddar Bazaar and Civil Lines, iii) “Area between the two cities consisted of administrative and civil buildings and educational institutions”, iv) Lyari and Macchi Miani (north of Old Lawrence Road, now known as Nishtar Road) (Hasan, 1999).




Fig. 4.02. Karachi and environs, as mapped in ‘A handbook for travellers in India, Burma and Ceylon’ published in 1911 by Sir John Murray. The image shows the then locations of the native city identified as ‘CITY’ as well as the Saddar Bazaar and Civil Lines areas between which lay the Artillery Lines with the Cantonment to the east and Lyari Quarter to the west. This was the extent of the pre-Partition city.

In this already divided city, there was the additional layer, common to many south Asian cities, of communal clustering; this was the clustering of residents on the grounds of ethnicity, language, caste, religion and/or trade. Mughal cities in the Sub-continent were often divided along these lines (Lowder, 1986) and the native areas of Karachi, despite being relatively new, were no exception. It

was into this environment that the *Muhajireen* were introduced; and whilst they were geographically and therefore culturally and linguistically different to the various communities already resident in the city, they could not as yet be classified as a cohesive 'ethnic group' for all they had in common with each other, broadly speaking, was language (Urdu), religion (Islam) and a shared sense of sacrifice for a much awaited homeland and subsequent sense of marginalisation, victimisation and disappointment. That being said, the story of post-Partition Karachi is a narrative that comprises of numerous characters, whether migrant, 'native' or the state, and the politics of space and ownership of this economic hub and migrant city.




Fig. 4.03. (Clockwise from top left) a. the 'Native Town', b. Saddar Bazaar and Civil Lines, c. Administrative and educational centre, d. Lyari and Macchi Miani.

As stated above, in order to understand the role that has been played by the *Muhajir* community in the growth and development of Karachi, it is important to get an idea of how, why, and when the city has grown from a small, cosmopolitan colonial port city of 450,000 people to a highly contested, teeming metropolis of 24 million people today. For this purpose there was a need to identify when and where major spatial expansion took place, when major infrastructure and development projects were undertaken and what were, if any,

the social and political circumstances that induced these spatial responses. Any overlap between these features would in turn not only identify critical time periods in Karachi's history but also begin to articulate the possibility of a relationship between the development of space, the politics of that same space and the emergence of an identifiable socio-spatial *Muhajir* identity. This process of plotting the simultaneity of social, spatial and political events in the city's history became the basis upon which the diachronic study of the city was developed.


Graph 4.01, shows the plotting of the occurrence of four parallel sets of events: i) political events (international, national and city level), ii) Karachi based, large-scale administrative planning and development initiatives, iii) housing initiatives, and iv) transport developments. This graphic process articulated the fact that events across the four categories outlined above were clustering in certain time periods i.e. a number of events/projects took place or were initiated within a short time frame suggesting a possible knock-on effect e.g. Bangladeshi independence led to the influx of migrants leading to the rise in housing and development projects and inter-group tensions. The highest concentration of events (both political and developmental) occurred between 1956-61, then again between 1971-81 and finally between 2001-11. On looking closer, it became apparent that within these time frames Pakistan underwent major political changes; 1958 brought the imposition of Martial Law, 1971-81 saw the election of the first civil government in over a decade, the secession of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh, and finally the return of Martial Law, and 2001-11 saw the arrival of 'moderate enlightenment' under another military government. Each new political wave sought to bring with it a slew of developmental initiatives.

As can be seen from Graph 4.01, at various intervals in its post-Partition history, a total of five master plans have been proposed for the development and growth of Karachi, none of which were ever entirely implemented. This began with the MRV plan of 1951 (named after the Swedish firm that authored it, Merz Rendall Vatten), and was never implemented, followed by Doxiades' Greater Karachi Resettlement Plan (GKRP) proposed in 1958 at the beginning of Field Marshal Ayub Khan's eleven-year martial law. This was not fully implemented and

eventually abandoned in 1964 only to be followed by the Karachi Master-Plan 1974-85, proposed in 1968. Of the master-plans proposed thus far, this was probably the most insightful, seeing Karachi's growing housing and transportation issues as its key focus. Sadly, this too was abandoned to be replaced in 1989 by the Karachi Development Plan 2000 and finally the most recent being the Master-Plan 2020 proposed in 2007. For graphic reproductions of these maps, see Appendix A.

These events have been further synthesised in Table 4.1 to identify the periods of socio-spatial significance in the city's history and show the synergistic relationship between the growth of the city, urban development processes and projects and the ethno-politics of both those in government as well as the residents of the city.

As illustrated in both Graph 4.01 and Table 4.1, each master-plan was initiated by a new government and each proposal came with a new vision for the city that articulated the then government's ambitions for Karachi. It should also be noted that with almost each decade since Partition, Karachi has seen the arrival of a fresh wave of migrants; Partition brought the *Muhajireen*, the agricultural and industrial reforms of the late 1950s and 60s brought upcountry rural economic migrants from Pakhtun and Punjabi backgrounds, the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 brought the Bihari refugees during the 1970s, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 triggered the mass migration of Afghan refugees fleeing the war in the 1980s and finally the most recent influx, that of internally displaced people (IDPs) from Swat and Waziristan, the result of military operations in the area targeting terrorist organisations there.



Year	Political	Evolution of the city	Urban development outcomes.	Ethno-political outcome
1947-58 A Dichotomous Entity	Politically erratic, 7 Prime Ministers in a period of 11 years. Many hailing from migrant backgrounds until Martial Law is declared by Iskander Mirza, Oct 1958.	Influx of refugees, City as the Federal Capital. Karachi's 1 st master-plan proposed in 1951; the MRV Plan which was never implemented. A 2 nd master-plan proposed by Greek urban planner Doxiades at the request of Ayub Khan in 1958, the GKRP.	Formal developments made in the north and north-east of Karachi to settle <i>Muhajireen</i> . Settlements can be broadly classified as, Relief & Transit camps, Gov. sponsored Housing Schemes, Community initiated Housing Societies &, Informal squatter settlements. The Relief & transit camps and informal settlements were based in the city centre whilst new developments were located towards the north and north-east of the city centre.	<i>Muhajireen</i> were clustering in Northern and North-Eastern areas of the city; e.g. Liaquatabad, Nazimabad, North Nazimabad, Federal B Area, the housing societies of PECHS, Sindhi Muslim, Bahadurabad etc. and the squatter settlements on the northern banks of the Lyari River- Golimar, Lalukhet etc.
1958-69 The Golden Age	Field Marshal Ayub Khan/Martial Law	The so called "Golden Age", the city goes from being the Federal capital to the economic/industrial hub of the country. 3 rd master-plan proposal in 1968; Karachi Master-plan 1974-85.	Industrialisation results in influx of up country migrants into the city, Gov. decides to "decentralize population" and hence pushes squatters out of the city centre to new industrial sites at the periphery (Landhi-Korangi & New Karachi).	Transport monopolies emerge with preferential treatment of <i>Pukhtoons</i> exacerbating ethnic tensions. N.B. Pathan presence in the city can be confirmed by ethnic riots after the 1965 elections; Gohar Ayub leads a Pathan victory parade through Lalukhet and Golimaar.
1970-77 Cosmopolitan Or Divided City	Z.A.Bhutto	Bhutto envisions Karachi as a cosmopolitan international city similar to those being developed in the Middle-East due to the oil boom.	Coastal development projects, changes in FAR for certain areas to boost commercial activity and the emergence of the high-rise building,	Growth of squatter settlement with the influx of Bengali/Biharis after the "Fall of Dhaka". Politics of ethnicity kicks into over drive; Nationalisation, Quota System, Language riots, student politics takes hold of educational institutions, resulting in the emergence of the <i>Muhajir</i> student union, APMSO in 1978 at KU.
1977-87	General Zia-ul-Haq/Martial Law	Limited development, influx of Afghan refugees which in turn brings drugs and arms through and to the city.	Regularisation of informal settlements (1978). The development of high-rise apartment complexes in Gulshan-e-Iqbal and Gulistan-e-Jauhar by private developers; funded by ex-pats remittances from the Gulf States.	Establishment of MQM (1984). Ethnic tensions rise resulting in clashes between <i>Muhajirs</i> and Pakhtuns especially in the squatter settlements of Orangi west of the city between 1985-86.
1988-97 ('99)	Multiple Civil Governments	4 th master-plan proposed in 1989; Karachi Development Plan 2000. Ethnic politics,	Development of Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Scheme 45, Taiser Town and Gulzar-e-Hijri.	Operation "Clean-up" instigated (1992-94), MQM's top brass goes "underground", party chairman Altaf Hussain leaves Pakistan.

Year	Political	Evolution of the city	Urban development outcomes.	Ethno-political outcome
		Operation “Clean-up” (1992),		Areas like Lines Area, Liaquatabad and Golimar become “no-go” areas for gov. security forces.
1997-2007 World Class City	Gen. Musharraf at the centre, MQM heads the CDGK	Masterplan 2020 envisions Karachi as a “world class city and an attractive economic centre.”	Flyovers and underpasses, The LEW & Northern Bypass are built, Dolmen City is revived and Creek City initiated.	Emergence of new displaced persons townships in Malir and Hawkesbay. Further expansion and congestion of the city.

Table 4.1. Brief overview of Karachi’s political and urban development histories.

From 1947-59 the city was the Federal Capital of Pakistan and hence development took place to cater to this role in the form of secretariat buildings and housing for civil servants etc., whilst rehabilitating the vast influx of *Muhajireen* who were arriving at the same time. Figure 4.04 shows the city already beginning to push beyond the boundaries of the original city limits with what appears to be informal settlements beginning to emerge to the north and east of the city.




Fig. 4.04. Karachi 1949: The map shows that the city has already begun to push beyond the original city limits just two years after Partition.

In the sixties, Karachi was seen as the country's primary economic and industrial hub with industrial estates of New Karachi and Landhi/Korangi developed to the north and east of the city respectively (Fig. 4.05). Simultaneously, the implementation of green revolution policies in the agricultural sector and the construction of both the Mangla and Tarbela Dams in the north of the country resulted in the relocation of large numbers of up-country rural migrants, many of whom were drawn to large industrial centres like Karachi. Many of these displaced communities established informal settlements along the northern bank of the Lyari River whilst a number of settlements were developed around the industrial estates. Although there was considerable domestic migrant movement and political upheaval in the country, there was

simultaneously much development thus making this the so-called “Golden Age” of both Karachi and Pakistan. Development in the city boomed through the 1950s and 60s with the Saddar area as its cultural hub, and numerous cinemas, bars, nightclubs, billiard rooms and coffee houses all within just a few streets of each other (Hasan, 1999).




Fig. 4.05. Karachi 1958-60: The map shows that outward expansion of the city, much of it propelled by the location of large industrial units 20km away from the original city. Despite this expansion, the Saddar area continued to be the cultural hub of the city.

After the secession of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 and upon Z.A Bhutto assuming the Premiership of Pakistan, three important development related things happened in Karachi. Firstly the arrival of Bihari and Bangladeshi migrants resulted in the development of fully serviced, newly planned low-income settlements opening up towards the west in the city's Orangi and Qasba neighbourhoods. Once finished, these settlements ended up being too expensive for the low-income communities they were intended for but numerous informal settlements sprang up in close proximity to them, to accommodate the slew of repatriated migrants heading into the city, availing the infrastructure the state had put in place to service the formal schemes, giving birth to the largest of Karachi's slums or *katchi abadis*, Orangi Town (Fig. 4.06.).

Secondly, Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto vision for Karachi was that of a “cosmopolitan international hub” (Hasan, 2002), feeding off of the Oil boom²² in the Gulf states resulting in the building of a number of up-market hotels in Karachi’s city centre, initiating a higher-income coastal residential development along with the construction of a large casino complex by the sea, and the sanctioning of middle-income, mid to high-rise apartment complexes in the city’s north and north-east sectors starting the trend for apartment living in the city. Simultaneously, the government encouraged the development of Karachi’s industrial ‘eastern corridor’ beyond Korangi and Landhi by laying the groundwork for a second, smaller port; Port Qasim, and the Export Promotion Zone (EPZ), (Fig. 4.06). As the city expanded during this period, commercial trends shifted away from the traditional market spaces of the old city centre to *shopping centres*, leading to the emergence of newer commercial districts in places like Tariq Road just north of the old city centre and Hyderi in the city’s new North Nazimabad locality, thus possibly bringing on the decline of the old city.

²² The Oil Boom in the Gulf gave large numbers of migrant workers from South Asia the opportunity to work abroad, many of whom were single men living in austere conditions in order to remit as much of their salaries as possible to their families at home. Many eventually invested these remittances in the property market. Simultaneously, the Bhutto government saw Karachi’s proximity to the Gulf as advantageous, sanctioning large projects with the intention of catering to the entertainment needs of foreigners looking for a weekend away (Hasan, 2002). Both factors together resulted in a building boom in Karachi.




Fig. 4.06. Karachi 1972-74: The salient development features of the period were the growing informal settlements towards the periphery of the city, the industrial expansion to the east and west of the city and the movement of commercial activity out of the old Saddar Bazaar area.

General Zia-ul-Haq's military coup in 1977 brought this formal development to sharp halt. Bhutto was arrested on charges of complicity in political assassination, the constitution of 1973 was suspended, assemblies were dissolved and Pakistan's 4th Martial Law was imposed. The period 1978-88 saw not only the imposition of the *Hudood Ordinances*²³ and the subsequent decline of the city's cultural activities with bars, clubs and cinemas being forced to shut down, but also a massive influx of Afghan refugees, the result of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. During this period, whilst very little development work was taken place in the formal sector, in order to deal with the latest influx of migrants, the informal sector once again stepped in to bridge the gap left by the state in the realm of housing and transport so much so that a Presidential order regularising *katchi abadis* was issued in 1978 (Gazdar and Mullah, 2011). This led to the growth of informal settlements to the west of the city – Orangi Town, Baldia and most recently Ittehad Town.

²³ *Hudood Ordinances* are Islamic Laws promulgated in 1979 by General Zia-ul-Haq's regime. These laws advocate the implementation of Islamic forms of punishment for criminal offenses, addressing issues as diverse as property disputes to blasphemy.

The introduction of many waves of migrants each in close succession, vying for their share of the ever-diminishing resources of Karachi led to increased ethno-political tensions in the city during the mid-1980s especially in Karachi's north western areas; i.e. Qasba and Aligarh Colony, where this mix of communities came into daily contact. The Afghan War meant that drugs and arms were readily available in the city, the stockpiling of which was encouraged by the political leaders of the time leading to the militarisation of political parties and their student groups and a period of bloody ethno-politics and turf wars.

The decade following General Zia-ul-Haq's assassination (1988-99) was politically tumultuous for the country and city politics was marred by ethnic conflict between Sindhis, Pashtuns, and *Muhajirs*. This political upheaval was off-set by developmental stagnation; during this period the only notable development effort by the state appears to be the proposal of Karachi Masterplan 2000. General Musharraf's presidency from 1999-2007 led to political stability and encouraged urban development; a noticeable building boom seen in the form of numerous apartment complexes mushrooming in the city's central localities of Gulistan-i-Jauhar and Gulshan-e-Iqbal, and the extensive development of the transport networks - signal free corridors, Lyari expressway, Northern and Southern By-passes - facilitating rapid movement between the city's peripheries and the centre (Fig. 4.07). It should be noted that often due to where such urban mega-projects are inserted i.e. often very dense, informal, central areas of the city, the lack of availability of land and potential displacement of communities are critical hurdles to overcome. These issues have therefore made some of these transport projects quite political resulting in the resettlement of many inner-city communities to peripheral under-developed localities (Gazdar and Mullah, 2011) leading to loss of employment and education opportunities (Sattar, 2012) as well as issues of severance within communities that were permitted to remain.

Simultaneously this period saw the continued growth of informal settlements to the east and west of the city to a point where some estimates suggest that up to 50% of Karachi's population resides in informal settlements or *katchi abaadis* today (Hasan and Mohib, 2003), as well as increasing economic segregation that can be seen with the rise of gated communities in wealthier areas, as well

as the 'colonisation' by the wealthy of prime beachfront public spaces, and peripheralisation of the poor in distant settlements requiring a two hour commute into the city for work on a daily basis (Karachi Rising).




Fig. 4.07. Karachi 2007-09: The city today is a city of multiple signal-free corridors connecting the port to distant peripheries of which many are low income settlements housing almost 50% of the city's population.

4.2.2 Spatial Transformation: a syntactic interpretation

When syntactic analysis is applied to the spatial transformation of the city discussed in the previous section, it becomes possible to isolate and highlight some interesting socio-spatial phenomena. Analysing city-wide accessibility (normalised integration or $NAIN R_n$) in Karachi in its earliest post-Partition incarnation, it can be seen that the old city centre continues to be highly accessible and well connected as illustrated by the cluster of red lines at the convergence of M.A. Jinnah Road, Nishter Road and I.I. Chundrigarh Road and the Saddar Bazaar. But, along with this original centre, a new cluster of highly accessible street segments seems to be emerging north-east of the old centre in the newly redeveloped Jamshed Quarter. What perhaps makes this an emergent centre is the ring road created by the old historical thoroughfares connecting old to new (Fig. 4.08a). By isolating the top 8% of highly accessible

street segments at the city scale, this emergent pattern becomes more apparent as seen in Figure 4.08b.

The form of the city as seen in the plan of 1958-60 was in part the result of the partial implementation of Doxiades' Greater Karachi Resettlement Plan 1958-60. This proposal took into account the fact that the city at the time was to be the federal capital and hence broad boulevards and avenues were laid out to connect the northern areas where many of the civil servants and their families were to be housed proximate to the city centre. Again, an analysis of city-wide accessibility (NAIN Rn) shows that this superstructure appears to be the most accessible and well connected, connecting the centre to the peripheries of the city in the form of a deformed wheel (Hillier, 1989). It also seems to show that whilst the old city centre persists, the increasing connectivity and accessibility of the newer centre to its north-east appears to be pulling some of the structural emphasis away from the older centre. Additionally, the newer, peripheral informal settlements of Malir, Landhi and Korangi to the east and Baldia to the west, as well as inner city informal settlements along the Lyari River (many established by up-country migrants displaced by the construction of large dams in both Punjab and Khyber Pakhtun Khwah provinces) appear to be highly segregated, appearing as blue lines in Figure 4.09a. Interestingly, emergent affluent neighbourhoods in the north-west and south of the city, appear to be similarly segregated suggesting that the extreme ends of the economic spectrum appear to be living in similarly inaccessible localities. These patterns of accessibility and segregation of the spatial configuration of the city are better illustrated by isolating the street segments with the highest 8% of NAIN Rn values as well as those with values in the bottom 25%²⁴ as seen in Figure 4.09b.

²⁴ Whilst using the highest 10% of globally integrated lines to isolate the integration core of a city has been previously used (Khan and Nilufar, 2009), in this particular case using the top 8% and the bottom 25% of street segments for NAIN_Rn in this section was a decision that was reached through a process that may be considered a sensitivity test of sorts; a range of values at both ends of the spectrum were tested (the highest 10% inclusive) in order to see if it was possible to isolate i) the city's integration core and ii) the city's informal/unplanned/slum settlements thereby making it possible to study and understand the configurational and functional differences between the city's most integrated and least integrated street segments.

As discussed in the previous section, by 1972, whilst the old centre still housed considerable commercial activity, newer commercial centres had begun to emerge in localities further afield catering to a growing population living in the 'suburbs' of the city. These newer commercial streets seemed to gravitate to locations along the city's highly accessible superstructure. Simultaneously, as commercial and cultural activity went into decline in the old city centre, and newer commercial locations became more popular, this shift appeared to be mirrored by the movement of the integration core (a cluster of highly accessible street segments) away from the old city centre towards the north of the city illustrated by Figures 4.10a and 4.10b.

A NAIN Rn analysis of Karachi in 2007-09 as seen in Figures 4.11a and 4.11b brings to light the persistence of another socio-spatial phenomenon; the similar level of segregation of both the urban slum and the affluent gated community. Figure 4.11b highlights the street segments that fall into the bottom 25% of NAIN Rn values; i.e. the least accessible street segments in the system and, as seen in the analysis for the year 1958-60, the bulk of the street segments highlighted are to be found in the city's low-income informal settlements to the west and the affluent – in some cases gated – settlements to the south. Hence what was an emergent phenomenon in the early 1960s in the city, has persisted, encompassing larger sections of the city.

Finally by arranging Figures 4.12a-12d side by side, the shift and growth of the integration core to the north of the city becomes quite apparent. Historically, this shift coincides with the shift of population, the decline of the inner city's cultural nightlife and commercial activity where much of the city centre today is warehousing and wholesale markets. This is not necessarily an unusual phenomenon. This shift and growth of the integration core was identified in a similar diachronic space syntax study conducted on Dhaka for the period 1953-2007 (Khan and Nilufar, 2007) where the city's post-Partition expansion and shifting core are mirrored as above by the shift of socio-economic activity from the old city areas to the newer developments.




Fig. 4.08a. Karachi 1949: City-wide accessibility (NAIN Rn).




Fig. 4.08b. Karachi 1949: Map highlighting the street segments with the highest 8% of city-wide accessibility values (NAIN Rn), showing an emergent secondary centre north of the colonial city centre.




Fig. 4.09a. Karachi 1958-60: City-wide accessibility (NAIN Rn) and the location of industrial estates.




Fig. 4.09b. Karachi 1958-60: The map illustrates how the integration core is shifting towards the secondary centre shown by the increased clustering of street segments with the highest 8% of values for city-wide accessibility (NAIN Rn) around the secondary centre. Additionally lowest 25% of NAIN Rn street segments show the high segregation of peripheral informal settlements and some affluent areas.




Fig. 4.10a. Karachi 1972-74: City-wide accessibility (NAIN Rn) and the location of industrial estates in the city.




Fig. 4.10b. Karachi 1972-74: by isolating the street segments with the top 8% NAIN Rn values, it becomes apparent that the location of commercial activity is related to the increased accessibility of a street segment.




Fig.4.11a. Karachi 2007-09: City-wide accessibility (NAIN Rn).




Fig.4.11b. Karachi 2007-09: The map illustrates the persistence of the segregation of peripheral informal settlements and affluent settlements highlighted by isolating the lowest 25% of street segments values of NAIN Rn.







Fig.4.12a-d. Clockwise from top left, from 1949 to 2009, the shifting of the integration core to incorporate early *Muhajir* settlements to the north of the old city centre.

4.3 The *Muhajir* City: from migrants to masters and back again.

The previous section analysed the spatial transformation of the post-Partition city in light of urban development decisions, migration into the city and national politics. This section will explore the impact that the same urban policies, immigration and national politics had on the *Muhajir* presence in the city for the same time periods.

4.3.1 - 1949: *Muhajir* arrival and inner city spatial clustering

The new government did not expect the kind of refugee influx that Karachi experienced and whilst it was dealing with setting up the machinery of the state, refugees took up residence in whatever empty buildings and vacant plots they could find in and around the city centre. Inner city refugee squatter settlements included areas in and around Burns Road, Frere Road and parts of the native city of Kharadar (Gayer, 2014) and, peripheral areas comprising of relief and transit camps in Lines Area to the north east of the city centre and Agra Taj and Bihar Colonies in the city's Lyari neighbourhood and squatter settlements in Lalukhet (later to be known as Liaquatabad) and Golimar (later to become Gulbahar), north of the Lyari River (Fig. 4.13a). The influx of *Muhajir* refugees led to a cultural transformation of the city scape; the emergence of the Burns Road as food street selling specifically North Indian specialities such as *Nihari* and *Payas* and the mushrooming of tea houses and book shops in the Saddar area and the emergence of the Urdu press as a formidable proponent of *Muhajir* rights (Ansari, 2005).

Interestingly, as seen in Figure 4.13b, most of the inner-city neighbourhoods the refugees of means initially occupied were proximate to streets that were highly accessible at the city scale. On the other hand, many of the relief and transit camps and informal squatter settlements established for and by the neediest of refugees were set-up outside the old city limits and, as the figure shows, were the most segregated additions to the system. This seems to suggest the beginnings of a centre-periphery wealth divide in the city.




Fig. 4.13a. Karachi-1949. Map showing the spatial network of the city and the location of Relief & Transit campsites established by the government to accommodate the initial refugee influx.




Fig. 4.13b. *Muhajir* relief and transit camps and their relationship to the top 8% and bottom 25% of street segments, NAIN Rn, Karachi 1949.

4.3.2 - 1958-69: The urban “golden age”²⁵ and *Muhajir* marginalisation

Between 1947 and 1958, the State’s primary objective appeared to be the establishment of government machinery and the rehabilitation of refugees though it was not equipped or even expecting the kind of influx and upheaval Partition generated. As a result, by the late fifties four broad kinds of housing settlements had emerged catering, more-or-less exclusively to the first wave of *Muhajir* migrants; i) State sponsored housing schemes primarily to the north of the Lyari River, i.e. Nazimabad, North Nazimabad & Federal ‘B’ Area, ii) community driven co-operative housing societies that generally catered to homogenous communities to the north east of the old city centre such as Hyderabad Colony, Bahadurabad, P.E.C.H.S., Delhi Mercantile Housing Society, iii) State sponsored low income housing settlements generally attached to industrial estates in Landhi-Korangi etc., and finally iv) informal squatter settlements or *katchi abaadis* such as Lines Area, Lalukhet (Liaquatabad) and Golimaar (Gulbahar). In this instance, housing in the city for the *Muhajireen* was a combination of state sponsored and community driven housing initiatives across income brackets that had been trying to tackle Karachi’s housing crisis from very early on in Karachi’s development history (Fig.4.14a).

This process of settlement laid the groundwork for a city organised in a manner so as to perpetuate socio-economic segregation, compounded further by Ayub Khan’s interpretation of Doxiades’ Greater Karachi Resettlement Plan; satellite industrial estates and their residential units, i.e. New Karachi to the north and Landhi-Korangi to the east were established at a distance of 20km from the city centre with the intention of housing residents of inner city squatter settlements that had been bulldozed, planned middle-class housing schemes extending towards the north of the city centre, satellite settlements emerging for lower-middle income settlers in the form of Shah Faisal Colony and Malir to the east and Baldia in the west and ‘Housing Societies’ for the city’s wealthy just north east of the city centre. This essentially created a centre-periphery wealth

²⁵ Pakistan’s first martial law period (under Field Marshall Ayub Khan) is often referred to with a sense of nostalgia as the ‘golden age’ despite the fact that the nation was helmed by a military leader. This is due to the amount of nationwide industrial, agricultural and urban development that took place during this period (Daechsel, 2011).

divided through the planning of the city with the wealthy and middle-classes occupying well integrated, prime locations close to the city centre whilst the lower income groups were relocated to segregated peripheral areas limiting their access to services and employment (Fig. 4.14b).

That being said, some of the Relief & Transit camps and tent settlements of the earlier period had now become permanent inner city squatter settlements but, due to their dense and irregular internal structure, these settlements remained surprisingly segregated despite their central location. Due to lacklustre industrial growth and limited services provided to these far flung locations, relocated communities wished to move back into the city centre but were unable to do so due to the bulldozing exercise mentioned above. This resulted in newer settlements beginning to emerge along the main link roads between the city centre and its industrial satellites. This peripheralisation of migrant communities may in part have contributed to the emergence of the political/militant *Muhajir* identity where proximity, rising densities and accessibility created an incubator for those who felt disenfranchised.




Fig. 4.14a. Types of *Muhajir* settlements, 1958-60.




Fig. 4.14b. Illustration of the centre-periphery socio-economic organisation of Karachi, 1958-60; affluent *Muhajir* communities occupying areas of higher global integration whilst the lower and lower-middle income groups are pushed to the segregated peripheries.

4.3.3 - 1972-74: *Muhajir* re-imagining and spatial expansion

Z.A. Bhutto's refusal to accept Mujeeb-ur-Rehman's²⁶ parliamentary victory in the general elections of 1970 led to the 2nd Indo/Pak war in 1971 and the eventual independence of Bangladesh. This led to the arrival of Bihari refugees in the city and a subsequent mushrooming of informal settlements to the west instigating the development of Karachi's largest informal settlements, Orangi Town. Additionally, as discussed earlier, the localities of Gulshan-e-Iqbal and Gulzar-e-Hijri began emerging as areas of middle-income, mid to high-rise apartment developments (Fig. 4.15a.). Simultaneously, localities known to be primarily *Muhajir* such as Shah Faisal Colony, Malir, Landhi and Korangi, New Karachi and Mehmoodabad, appeared to have developed further and densified. Figure 4.15b shows that whilst the integration core and therefore the most accessible segment clusters of the city seems to have shifted into areas that the previous section showed housed *Muhajir* communities, the areas that were most segregated, i.e. those highlighted by isolating the lowest 25% of NAIN Rn street segment values, also were historically *Muhajir* settlements.

Upon taking up the presidency, Bhutto nationalised educational institutions and industries, drastically increasing rural quotas for positions in educational institutions, the civil services and nationalised industries, and in the context of Sindh, the province to which Karachi belongs, made learning of Sindhi in educational institutions mandatory and elevated it to the status of an official language in government departments, giving it the same status as Urdu and English. These policies were seen by the *Muhajirs* as a conscious move to marginalise them in all aspects of state activities and led to protests and an increased sense of isolation and victimisation.

This sense of isolation and marginalisation pervaded student politics at the University of Karachi where *Muhajir* students no longer felt sufficiently represented by their traditional party, the Jamaat-e-Islami; they felt the student wing had become overwhelming Punjabi. This led to the emergence of the All Pakistan Muhajir Students Organisation (APMSO), in 1978 and laid the

²⁶ East Pakistani leader of the Awami League and winner of the 1970 general elections in Pakistan.

foundation for the eventual establishment of the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in 1984.




Fig. 4.15a. Refugee Settlements to the west and apartment developments to the east of the *Muhajir* areas, 1972-74.




Fig. 4.15b. Migrant/refugee settlements at the periphery of the city continue to be highly segregated.

4.3.4 - 2001-11: A *Muhajir* City: political domination and spatial control

The map from 2007-09 shows the growth and expansion of informal settlements to the west of the city centre to absorb the last wave of migration, i.e. Afghan refugees after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Both Orangi and Baldia townships have expanded so much so that they now abut each other, the boundaries between townships are no longer clear. This vast stretch of informal settlements makes up the entire western wing of the city.

Continued development towards the north-east of the city was, as discussed earlier in this chapter, an outcome of the building boom of the 1980s and 90s that was fuelled by remittances from the Gulf States and a change in building bye-laws introduced by the Bhutto government in 1972. The development of this area of the city was a combination of state sponsored settlements or *colonies* - Shah Latif Town, Gulzar-e-Hijri, Scheme 33 - and initiatives undertaken by the private commercial sector, private developers applying for and constructing mid to high-rise apartment complexes (Mahmood, 1999) (Fig. 4.16a).

The post Zia period (1988 onwards) saw the rise of the MQM in city politics; a party that claimed to be the one true voice of the *Muhajir* peoples of urban Sindh. Since 1988 they have been part of every provincial and local body government bringing the *Muhajir* cause back into the limelight, their presence once again impacting the development and growth of the city. The transportation links needed to connect the city as it grew, a product of the late 1990s and 2000s, have been hugely impacted by *Muhajir* politics. An example of the MQM's political clout can be seen in the fact that the building of the Northern and Southern by-passes, both proposed as part of the Karachi Master-plan 1974-85 in 1968, as well as the later addition of the Lyari Expressway which was initially proposed as an alternative to the construction of the Northern By-pass were eventually sanctioned and built between 2001-07, a time when the City District Government was dominated by the MQM, with significant backing from the Federal government presided over by General Pervez Musharraf, himself considered a *Muhajir*. Whilst these major transport links along with the construction of 4 signal-free corridors through the central and eastern districts of the city have now enhanced connections between the

satellite towns of the 1960s (Shah Faisal colony, Malir and Landhi and Korangi) and the city (Fig.4.16a), they have simultaneously displaced a number of communities, some of which have been relocated to the outlying townships of Taiser Town and Hawkes Bay Town.

As noted in section 4.2.1 these kinds of urban mega-projects are often located in dense, informal central areas of the city, where there is a severe shortage of large available tracts of land required for these projects. Karachi is not unique in this, Follmann states that this insertion of urban mega-projects into what he refers to as an 'omnipresent informality' (Follmann, 2015, p. 214) is a common feature that needs to be acknowledged in many cities of the Global South today. Roy's work on Indian cities shows that local politics plays a major role in making the land required for these projects available. Using the often informal nature of the settlements and their lack of land deeds to their advantage, political parties may either exercise the principle of eminent domain or orchestrate often violent evictions in order to repossess the land required (Roy, 2009).

The role these transportation links have played in making Karachi more a *muhajir* city than before will be explored further in following sections of this chapter. That being said, something to consider is that despite the construction of numerous flyovers and underpasses since 1993, the western and southern portions of the city still remain highly segregated; the former housing the poor and the latter, the wealthy of the city. Interestingly, it can be seen that as the city has grown, those areas that in 1949 sat at the edge of the then city and appear in the lowest 25% of street segments for NAIN Rn and were therefore the most segregated regions of the city, today as the city has grown, form part of the top 8% of street segments at NAIN Rn, i.e. the most integrated sections of the city. Figure 4.16b brings an interesting phenomenon to light; in Karachi today it appears that the low-income informal settlements to the west and the affluent areas to the south are equally segregated.



Fig. 4.16a. Growth of the informal settlements to the west of the city centre and large scale infrastructure development projects, 2007-09.




Fig. 4.16b. Both informal settlements to the west and affluent settlements to the south are highly segregated and the previously segregated earliest *Muhajir* settlements at the edge of the old city now occupy the most integrated areas of the city.

4.4 Spatial clustering of a modern community: the use of socio-spatial proxies to define *Muhajir* space

The above discussion shows how i) the city has developed and ii) where the *Muhajireen* were initially settled. But as can be seen by the number of different waves of migration that have come into Karachi, the city's ethnic make-up is today far more complex than it was in this earlier period, hence in order to track the community today, there is a need to understand and identify ethnic markers that are particular to their identity and practices today.

Whilst the *Muhajir* identity may seem to be a reasonably recent phenomenon, it may actually be considered the evolution of the pre-Partition *Indian Muslim* identity that was the crux of the Pakistan Movement. This call for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India was essentially the politicisation of communal differences between Hindus and Muslims of the Indian Sub-continent. Hence one may argue that the *Muhajireen* were predisposed in a way to political mobilisation. Whilst religion was the primary unifying factor in politically mobilising the disparate Indian Muslim communities, language - in this case Urdu - played a critical role as the necessary *Lingua Franca* understood by most across the spectrum of communities that made up the Indian Muslim conglomerate. Urdu was in fact politicised well before the Pakistan movement in that whilst Hindi and Urdu have the same root; i.e. Hindvi/Dehlvi, through Mughal patronage and subsequently Muslim separatism, there was a conscious push to "Arabicise/Persianise" Urdu both through the form of its text as well as the hybridity of its vocabulary, borrowing heavily from Persian and Arabic (Rahman, 2011).

This Pre-Partition linguistic necessity became critical to Post-Partition community identities as language became a means for the State to differentiate between "sons of the soil" and migrant peoples or 'old' and 'new' Sindhis. Simultaneously, for the *Muhajireen* it became a badge of honour; being dubbed 'Urdu-speaking' was representative of one's sacrifice for and commitment to a Muslim homeland. As stated above, in Karachi linguistic association will generally determine one's ethnicity which in turn will broadly determine for who one will vote for in an election. The city's older 'native' Sindhi and Balochi

communities, many of whom are resident in old inner city areas, will speak Sindhi and Balochi respectively, but will vote primarily for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), with some votes going to Baloch separatist groups. The Pakhtuns who are originally from Khyber Pakhtun Khwah in Pakistan's North West are primarily Pashto speaking, and up until the last election, voted for the secular Pakhtun-centric Awami National Party (ANP). Migrants from the Punjab may speak a number of different languages that include Punjabi, Seraiki, and Hindkoi etc., but will generally vote for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), and finally the *Muhajir* population, colloquially identified as 'Urdu-speaking', consider Urdu as their "mother-tongue" – a term used in the census when referring to respondents' primary language - and have historically voted for the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in elections since 1988 when the party first contested the elections. This phenomenon provides two socio-spatial markers that help identify *Muhajir* localities, that of language and politics.

Again, as mentioned earlier, the Indian Muslim identity and resultant Pakistan Movement were built around a broad religious solidarity which was by no means indicative of a homogenous religious identity. Amongst the myriad of Muslim sects that make up the *Muhajir* community today in Pakistan, two are of particular interest to this study, the Sunni Bareilvi sect and various Shi'a communities. Both sects had large populations of adherents in the provinces and cities from where the *Muhajireen* migrated and both have a distinctive urban presence in the form of identifiable religious institutions in the areas in which they settled. This provides the third socio-spatial marker that may help to identify *Muhajir* spaces in the city today completing Vertovec's triad; linguistics, cultural and religious institutions, and political mobilisation.

As the city has grown, for the purposes of governance, it has gone through a number of different delimitations each with its own local government structures. Most commonly this has taken the form of large 'districts', the number and extent of which has changed over time from four to five and then most recently six districts after the general elections of 2013. For a period between 2002-07, Karachi was divided up into 18 towns that were further subdivided into 178 union councils. With elections in 2008, this delimitation was again revised and the city government reverted to its pre-2002 composition of 5 large districts.

Whilst these districts are large, varying in size, population density and built-up area (see Table 3.2 and Fig.4.17), these administrative boundaries have been used in conjunction with data pertaining to language and voting practices in order to identify broad regions – if that is the case – of *Muhajir* settlement in the city today.

Today, Karachi's 5 districts are; District South which consists of the port areas, much of the old city centre, Mehmoodabad and the cantonment areas of Defence Housing Authority and Clifton, District East includes the industrial estates in Landhi-Korangi and their adjoining residential areas, Shah Faisal Colony, and the various housing societies and peripheral areas of the old city. District Central is made up completely of post partition developments north of the Lyari River, i.e. Liaquatabad, Nazimabad, North Nazimabad, New Karachi, and North Karachi, it is the smallest of the 5 districts with the highest population density. District West comprises of all the areas west of Manghopir Road that connects the city centre to the various industrial estates that lie to the west of the city; SITE industrial estate, Baldia, Orangi Town and Qasba. Finally District Malir, the largest of the 5 districts and most sparsely populated and comprises of areas north of Shahra-e-Faisal which include Malir, Malir Cantt, the airport, land belonging to the Pakistan Air Force and various villages (*Goths*) and their surrounding agricultural land (Fig.4.17)





Fig. 4.17. District boundaries Karachi, 2009.

4.4.1 – Language: The Lowest Common Denominator.

As discussed earlier, the *Muhajir* identity is a development of the Indian Muslim identity that was key to the emergence of Pakistan. Most refugees who relocated to Karachi came from one of five Hindu majority regions in India; i) Uttar Pradesh (primarily the cities of Delhi, Agra and Lucknow), ii) Central Provinces & Berar, iii) Hyderabad Deccan and Madras, iv) Bombay and Gujarat, and v) Ajmer and Rajputana. The movement of refugees to Sindh was primarily one of people moving from urban centres in India to urban locations in Pakistan. Despite varied geographical backgrounds, in most cases, the migrants' primary language was Urdu and this became their lowest common denominator. The magnitude of their numbers and the movement out of the city of the Sindhi-speaking Hindu urban population, transformed the cultural landscape of the city centre at Partition with the percentage of the population speaking Sindhi dropping to 8.6% in 1951 from 61.2% just a decade earlier whilst simultaneously, the percentage of Urdu speakers grew from 6.3% in 1941 to constitute 50% of the city's total population in 1951²⁷. Subsequent censuses have shown that this figure has held more-or-less steady at 50%, only recently dropping to 48% of the population of the city (Hasan and Mohib, 2003). These figures suggest that Urdu is the language most commonly spoken in the city as opposed to Sindhi or Gujarati as was previously the case. The quote below from the memoirs of a young army major who came to Karachi to visit his family for the first time shortly after Partition provides an insight into the kind of transformation the city went through.

“On the whole Karachi might have been a leaf from Delhi or Lucknow- the same language, the same dress, and the same *paan*-chewing good Samaritans... Between the Bundar Road and the Marriot Road shopping areas and Saddar, one would find almost everyone one might have known or cared for. The men from Delhi and UP had turned the city into a replica of their native Delhi and Lucknow.” (Siddiqi, 2008, p. 64)

Despite historical and anecdotal accounts describing how the *Muhajireen* occupied and transformed the old city areas upon their arrival (Siddiqi 2008

²⁷ Government of Pakistan Population Census Report 1951

Hyder 1999), as seen in the previous section, the *Muhajir* community moved out or was forced out of the city centre shortly after their initial migration as part of the State's rehabilitation process.

Analysing census data pertaining to the mother-tongue of respondents, shows that this avoidance of the city centre by the *Muhajireen* has persisted over time. At the last census in 1998, the highest concentrations of Urdu-speaking households were to be found in Karachi's districts Central and East, with 73.57% and 60.75% of households respectively claiming Urdu as their mother-tongue (Fig.4.18).




Fig. 4.18. District-wise distribution of households claiming Urdu as their mother-tongue, highlighting concentrations in the city's central and eastern districts. Source: Census of Pakistan 1998.

4.4.2 - Politics: The Re-awakening & Re-imagining of a Community.

The Muttahida Quami Movement or MQM was a party that emerged out of student politics on the campus of the University of Karachi in the mid-1970s when *Muhajir* students felt that their concerns were being side-lined in favour of their Punjabi peers by the student wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) - the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT) - their traditional representatives. The party today claims to be the primary political voice of the *Muhajir* community and has dominated Karachi's politics since it first contested elections in 1988 under the leadership of its founding member Altaf Hussain.

MQM has a unique three tier party structure; Nine Zero²⁸ which is MQM's nationwide, as well as Karachi-wide headquarters situated in Azizabad, a lower-middle income neighbourhood in District Central, under which there are 26 Sector offices distributed city-wide, each of which oversees between eight to ten Unit offices in their immediate vicinity. These Units are embedded within the community with the intention of both serving the community and disseminating the party's political message. In an environment where public sector services often fail to deliver, this is a case of non-state actor filling voids left by the state (Gazdar & Mallah, 2013). These social facilitators are embedded both physically and socially within the community they serve; Unit offices are generally located within the neighbourhood they serve and recruitment of party workers/activist is from the same area - proof of residence in the area has to be produced in order for a potential recruit to be eligible to sign up to a particular unit. This familiarity of space and community serves as the party's grassroots strength; the Unit/Sector facilitates everything from access/provision of services such as water and electricity to the neighbourhood they serve to resolving neighbourhood disputes whilst simultaneously policing the community from within. The intention behind this kind of neighbourhood philanthropy is that this social capital automatically converts into a willing vote bank in an election year. This informal arrangement suggests that the presence of a Unit office within a neighbourhood implies that the population- whether willingly or unwillingly- subscribes to the MQM's agenda. Figure 4.19 shows the distribution of Unit Offices across the city and their concentrations per district.

Hence the political aspect of this community can be divided into two mappable features; i) electoral results, and ii) physical presence on the ground in the form of unit offices. Whilst housing and development initiatives in the first decade after Partition helped to track the initial *Muhajir* clusters in the city, with the MQM being a more recent phenomenon, the plotting of the above mentioned features has made it possible to track the presence of the *Muhajir* community over the last 25 years. This in turn has made it possible to assess whether the

²⁸ Nine Zero takes its name from the last two digits of the landline number allocated to the original 120 sq yd dwelling that was owned by Altaf Hussain's family in Azizabad and used by MQM's founders as a meeting place.

initial *Muhajir* clusters have persisted and what impact this has had on the city as it has grown.

As stated above, MQM first participated in the general elections in 1988; whilst MQM has had a strong showing across Karachi in all general and provincial elections that they have contested since (1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2008, and 2013), the party has also won 100% of the assembly seats in districts Central and East for the same, and the numbers of seats they have taken in district West have increased over time (Fig. 4.20).

The mapping of both the party's physical presence within the community in the form of Unit offices and Karachi's ethno-specific voting history from 1988-2013 when combined; broadly identify *Muhajir* clusters in the city that coincides with the areas identified through linguistic concentrations; Districts Central and East. Thus 25 years of provincial electoral results (1988-2013) suggest that there is a strong correlation between language and politics as a means of ethnic and political identification.

It should be noted that the thematic maps shown here have been normalised by the area of the district in which they are situated.




Fig. 4.19. City-wide distribution of MQM Unit Offices. Inset: Thematic map showing district-wise concentrations of MQM Units.





Fig. 4.20. District-wise MQM provincial assembly electoral results for the years 2002 and 2008.

4.4.3 - Religion: Minority Specificity within religious commonality

As already discussed, Pakistan was envisioned as the homeland for the Muslim minority communities of India, thus the majority of migrants to Pakistan were Muslim. Under the broad definition of Indian Muslims at the time were certain minority sects that were more commonly found amongst the migrants communities from undivided India; the Shi'a community and those who subscribe to the Barelvi School of Islamic thought are two such communities (Verkaaik, 2004).

The Shi'a sect are followers of the 4th Caliph, Ali-ibn-Abi-Talib, the sect really took root after the events of the succession of the Caliphate at Karbala in Iraq in 680 AD. The mosques or *Imambargahs* of the Shi'a community today can generally be identified within the fabric of the city through the display of Shi'a *Alams* - a combination of the icon for the *Panjetan-e-Pak*²⁹ and a pennant - atop the mosque. These institutions may be seen as community centres where religious rites such as those associated with the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussain and his family in the month of Muharram are practiced and religious artefacts are stored, often with an attached prayer space. These are spaces where the community comes together, including women - a section of society who are often excluded from traditional mosque spaces in Pakistan.

The Barelvi sect is a sect of Sunni Islam that was founded in the Northern Indian town of Bareilly by Ahmed Raza Khan at the end of the 19th century and centres around the glorification of the Prophet Mohammad. It tends more towards the Sufi traditions familiar to the Sub-continent rather than the reformist versions of Islam such as Wahabism and the Deobandi Movement. Subscribers to the Barelvi tradition are discernible by their distinctive Green turbans, also often painting the domes of their mosques a similar shade of green; this is commemorative of the dome of the *Masjid-i-Nabvi* in Medina. Due to their roots in regions of the Sub-continent from which large numbers of Muslims migrated,

²⁹ Translates into the 'five purified ones' and refers to the Prophet Mohammad, his daughter Fatima, his son-in-law and cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib and their sons Hassan and Hussain and is often depicted as a five-fingered hand.

followers of both the *Isna'Ashari* (Shi'a) and *Barelvi* sects tend to be members primarily of the *Muhajir* community.



Fig. 4.21. *Imambargah*, Malir, Karachi.
Photographs by Mohammad Imran Khan.



Fig. 4.22. *Barelvi Masjid*, Karachi.

The MQM is an ethnic, secular party as opposed to a religious one and hence do not appear to make a distinction between the sectarian differences amongst their constituents. In fact, much of the imagery employed by party officials pertaining to the marginalisation and victimisation of the *Muhajir* community makes reference to the wisdom of Hazrat Ali and the valour of Imam Hussain and his followers and the events of Karbala (Verkaaik, 2004). As subscribers to both religious groups are largely *Muhajir*, their religious buildings are generally identifiable within the city scape, and the Islamic practice of congregational prayers 5 times a day whereby people tend to frequent and live in close proximity to a local mosque of their preferred school of thought, a mosque seems like an appropriate communal institution to use as a marker of ethnic clustering.

With *imambargahs*; other than two pre-Partition clusters in the old city centre - Bara *Imambargah* and Shah-e-Khurasan/Khoja *Imambargah* close to the Quaid's Mazaar - there are concentrations of *imambargahs* in Pak Sadat Colony in Shah Faisal Colony, Jaffer Tayyar Society in Malir, the Balti Para in Lines Area and then dotted consistently around in District Central. Similar concentrations of Barelvi mosques are to be found in Korangi, Shah Faisal Colony, and PIB Colony in District East, and again in the areas of District Central especially the Liaquatabad, and Golimaar localities and in adjacent areas of District West such as Pak Colony. The idea here was to see if there was a correlation between Shi'a and Barelvi mosques and a *Muhajir* presence.

Again here there appears to be an overlap of the areas that vote MQM and where the Shi'ite and Barelvi communities reside. (Figs. 4.23 and 4.24 respectively.)

The district scale results from this triad of identity-markers seems to confirm that the community is clustering primarily in Karachi's central and eastern districts. But these municipal boundaries enclose large parcels of land and thus this process of identifying *Muhajir* residential clusters is broad and prone to overlook the finer scale nuances of ethnic residential clustering due to their scale and the fact that municipal boundaries are not necessarily indicative of community boundaries. Hence, by overlaying the location of these identity-markers on the housing schemes etc. that the *Muhajireen* were originally allocated certain finer grain patterns begin to emerge. A degree of overlap and locational persistence in their settlement patterns becomes apparent, whilst simultaneously, there appears to be some spill over into adjacent and proximate localities suggesting a degree of colonisation and out movement to areas that are close to but not within the original central hub of rehabilitation and resettlement (Fig. 4.25). The specificity of this clustering is explored further in the following section.




Fig. 4.23. City-wide distribution of Shi'a *Imambargahs*. Inset: Thematic map shows the total number of *imambargahs* per district, again showing the greatest concentrations in districts Central and East.




Fig. 24. City-wide distribution of Barelvi Mosques. Inset: Thematic map shows the total number of Barelvi mosques per district, showing the greatest concentrations in districts Central and East.




Fig. 4.25. City-wide distribution of *Muhajir* communal institutions relative to early *Muhajir* settlements.

4.5 Further Clustering: *Muhajir* “Hotspots”.

Using geographical information systems heatmap feature to map and analyse the clustering of *Muhajir* communal institutions, it was possible to highlight clusters of mosques, *imambargahs* and political offices within a specified radius, these specified distances in the case of this part of the study being as *the crow flies* as opposed to network distances. The raster image produced through the heatmap analysis showed that where clusters appeared to be denser, hotspots or brighter areas appeared (Fig. 3.02). These raster images were then converted into contour maps as a means of geographically visualising communal institution densities. After testing various radii for each feature, it became apparent that a radius of 800m (or about 10 minutes’ walk) most accurately represented the catchment of Bareilvi mosques and Shi’a *imambargahs* – 800 m being a comfortable walkable distance for regular users of these facilities that may frequent these spaces up to five times a day. This particular radius seemed to be able to define certain neighbourhoods or settlements with the densest clusters appearing in Golimaar/Gulbahar, Liaquatabad, PIB Colony, and Martin Quarters, Shah Faisal Colony and Malir Colony (Jaffar Tayyar Society), and inner city areas like Soldier Bazaar, Kharadar and Lines Area (Fig. 4.26.), whilst interestingly not showing any institutional clustering in the “Society” area – localities that were initially settled by the wealthier *Muhajir* communities. It should be noted at this point that clusters of *imambargahs* in Kharadar and Soldier Bazaar are amongst the oldest in the city and pre-date *Muhajir* presence in the form that we recognise it today. These particular *imambargahs* play an important role in the city’s Muharram activities every year hence whilst they are significant to the Shi’a community in general, they are not necessarily specifically indicative of *Muhajir* presence. Additionally, this method of identifying ‘hotspots of features’ seems to also pick up newer *Muhajir* areas that were developed post the initial rehabilitation drive of 1947-60; i.e. Gulshan-e-Iqbal in the north, Mehmoodabad in the east, and Qasba Colony in the west.

Whilst mosques and *imambargahs* seem to function understandably at a smaller radius of 800m, where there may be more than one mosque or *imambargah* serving a neighbourhood, after testing multiple radii (500-2000m) it appears that MQM unit offices are distributed at one unit per neighbourhood;

they seem to be serving a catchment radius of about 1500m (about 20 minutes walk), or the size of a neighbourhood. It should be noted that at a radius of 1500m, the clusters form continuous district-wide contours that appear to encompass most sector offices which is significant as the party structure encourages a direct link between the Sector office and the units under it with limited lateral interaction between units in the same sector (Fig. 4.27.). Simultaneously it should be noted that whilst the unit clusters seem to be highlighted at a radius of 1500m, the individual units still seem to be located on streets that are quite segregated but this may be due to the fact that the relationship of the unit is to the neighbourhood rather than the global city structure. This local level locational significance of the unit relative to the structure of the neighbourhood it serves will be analysed further in the following chapters.

The religious and political institutions appear to be functioning at different local radii, possibly the result of the difference in concentrations of the two types of communal institutions. Upon combining the various communal institutions and the radii at which they seem to be functioning, it appears that as a collective entity, the elements seem to highlight the most significant clusters at a radius of 1000m as seen in Figure 4.28. This compound feature that combines all identity markers may be interpreted as giving a cartographic form to the *Muhajir* “area of influence” or *Muhajir* majority areas in the city (Fig. 4.29).

By overlaying the four original categories of *Muhajir* settlements on this form of *Muhajir* presence in the city today as seen in Figure 4.30, it becomes apparent that many of the original clusters have persisted over the last 60 years. In addition to this spatio-temporal continuity, there appears to be a spill-over and colonisation of adjacent localities as the community has grown and their original clusters have densified. Simultaneously there appears to be some areas within the *Muhajir* cooperative housing society block in which no identity markers were found and therefore are not highlighted as part of this current day *Muhajir* presence. This may be due to the fact that the data sets used are not exhaustive but simultaneously, the lack of all three indicators may suggest an absence of *Muhajir* presence, a movement out of these areas of *Muhajir* settlers or a different religio-political definition to the communities resident there in.




Fig. 4.26. Contour-map showing Barelvi mosque and Imambargah clusters at a radius of 800m.




Fig. 4.27. City-wide MQM Unit clusters at a radius of 1500m.



Fig. 4.28. Contour map of combined communal institution influence at R1000m.




Fig. 4.29. The polygon demarcates *Muhajir* 'areas of influence' or *Muhajir* dominated areas as determined by the clustering of *Muhajir* socio-spatial markers.




Fig. 4.30. The map illustrates the persistence of occupation and clustering of the *Muhajir* community in the city over the last 65 years.

4.6 Discussion

Whilst analysis of historical and masterplan documents showed that *Muhajir* settlers were clustering, or being forced to cluster by the State in certain localities of the city shortly after Partition, it appears that over time, these clusters have persisted, densified and spilled over into adjoining localities as these areas have developed. Interestingly, as a result of this persistence of settlement and as the city has developed and sprawled inland, the refugee community that was originally settled at the city's peripheries today occupies the geographical centre. On closer inspection it can be seen that whilst the *Muhajireen* occupy the centre, the wealthy *Muhajir* communities that initially commandeered the spaces closest to the old city centre today occupy Karachi's segregated southern peninsula of Defence and Clifton, suggesting a partial inversion of the initial economic geography of the city. What has remained consistent is the fact that the poor and disenfranchised by the State continue to occupy the segregated fringes of the city, a space initially allocated to the earliest *Muhajireen*. This socio-spatial continuity too speaks of a role reversal; to be *Muhajir* no longer implies a state-less rootless and disenfranchised existence. This space – both spatially and politically - is now occupied by more recent migrants to the city, and today the *Muhajireen* have taken on the role of the State's representatives in the city.

With regard to this role reversal, it may be worth considering that the community's spatial clustering, locational persistence and spatial proximity may have as much to do with the emergence of an ethno-political identity as would be expected from commonalities of traditions and language, and the State's supposed early policies of social, political and spatial marginalisation. And, whilst electoral results suggest that the *Muhajir* community holistically views the MQM as their political representatives and there appears to be a general persistence of place, there may also be some schisms within the group; as stated earlier, the original *Muhajir* settlements included the various co-operative housing societies situated near the city centre, the clustering of communal institutions - or lack thereof in this case - seems to suggest that either the *Muhajir* community has moved out of these areas or, that there is a split within

the community. To begin with, one can hypothesise that the split is along economic lines as many of the housing societies were established by and for the wealthier members of the community, but that this split includes political and sectarian preferences too, i.e. the wealthy do not perhaps subscribe to the same religious/political ethos as those that occupy the middle and lower-middle income areas of Districts Central and East. Hence there is a need to perhaps make a slight distinction between cultural *Muhajireen* and political *Muhajireen*. Whilst in many cases they may be one and the same, in the case of those who have moved out of *Muhajir* majority areas to more affluent parts of the city, or those who have always been more affluent such as the original residents of the Housing Societies, their political affiliation is no longer clear as these areas tend to be both ethnically and politically more diverse. An example of this is the city's southern neighbourhoods of Defence and Clifton that have over the last six provincial elections, never voted for the same party in successive elections.

And in the case that wealthy communities have moved out, many of these initially low-rise areas have been redeveloped and, whilst the communities moving in may still be culturally *Muhajir*, the economic bracket and political association is often different to those who have moved out; the housing societies were previously higher income areas where many of the original residents were supporters of the Jamaat-i-Islami. Today, due to the rise of apartment living, many of these areas have been redeveloped as middle-income, mid-rise areas. This seems to suggest that, whilst this study argues that segregation and clustering in the city persists along ethnic/political lines, ethnicity appears in turn to have some association with the economic status of the community, a feature that will be explored further in the following chapter.

4.7 Conclusion

The above analysis and discussion shows that despite the fact that the community began as a disparate group of refugee communities, many of whom had lost most of their material wealth, they have through time and circumstance developed an identifiable material culture that can be mapped and shows that they do indeed cluster as a community and have come to dominate the politics and space of the city. Whilst much of their early clustering was the result of the

government's efforts to rehabilitate *Muhajir* refugees as soon as possible after Partition, these clusters have persisted and densified since their inception with the addition of newer contiguous areas, as the community has grown physical, economically and politically.

What the mapping of the diachronic processes of the growth and development of Karachi has shown is that space, ethnicity and politics are intrinsically linked, the changing fortunes of a community can quite literally be mapped through the history of the city. And this has been the case with the *Muhajir* community, as the community and their self-image and perception has changed, so too has their spatial location within the city; from rehabilitation and bureaucratic backbone, to spatial and political marginalisation, to political powerhouse occupying the central areas of the city.

By mapping and analysing the clustering of the community's socio-spatial proxies in the city, it has been possible to give *Muhajir* presence in the city today a mappable, bounded form that was a feature previously unavailable. *Muhajir* dominance and influence appear to pervade the geographic and integration core of the city, and what the implications of this centralised occupation have on the services, facilities and other residents of the city will be explored in the following chapter.

5.

Muhajir space and its urban interfaces: Spatial characterisation of the Muhajir areas of influence and the nature of their socio-spatial interface from the macro to the micro scale.

5. 0 Introduction.

Thus far we have seen that the *Muhajir* community initially clustered in certain areas of the city, the location of many of these early settlements determined largely by State led planning, housing projects and the availability of land. Thereafter, through a process of mapping socio-political institutions, it has been seen that these initial clusters have persisted with some spill-over into adjacent localities as the community has grown and the initial settlements have densified. During the time that has lapsed between their initial settlement and their current day mapping, the *Muhajir* community's initial influence on the space and politics of the city went into rapid decline as the community was systematically marginalised. This has been followed by a more recent period of political re-awakening and involvement in city politics, resulting eventually in a period of political dominance and, as this chapter will argue, a period of spatial control and manipulation. As the discussion continues to narrow down to the specific spatiality of *Muhajir* identity in Karachi, this chapter attempts to address the questions of how continued spatial clustering in the localities claimed by the community has impacted their relationship with the city. Furthermore, this chapter intends to identify the form the spaces of interface between *Muhajir* areas and the city take and, whether there are identifiable socio-spatial characteristics to the spaces which the community occupy beyond these points of interface that would define them as *Muhajir*.

The hypothesis here is that as the *Muhajir* community has become more politically dominant within the city, the MQM has exercised its ability to influence

infrastructure development in the city so as to pursue a political agenda of controlled surveillance that pervades the urban system across scales within their area of influence, a control that is potentially being challenged at the peripheries of this influence. Whilst this area of influence is wide and encompasses an array of communities and spaces, there is a specificity to the economic and spatial definition to a politically active, *Muhajir* dominant settlement.

Whilst the previous chapter analysed the growth and development of the city in order to identify if and how the *Muhajir* community were clustering, the analysis and discussion in this chapter shifts to focus specifically on the articulation and definition of *Muhajir* space or the *Muhajir*-ness of space – i.e. the idea that this culturally similar minority group reproduces spatially similar environments despite variations in other circumstances - during their later period of political dominance. The intention here is to explore how the community and its spaces interact and interface with the city and thus this discussion is divided into three sections. Section one deals with the relationship of *Muhajir* dominant areas with the various aspects of the city including transportation networks and commercial and industrial centres and the spatial implications of political dominance. Whilst the previous chapter provided a mappable form to *Muhajir* influence in the city, there is a need to identify and focus on *Muhajir* centres to truly analyse the spatiality of the community, hence section two identifies *Muhajir* centres and attempts to establish some socio-economic and socio-spatial similarities between these centres that in turn may assist in identifying a space as *Muhajir*. And finally, section three focuses on specific case studies that are demonstrative of the range of *Muhajir* settlements and the manner in which these interface with the city at large. The chapter concludes with a discussion outlining the key findings of the above mentioned three sections.

5.0.1 Data and Methodology

As stated above, the analysis and discussion in this chapter is divided into three sections, each section developing a view of the relationship of the community to the space it occupies within a series of diminishing scales from that of the city to that of the settlement itself.

Using the outline of *Muhajir* dominant areas developed in the previous chapter as the base layer for this analysis, in the first section the data obtained from newspaper articles, development reports and masterplans were overlaid so as to analyse the relevance and relationship of key infrastructural and service related urban features to this ethno-spatial form. These features were then tested against their spatial network values within the system to ascertain whether there was a consistent spatial logic to the manner in which these features had been laid out within the city's spatial configuration.

The second section identifies and develops the definition of *Muhajir* centres. By establishing the centroids of the cluster analysis discussed in the previous chapter and using data from masterplan documents, as well as spatial network measures, centres were classified spatially and economically in order to develop a categorisation of *Muhajir* settlements. This categorisation took into account the settlements' morphologies, spatial proximities and socio-economic features in an attempt to present a holistic description. From these categories, specific case studies were selected for the purpose of in-depth exploration of *Muhajir* space, attempting to make this selection representative of the cross-section of *Muhajir* settlements in the city seen thus far in this investigation.

Focusing on the case studies, the third section seeks to analyse the interface between the settlement and the city and how the integration of the interface impacts the manner in which the settlement and its residents interact with the city. Here, using space syntax methodologies, proximity to streets that are most likely to be used for movement through the city (high Choice streets) and the accessibility of the settlements' public spaces to the city-wide network are investigated and the potential impact that these features may have on the integration of the community into the wider population of the city is assessed using employment data taken from 243 questionnaires completed by residents of two of the case studies. This completes the discussion on the interface between *Muhajir* space and the city.

5.1. Political Dominance and Urban Development: the relationship of key infrastructure and service related urban features to ethno-spatial form

This section will analyse how the development of key services and infrastructure relate to the *Muhajir* community and their spaces of influence. It is also important at this stage in the discussion to acknowledge the MQM as a key political player in any discussion pertaining to *Muhajir* space and the community's relationship with the city. In brief, they have dominated Karachi's politics since 1988 when they first contested an election, going on to become the target of a State backed paramilitary operation to clean up Karachi between 1992-94. Despite this, they have always been viewed as the kingmakers in provincial politics. They re-emerged stronger than ever between 2002-08 with the political and financial support of the Federal Government with the city's mayor from 2005-2010 being a member of the party.

As the earlier discussion related to language, politics and communal institutions shows, many of the initial *Muhajir* clusters have persisted but, in order to develop the discussion in its specificity, there is a need now to establish the potential centres of the community today and the relationship of these localities to the city and how it functions. For this purpose, the contour map discussed in the previous chapter that articulate *Muhajir* communal institutional densities and potential catchment was used to define an outline of what may be considered as the *area of influence* of *Muhajir* presence or, space of *Muhajir* dominance in the city. This provides a mappable 'boundary' that seems to include not only areas that have historically been held by the *Muhajireen* from Partition, but also highlights newer *Muhajir* settlements and certain adjacencies and proximities that are of interest to this study. In the latter category, there are areas like Gulshan-e-Iqbal, which lies across the Lyari River, to the east of Federal B Area, Qasba and Aligarh colonies west of North Nazimabad, and Mehmoodabad lying just south of the area earlier allotted to the housing societies and Delhi colony and Defence Phase 4. Simultaneously this area of influence seems to extend to incorporate the old city centre (Fig. 5.01.).

This seems to suggest that despite the fact that historically the city centre had supposedly been emptied of *Muhajir* squatter settlements by Ayub Khan's

government in the late 1950s, the CBD and many of the wholesale markets now clustered in the old city centre and other commercial areas may still come under *Muhajir* influence. This may be attributed to the presence of a large number of Gujarati-owned businesses and Gujarati-speaking communities in the old city centre. Whilst these communities may not be Urdu-speaking, they have historically identified with the *Muhajireen*. This influence over commercial activity in and around the old city centre seems to extend to absorb the newer shopping districts of Tariq Road and Bahadurabad that have developed over time as part of the housing society cluster which will be discussed further in this chapter.

Whilst discussing the housing societies, it can be seen that the boundary established at the walkable scale of 1000m, the area of influence whilst proximate to, excludes wealthier parts of the housing society cluster. This, as discussed earlier can be seen by a noticeable absence of *Muhajir* identity-markers in the area and may be attributed to either the movement out of this locality of the *Muhajireen*, or a religio-political schism within the community whereby wealthier members subscribe to a different religio-political ethos than their economically weaker brethren. So whilst these areas may still be home to various ethnically *Muhajir* communities, the MQM's presence is less substantial, demonstrated by the lack of MQM Unit offices. This shift away from the MQM is illustrated by some of the wealthier, conservative communities resident in this centrally located affluent area reverting to their political roots, voting in the Jamiat-i-Islami in Local Body elections in 2005 in this area.

The contour map used to establish the boundaries of the area of influence discussed above can be used to further isolate and define areas that may be considered major centres of *Muhajir*-related activity today. These centroids, as discussed in the methodology section of this study, mark the geometric centres of the polygon generated from a cluster analysis of *Muhajir* socio-spatial markers. These centres include six in District Central, five in District East, one in the old city in District South - the area of Kharadar - and one centred on the Shi'a settlement in Malir Colony in District Malir. Despite *Muhajir* presence in Qasba and Aligarh colonies in the west, there is also a noticeable absence of a *Muhajir* 'centre' in this area possibly suggesting a wider mix of ethnic groups in

the western district of the city (Fig. 5.02.). What this process brings to light is that whilst *Muhajir* influence seems to extend beyond the original areas of settlement, the 'centres' still appear to be situated in the older post-Partition settlements of the city, i.e. Liaquatabad, Golimar, Nazimabad, Federal 'B' Area, North Nazimabad, Shah Faisal Colony and Malir.




Fig. 5.01. Muhajir area of influence and localities, 2007-09.




Fig.5.02. Muhajir areas of influence and centres, 2007-09.

5.1.1 Major roads and the Construction of flyovers

In Karachi, a city where 50% of the population is thought to reside in dense unplanned settlements (Hasan and Mohib, 2003), access to a main road is vital. In most cases, the internal streets of such settlements are often no more than three metres wide and therefore difficult to navigate unless users are pedestrians, cyclists or using smaller means of motorised transport such as motor bikes and rickshaws which not all residents have access to. Therefore, access to a main road implies access to public transport which in turn means access to the city's various services such as higher education, hospitals and centres of commerce, employment and entertainment.

Figure 5.03 shows that isolating all street segment values for Normalised Choice at radius n ($NACH_{Rn}$) for the segment map for 2007-09 greater than 1.35^{30} , it is possible to pick up the superstructure of the city highlighting particularly the major thoroughfares. Additionally, by overlaying the *Muhajir* centres on this spatial network, it can be seen that most centres appear to be in close proximity to these high choice street segments as many of these streets pass through areas defined by high *Muhajir* communal institution densities. In fact on further analysis, it appears that of the 1936 street segments defined through this process of isolation, 1270 lie within the mapped *Muhajir* area of influence (approximately 66% or one third of the total selection). This suggests that whilst the settlements themselves may be quite segregated, residents are within easy access of a major road. This spatial proximity to the city's superstructure has in more recent times proven advantageous to the community's control of the city as their ethno-political identity has evolved and strengthened as will be seen in this chapter, but is potentially the outcome of a fortuitous overlap of early *Muhajir* rehabilitation projects along the west bank of the Lyari River and the road network laid out as part of the Greater Karachi Resettlement Plan (GKRP) in 1958 which has subsequently determined the direction of growth of the city (Hasan, 1997).

³⁰ Whilst research has shown that a maximum Normalised Choice value ($NACH$) of 1.4 highlights the foreground or primary structure of a spatial system at a given radius (Hillier, Tang and Turner, 2012), it was found in the case of Karachi, a $NACH$ value at radius ' n ' of 1.35 best articulated the complete superstructure of the city.

Furthermore, when overlaying this information on the *Muhajir* area of influence, an interesting pattern emerges; most major thoroughfares pass through the boundary of *Muhajir* influence, with these connections becoming particularly important to connecting outlying, segregated areas to the global network of the city, Mehmoodabad and Korangi via the Shaheed-e-Millat Expressway, Shah Faisal Colony and Korangi through the Malir River Bridge and Shah Faisal Colony to the central areas of the city through the Signal-free Corridor 2. This becomes particularly apparent when the global choice network from 1972-74 is compared to that of the city today. In this case, whilst the network has extended outwards as the city has grown, the most significant connections have been those between the central *Muhajir* settlements and the outlying settlements mentioned above (Fig. 5.04). This close relationship between *Muhajir* areas, infrastructure development and high choice segments seems to be reinforced by the fact that there has been limited public works in the large squatter settlements to the west of the city in Orangi/Baldia Town as well as in the high-income districts of Defence and Clifton to the south, both areas that have been shown earlier in this study to be ethnically, and subsequently politically, mixed localities of the city.

Another side of this political monopolisation of development projects is the aspect of surveillance and control of movement through the city; major through routes connecting the city centre to the periphery all pass through *Muhajir* majority areas. This strategic control of the city's major street network has afforded the community, and therefore their political representatives, through their location and the development of key infrastructure projects is key to the manner in which MQM controls activity in the city; the political party has been known to barricade major thoroughfares as a means of political protest thereby obstructing the flow of people and produce in and out of the city, limiting commercial activity and, essentially bringing the city to a standstill. This ability to control the commercial activities of the city will be further explored in the following section.




Fig. 5.03. Shows the location of recently built flyovers and underpasses and how they are primarily located on street segments with a Choice value greater than 1.35. This has been overlaid on the *Muhajir* cluster map (1000m), thus showing the relationship of high Choice streets to the location of flyovers and *Muhajir* presence.



Fig. 5.04. Shows a comparative study of the extent of the superstructure of the city for the years 1972-74 and 2007-09. The threshold being a value of 1.35 for Normalised Choice at Rn.

5.1.2 Location of Commercial Centres

Whilst the historical discussion earlier in this chapter showed that many of the earliest industrial settlements at the periphery of the city were developed in order to decant *Muhajir* squatters from the old city centre they occupied thus resulting in a considerable *Muhajir* presence in these areas today, much of the earliest commercial activity was confined to the old city centre. This has obviously changed as the city has grown, with commercial areas naturally developing outside the old city centre, with retail activity in the old city declining and many of these old colonial commercial areas gradually being replaced by wholesale markets, warehouses and medium rise apartment complexes (Hasan, 1999). The emergence of many of the newer commercial areas has been quite organic and informal with categorisations of plots from residential to commercial being initially carried out on a plot to plot and case to case basis when applying for planning permission and amendments to the floor area ratios (FAR) in the building by-laws being a long and arduous process with numerous political hurdles. That being said, seventeen key commercial areas have been officially categorised as 'Commercial' in 2003 in a two phase process; six major roads initially followed by eleven more in the second phase (Anwar, 2010) . Whilst the process was drawn out, what is of particular interest to this study are the areas in which these streets are located and when this amendment was eventually passed and by whom, as the political jurisdictions these areas fall into are critical to the economic and political life of the city.

As stated above, many of these were streets that had informally developed as commercial centres over time with the categorisation of individual plots being changed as and when needed and amendments to building bye-laws being made periodically to accommodate this emerging trend, e.g. increases in the allowable Floor Area Ratio (FAR) in 1978 and again in 1990. The building bye-laws were finally amended in 2003-04 post the implementation of the Local Body Ordinance 2002 by the Musharraf government, when the mayor of Karachi and much of the City District Government was run and/or backed by the MQM. This was followed by the Sindh High-density Development Act in 2010. By marking these newly commercialised streets on a map of Karachi today and

overlaying the *Muhajir* areas of influence (Fig. 5.05.), it can be seen that of the seventeen streets only two fall outside the *Muhajir* areas today. These are both in the city's elitist districts of Defence and Clifton, one of them being a beach front avenue and part of the city's coastal re-development project.

It could be argued that a number of the streets identified are major thoroughfares through the city and serve high-density localities and hence are ideal for commercialisation. That being said, there are commercial spaces that serve high-density, lower-income communities or provide blue-collar city-wide services, such as furniture and spare parts markets, which function as part of the informal sector that have not been identified for change. This may simply be due to the fact that these are either of lesser commercial significance or serve a populace that is of a lesser political significance as the incentive and initiation of the legal process is as much a political one as it is an economic one.

Whilst we are looking at commercial areas, it is perhaps also relevant to locate Karachi's major industrial hubs relative to this modern day *Muhajir* boundary. Figure 5.06 shows that though these industrial areas were originally established at a time when the inner-city *Muhajir* population was being decanted to industrial estates at the periphery of the city, today these industrial sites appear to be located at the fringes of *Muhajir* occupation. Upon adding the location of large Pakhtun³¹ settlements in the city (see Appendix A for the original published map) and inter-city transport hubs an interesting pattern begins to appear; the industrial areas are located at the fringes of *Muhajir* presence but at the same time, more often than not, located at the edges of an industrial site is a large Pakhtun settlement. These adjacencies are relevant and play an important role in the politics of space in the city, an issue that will be explored further.

³¹ The mapping of Pakhtun settlements was informed by mapping exercises published by the Express Tribune, an English language daily in Pakistan. Hussain. N. (2015) Shahi Syed: Rise of a political rookie. *The Express Tribune*. 29th July, 2015 (See Appendix A) as well as newspaper references to Pakhtun presence in Sohrab Goth, Mingopir, Kunwari Colony, Pashtunabad and New Sultanabad (Ur Rehman, 2012) and Benaras, Waziristan Colony, Naziamabad and Numaish (Tribune, 8th May, 2010).




Fig. 5.05. Streets commercialised in 2003 overlaid on *Muhajir* clusters R1000m. Source: Anwar, F., "Land use planning for unsustainable growth: Assessing the policy to implementation cycle.




Fig. 5.06. Industrial areas and their proximity to both *Muhajir* and Pakhtun settlements. Source: Hussain. N. (2015) Shahi Syed: Rise of a political rookie. *The Express Tribune*.

5.1.3 Proximity to Nine Zero and the politics of the city.

Whilst it has been important to analyse the relationship between *Muhajir* space and integral urban features of Karachi that make it Pakistan's premier commercial centre, it is equally important to analyse the relationship between *Muhajir* space and its political hub; Nine Zero in Federal B Area's Azizabad neighbourhood indicated in Figure 5.07. All access points into this neighbourhood have been cordoned off with armed sentries posted by the party at all major entrance/exit points. Due to this level of surveillance, for the purposes of this study the entire neighbourhood has been considered as MQM HQ rather than just the one street segment where the secretariat building is located. Thereafter, a topological step-depth analysis was run, this essentially counts the number of turns away from a selected axial line in an axial map all other spaces are. As this is an analysis of an axial map, the system is viewed as the fewest and longest lines as opposed to line segments. For the purposes of this particular part of the study, topological step-depth has been considered due to the area of the city, the distribution of *Muhajir* centres and the preference of Karachiites to use motorised means of transport to get around the city (Qureshi and Lu, 2007)³² therefore the analysis considers longer stretches of linear space. Again, as in the case of segment analysis, step depth analysis colours up the map on a similar spectrum, i.e. red for fewer turnings away from the point of origin to blue representing the greatest number of turnings away in the system.

Figure 5.06 shows that in the step-depth analysis for 2007-09 that many of the centrally located and older *Muhajir* settlements at the periphery of the old city centre, as well as much of the newer developments towards the north and north-east of the city today that have been captured by the cluster analysis shown earlier are up to only 10 steps away from Azizabad. Whilst this does not capture the outlying settlements, it has been seen earlier that attempts appear

³² Using data on the manner in which a trip is made in Karachi – public transport, private/para transit, walking/cycling – and comparing data from 1987 and 2004, Qureshi and Lu (2007) show that trips taken using public transport have dropped from 57% to 52% whilst trips made using private /para transit have risen from 31% to 48% and whilst data on walking/cycling for 2004 was not available, this suggests that most trips are conducted using motorized means of transport.

to have been made to connect these areas to the central block of the city by introducing the Shaheed-e-Millat Expressway, Malir River Bridge and converting Rashid Minhas Road into a signal-free corridor.

Again, whilst the many transport development projects may not have dramatically changed the city-wide connectivity of Korangi, Shah Faisal Colony and Malir, when comparing step-depth for Azizabad in 1972-74, there is a noticeable increase in the reach of the 10-step limit applied earlier that these transportation links have facilitated. Previously this influence seemed to be limited to only those areas within the District Central municipal boundary, the Lyari River forming a natural break in the urban fabric. Again this seems to add to the notion that perhaps political clout has been used to extend physical reach within the city (Fig. 5.08.).

Whilst the discussion here has focussed on the relationship of *Muhajir* spaces to the centre, another aspect of the spatialisation of ethno-politics in the city that perhaps this process of mapping can shed light on is the nature of the peripheral areas of *Muhajir* presence and the kind of interface this space becomes with the rest of the city and its residents. The *Muhajir* community may occupy and control the central areas of the city but the peripheries appear to be a different case. As has already been seen, Karachi's major industrial sites are located at the fringes of *Muhajir* areas of influence which in turn appear to be flanked by low-income Pakhtun settlements, most of which are understandably inter-city transport hubs, transport being an industry monopolised by the Pakhtun community since the 1960s and Ayub Khan's patronage. Additionally, as seen in chapter 4, as the city grew in response to the influx of up-country migrants and Afghan and Bihari refugees, these peripheral regions absorbed these new arrivals resulting in vast multi-ethnic, low-income settlements. Hence, whilst the centre appears to be strongly *Muhajir* and specifically voting for the MQM, the peripheries appear to be home to a myriad of communities.

As discussed earlier, Karachi is a city where the politics of space and ethnicity often result in violent encounters between competing ethno-political groups. These encounters often take the form of targeted drive-by shooting or bombings of public events and spaces. Analysing the locations in which these encounters

and violent events take place and cluster may be a means to further describe the nature of these peripheral, ethnically mixed spaces. During the election period in May-August of 2013, ethno-political tensions in the city were understandably at a fever pitch and this situation formed a morbidly ideal environment for politically motivated acts of violence.

Figure 5.09 shows the cluster analysis for shootings and bombings mapped in the city as described in the methodology section of this study for this time period. The cluster radius for this particular analysis was set at 1000m; the cluster size increasing every time another event was encountered within this radius. What can be seen here is that there appears to be two kinds of locations in the city for the clustering of violent activity; peripherally located clusters and those located within the body of *Muhajir* majority presence and highly proximate to *Muhajir* centres. Interestingly one feature remains consistent across these clusters; the fact that these flashpoints of violent activity all appear to be within *Muhajir* space.

On closer investigation of the ethnic mix of these peripheral areas and the groups engaged in these encounters, it becomes apparent that most politically motivated violent encounters can be distributed into two categories; *Muhajir* vs. *Muhajir* conflicts or *Muhajir* vs. non-*Muhajir* conflicts. The former in localities such as Korangi and New Karachi are the outcome of 'tit-for-tat' killings between the MQM and their splinter faction MQM Haqiqi in Korangi and MQM and JI in New Karachi. Lyari and Qasba/Kati Pahari illustrate the latter category; *Muhajir* vs. non-*Muhajir*. The Lyari conflict is considered to the result of a proxy war between the PPP and MQM played out in the form of a gang war between two Baloch factions – the Peoples' Amn Committee (PAC) and the Kutchi Raabta Committee (KRC) (Yusuf, 2012). The situation in Qasba/Kati Pahari is a *Muhajir* vs. Pakhtun rivalry that dates back to 1985 and has been simmering since. Both instances seem to illustrate the diminishing hold that the MQM has on its space as distance from their political centre increases, suggesting that the peripheries become spaces of greater contestation than other localities in the city by virtue of their diverse ethnic definition.




Fig. 5.07. Muhajir area of influence and centres and their location relative to topological stepdepth from Azizabad, 2007-09.




Fig. 5.08. Topological Step-depth from Azizabad, showing the impact of added transport infrastructure to the MQM's 10-step reach.




Fig. 5.09. Location of flashpoints of violence and Pakhtun settlements relative to *Muhajir* presence.

5.1.4 The Scale of Political influence: The political logic of location

The discussion thus far has shown how the various physical components that make-up MQM's political presence on the ground function as elements unto themselves within the context of the settlement. This section will show that in addition to the spatial role played by these elements at the local scale, the political structure of the organisation as a whole is reflected in its spatialisation across changing scales; from that of the city to that of the settlement. The hierarchical structure of the MQM seems to suggest an inherent understanding on the part of the organisation of the various scales at which the city and its residents function. As discussed in the previous chapter, MQM's central headquarters, also known as 'Nine Zero', sits at the top of the pyramid managing both the country and city-wide running of the party. Under this are twenty-six Sector offices dispersed across the city, each of which oversee the activities of between eight to ten Unit offices located in various neighbourhoods within each Sector. This structure allows for a two-way flow of information; the dissemination of party ideology and instruction from the top down and the ability to build localised neighbourhood insight from the bottom up.

Upon testing the spatial rationale of this structure, an interesting pattern comes to light, whilst Nine Zero does not sit at the centre of the city-wide Normalised Choice network, it is located close to a major thoroughfare facilitating easy access to the larger spatial network. Additionally, as seen in Figure 5.10, this location allows for reasonably easy access to the community's major strongholds; i.e. District Central and East, further facilitated by the construction of flyovers and underpasses across the city in the last 20 years. Analysing the location of Sector offices across various radii using Normalised Choice values (NACH), showed that over 50% of Sector offices - fourteen of twenty-six - occupied the top 15% of Normalised Choice street segments at a scale of 3000m thereby occupying spaces with a reasonably high movement potential at the intermediary scale between city and settlement (Figure 5.11). A similar cross radii analysis of the 115 mapped MQM Unit locations shows that over 40% are located on the top 15% of Normalise Choice street segments at a radius of 1800m (Figure 5.12). The change in radii seems to suggest that the catchment or effective presence of the Unit office is deliberately designed to

address the scale of the settlement or neighbourhood as opposed to a wider catchment as seen in the case of the Sector. The use of 15% of the top NACH values for both the Sector and unit analysis as opposed to 10% as seen earlier in this discussion seems to suggest that whilst both functions exhibit a propensity to be located on streets with reasonably high movement potential, they are not necessarily the busiest segments at their respective scales. Whilst these results are not all inclusive, they do suggest that the political hierarchy has an important spatial element that acknowledges the changing scales at which the community interacts with the city.




Fig. 5.10. Relationship of Nine Zero to the top 3% of NACH_Rn street segments.




Fig. 5.11. Relationship of Sector Offices to the top 15% of NACH_R3000 street segments.




Fig.5.12. Relationship of Unit Offices to the top 15% of NACH_R1800 street segments.

5.2. Muhajir Settlement Typologies

This section will argue that there appear to be spatial similarities between these centres beyond the clustering of communal institutions and their proximity to major thoroughfares that may be interpreted as being indicative of a socio-economic profile for the community. Thus this section describes and defines the socio-economic, and morphological similarities of the *Muhajir* centres identified thus far using spatial network analysis and categorisations from masterplan listings of plot size and prevalent economic bracket in a settlement.

As seen in the previous chapter, the primary objective of various government agencies immediately after Partition was the rehabilitation of refugees resulting in the establishment of colonies and townships for displaced persons and housing schemes through a process of plot allocation initially through the Karachi Improvement Trust (KIT) and later through the Karachi Development Authority (KDA). The KDA classifies and regulates the allotment of residential plots in the following manner:

- i) Plots less than 100 square metres are reserved for *jhuggies* (temporary reed huts) and are classified as 'small plots'.
- ii) 'Medium' sized plots range in size from 100-335 square metres where 20% of the plots are reserved for government employees, 10% for defense personnel, 35% for construction companies and 35% for the general public.
- iii) 'Large' plots; i.e. those larger than 335 square metres in area, where 20% reserved for government employees, 10% for defense personnel and the remaining for the public sector (Dowall, 1991b).

This process of allocation suggests an in-built socio-economic stratification by plot size, i.e. where larger the plot the greater the affluence of the residents. Hence for the purpose of this section of the study, the average residential plot size of a settlement has been used as a measure of affluence of the settlement. This process of socio-economic and morphological profiling has been used to select case studies for further detailed investigation.

5.2.1 Housing type and Plot size as Economic Markers of a Community.

The centroids used to mark the geometric centre of the form derived from the heatmap analysis of *Muhajir* communal institutional densities and thus indicating centres within the *Muhajir* area of influence when overlaid on a map of Karachi coincided with identifiable *Muhajir* neighbourhoods. Many of these had come up in literature pertaining to the political exploits of the community referred to earlier in this study. Figure 5.13 shows the municipal boundaries of these neighbourhoods and the location of the centroids.

It should be noted that in this section, there is a noticeable absence of elements of *Muhajir-ness* and therefore *Muhajir* centres in higher income areas of the city, i.e. Defence and Clifton to the south. Additionally, of the twelve centres defined (Table 5.1), the average plot sizes in eight of these is 100 square metres or less, with most of these neighbourhoods being categorised as either “low” or “lower-middle” income in the Karachi Land and Housing Study (1989) (See Appendix A for complete masterplan listing). Many of these centres are to be found in the older, denser, post-Partition neighbourhoods of the city; the images suggest that in many cases structures have been added to incrementally over time, a fact that was confirmed by interviewees in the field, as and when the need arose and the individual households’ finances allowed. This in turn has led to a densification over time of these areas suggesting a reluctance of families to move out of these localities, another observation confirmed by respondents in interviews carried out in the field.

This densification is further illustrated by the prevalence in most of these localities of apartment living, Karachi’s signature Flat Culture with the built-up area covering more-or-less the entire plot area; the images in Table 5.1 are illustrative of how many of these localities consist of mid-rise walk-ups or squatter settlements where the built form extends from plot line to plot line, in many cases encroaching on the public spaces of the streets narrowing them in some case to a width of less than 2 metres. Discrete bungalow style homes with open spaces are generally to be found only in higher income areas. This seems to suggest that most *Muhajir* areas that exhibit typically *Muhajir* spatial characteristics and are politically active fall into the low-middle income range,

the well-to-do appear to be either less politically active or live in ethnically more diverse areas.

Table 5.1 shows the spatial network maps and images as well as socio-economic categorisation of the *Muhajir* centres identified and seems to suggest that there are 3 broad categories of *Muhajir* centres; i) middle-income, centrally located centres where individual plots are larger than 100 square meters (Nazimabad, Federal 'B' Area, North Nazimabad, ii) lower-middle income, peripherally located centres where plots area largely smaller than 100 square meters (Shah Faisal colony, Malir and Mehmoodabad), and iii) low-income, informal or and industrial settlements where plot sizes again are primarily less than 100 square metres (Golimar, Lines Area and Korangi) with Liaquatabad behaving as an anomaly being centrally located, planned yet small plots and lower-middle income. The above categorisation seems to suggest that there is some correlation between plot size and the economic bracket of the occupant with larger plots generally being associated with higher-income neighbourhoods.
















Fig. 5.13. *Muhajir* neighbourhoods in which the centroids are situated.

Muhajir Centre	District	Housing Type	Plot Size	Income Group	Image
Kharadar	South	Old City, unplanned			
Liaquatabad-Qasimabad	Central	Displaced Persons Colony	<100 Sq.m.	Lower-middle	 
Golimar/Gulb ahahar	Central	Informal Settlement	N/A		 
Nazimabad Blk 3	Central	Housing Scheme	101-335 Sq.m.	Middle	 
Federal 'B' Area Blk 9.	Central	Housing Scheme	80% <100 Sq.m.	Middle	 
North Nazimabad Blk N	Central	Housing Scheme	77% 121-400 Sq. Yds.	Middle	 
New Karachi Sec 11 D	Central	Housing Scheme	60% 101-335 Sq.m.	Lower-middle	 







Muhajir Centre	District	Housing Type	Plot Size	Income Group	Image
Lines Area	East	Informal Settlement	<100 Sq.m.	Lower	
KAECHS	East	Informal Settlement	<100 Sq.m.	Lower-middle	
Korangi# 3-4	East	Displaced Persons Township	70% <100 Sq.m.	Lower	
Shah Faisal# 1	East	Displaced Persons Colony	90% <100 Sq.m.	Lower-middle	
Malir- Jaffar Tayyar	Malir	Displaced Persons Colony	95% <100 Sq. m.	Lower-middle	

Table 5.1: Source: Plot sizes and income groups from Karachi Master Plan 1986-2000, Strengthening of Planning Process, Karachi Land and Housing Study- final Report. Dr. D. Dowall.

5.2.2 Categorisation of *Muhajir* centres by their position in the spatial network

Whilst the analysis above shows that there are certain economic and morphological similarities between settlements that make it possible to organise them into these categories, further syntactic analysis shows that accessibility (integration) varies across centres and does not appear to be determined by the economic or morphological classification of the centres as defined above.



Graph 5.2. Shows normalised integration for *Muhajir* centres for radius n, 1000m, & 500m.

As can be seen from Graph 5.2, by grouping the centres based on when they were established and therefore using the maturity of the settlement as a means of decoding its syntactic behaviour, a different set of similarities seems to emerge. Plotting NAIN values for the centres for radius n, 1000m – the radius at which the centres were most effectively articulated in the original cluster analysis - and 500m (a smaller neighbourhood scale), the graph brings to light a number of interesting phenomena. The oldest, centrally located centres of the city, i.e. those areas established in 1949 such as Golimar, Lines Area and Liaquatabad, have higher accessibility (NAIN) than the average for the complete system at a city scale whilst underperforming at the scale of the neighbourhood. Those areas that were developed in the second phase, i.e.

1958-60, and were peripherally located, and therefore appear to be highly segregated at the city scale, exhibited higher accessibility at smaller, neighbourhood scales. This suggests that these localities are quite introverted and function as neighbourhood centres as opposed to exhibiting great city scale connectivity.

Centres developed in phase III, 1972-74, again seem to be more accessible at the city scale than at the neighbourhood scale, exhibiting higher accessibility (NAIN) at Rn than at R1000m. This return to the earlier pattern of global to local behaviour may be attributed to the fact that many of these areas were proposed- but not built- at the time of Karachi's 2nd master plan, the GGRP, in 1958, and hence not only lie in close proximity to the original superstructure of city laid out in this proposal that dates back to phase II of Karachi's development but also exhibit greater accessibility. Thus these phase III centres appear to exhibit better connectivity to the city's structure despite the relative newness of the settlement itself. And finally, localities like the Karachi Administration Employees Housing Society (KAECHS) and Jaffar Tayyar Society in Malir, which are both peripheral; i.e. not proximate to elements of the superstructure, new and seem to be highly segregated across all scales as they.

This analysis suggests that the age of the centre and its proximity to the earliest superstructure of the city have considerable bearing on the global accessibility of the centres; those centres that have developed at a greater distance from this early superstructure seem to have turned inwards and function as centres at a neighbourhood scale.

5.2.3 Towards a more detailed understanding of '*Muhajirness*': selection of case studies

Keeping in mind the information deduced thus far about the nature of *Muhajir* centres, for a more meaningful understanding of the spatialisation of this community, there is a need to zoom into their spaces at the scale of the settlement. For such a study the selection of a representative number of cases across the city becomes an important task. The cases selected each fit into one

of the categories of *Muhajir* settlements as outlined at the end of section 5.2.1; Pir Ilahi Buksh is a middle-income, centrally located settlement comprising of medium sized plots, Shah Faisal Colony is a lower-middle income, peripherally located settlement consisting of small plots, and Lines Area is a low-income, informal settlement. By selecting one case to illustrate each of the categories, the intention is to show that this particular, culturally similar minority community reproduces spatially similar environments despite variations in other circumstances thereby giving tangible form to the '*Muhajir-ness*' of space. The case of Liaquatabad is an anomaly within this in that it is a primarily lower-middle income settlement that is centrally located where the plots are small and thus does not fit into any of the above categories but presents an interesting case in that it is situated at the heart of the *Muhajir* community's stronghold. All case studies selected fall into the earliest periods of settlement ensuring a certain degree of maturity to settlement patterns and development. Table 5.2 shows the most recent recorded figures for population and area for the case study areas distributed across the Union Councils that make up each area and the extent of the selected areas is shown in Figure 5.14.

Union Name	Council	Area (acres)	Area (Sq Km)	Population 2005	Population Density
PIB Colony		236.5	0.957	57,224	59795.19ppl/Km2
Shah Faisal Colony					
Natha Khan Goth		548.1	2.218	86065	
Drigh Colony		127.6	0.516	67683	
Pak Sadaat Colony		399.8	1.618	71,842	
Morio Khan Goth		114.5	0.585	71593	
Total		1190.0	4.937	297183	60195.06ppl/Km2
Lines Area					
Jutland Lines		167.4	0.677	104,708	
Jacob Lines		416.3	1.685	99,144	
Total		583.7	2.362	203852	86304.83ppl/Km2
Liaquatabad					
Supermarket		167.2	0.677	79,066	
Qasimabad		215.4	0.872	101,452	
Bandhani Colony		173.8	0.703	81,500	
Commercial Area		201.8	0.817	94,847	
Total		758.2	3.069	356865	116280.55ppl/Km2

Table 5.2 shows the most recent record figures for population and area of the selected case studies. Source: Karachi Master Plan 2020.




Fig. 5.14. Location of *Muhajir* study areas.

5.3. Functional proximities and spatial hierarchies: the embeddedness of *Muhajir* areas within their immediate urban surroundings

This section will focus on the intermediary scale and spaces that mediate between the city and the public life of the settlement; features, spatial relationships and spaces that address notions of interface and ease of accessibility to the settlement. The analysis here addresses previously discussed issues of proximity to transport link, commercial activity and the political presence of the MQM and investigates their relationship and impact on the selected case studies. The analysis also considers the changing degrees of public-to-private exposure at which the various communal elements within the settlement function. The discussion is divided into two parts; i) the accessibility of the settlement from the surrounding area and therefore the manner in which *Muhajir* settlements respond to their urban surroundings and ii) the internal spatial hierarchies of communal spaces. Part one analyses proximity of each case study to major thoroughfares and major commercial centres as defined earlier, i.e. street segments with a NACH Rn value greater than or equal to 1.35. It should be noted that the proximity of these settlements to and access to major thoroughfares is highly pertinent to this discussion as in lower and lower-middle income urban neighbourhoods in Pakistan, this proximity implies an ease of access to public transport systems that in turn allow for access to employment and other city-wide services such as education and healthcare. Additionally, whilst the useage of private modes of transport is on the rise, in Karachi up to 50% of all trips taken are by public transport (Qureshi and Lu, 2007). Therefore, in this section, the number of points of entrance into the settlement and whether there is a hierarchy to these entrances will also be addressed, and how this notion of accessibility impacts access to employment for the settlements' residents. Part two investigates the location and depth of communal areas like the local marketplace and the sector and unit office from the main points of entry into the settlement and the spatial relationships, if any, between communal spaces.

5.3.1 The accessibility of the settlement

It has already been established that this community tends to cluster, choosing to reside in certain central and older parts of the city. Whilst ethno-political clustering with regard to their places of residence suggests a degree of socio-spatial segregation from Karachi's wider community, the proximity of the settlements to major thoroughfares may be a measure of the degree of city-wide socio-economic integration. This section analyses the degree of accessibility and spatial integration of the settlement and economic integration of its residents.

5.3.1.1 Proximity to thoroughfares

As can be seen from the Figure 5.15, all four case studies appear to be in close proximity to a major thoroughfare. Of the four cases, Figure 5.15 shows that Liaquatabad and PIB Colony appear to be better connected to the global network than either Shah Faisal Colony or Lines Area in that both exhibit accessibility to the greatest number of high choice street segments of the four cases.

In the case of PIB Colony, whilst Ghosia Road to the north abuts the informal settlement at its northern end, the closest roads from which access to the settlement is possible are Jamshed Road and Shaheed-e-Millat/University Road to the east; the former connecting the settlement to the old city centre whilst also being a popular centre of employment for residents of PIB Colony, and the latter connecting it to the newer parts of the city to the north and east, particularly to the commercial districts of Tariq Road and Bahadurabad just east of the area shown in Figure 5.16a. Whilst the location of the settlement within the global network locates it very close to the integration core of the system, PIB Colony itself is quite segregated; the settlement initially being a bus route terminus. This segregation is heightened by the fact that it is bounded to the north by the Lyari River and now the Lyari Expressway, the construction of which has eliminated any makeshift pedestrian crossings between PIB Colony and Liaquatabad on the northern bank of the river.

Shah Faisal Colony is serviced by Shahra-e-Faisal to the north and more recently by the Malir River Bridge to the south but, similar to PIB Colony, there are no high choice roads through the settlement. Shahra-e-Faisal facilitates access to the old city centre and the Saddar Bazaar as well as provides links to Tariq Road, both city-scale commercial districts and popular centres of employment for residents of this settlement. Other employment centres popular with residents who work outside of the settlement include various localities of Malir, a settlement just north of Shah Faisal Colony, on the other side of Shahra-e-Faisal (Fig. 5.16b). The movement between these two *Muhajir* majority settlements will probably be further enhanced by the ongoing construction of two new flyovers Malir 15 and Malir Halt facilitating unobstructed movement across Shahra-e-Faisal.

Lines Area is sandwiched between Shahra-e-Faisal, M.A. Jinnah Road and Shahra-e-Quaideen. Very much like the previous two cases, whilst the settlement is surrounded by or proximate to street segments with high choice values, no high choice segments are found within the settlement itself, and like PIB Colony, despite its proximity to the integration core, the settlement itself has always been highly segregated, this is the case even today despite the recent construction of the Preedy Street Extension project. In fact this intervention has resulted in further segregation and severance within the settlement (Fig. 5.16c).

Liaquatabad, unlike the other cases, is the only area that is bifurcated by a high choice road. As a result, for the purposes of this study, Liaquatabad will be treated as two units composed of multiple smaller neighbourhoods; Bundhani Colony and Qasimabad to the east and Commercial Area and Supermarket to the west of Shahra-e-Pakistan (runs from Teen Hatti to Sohrab Goth). As can be seen from the figures, Liaquatabad's two units are almost completely encircled by high Choice street segments; edges that are not accessible by a high choice street segment abut water channels and hence are more-or-less inaccessible (Fig. 5.16d).




Fig. 5.15. Location of case studies relative to highest 3% of NACH_Rn street segments.




Fig. 5.16a. Proximity to main thoroughfares: PIB Colony.




Fig. 5.16b. Proximity to main thoroughfares: Shah Faisal Colony.




Fig. 5.16c. Proximity to main thoroughfares: Lines Area.




Fig. 5.16d. Proximity to main thoroughfares: Liaquatabad.

5.3.1.2 Points of entry (Hierarchy of entrances)

PIB Colony: Despite its central location, PIB Colony is primarily accessed by 1 entrance with 2 secondary entrances, one of which is primarily a pedestrian access. The main route into the settlement is via Jail Road which in turn becomes the main market street of the settlement once it enters the settlement. Jail Road may be accessed both from Nishtar Road and Jamshed Road from the city centre, or University Road/Shahheed-e-Millat from the east. The secondary entrances to the settlement lie off of Martin Road and University Road.

Shah Faisal Colony: There are three routes into the settlement; the oldest of which lies off of Shahra-e-Faisal north of the settlement, passes under the railway tracks at Drigh Road Station and through Natha Khan Goth (a pre-Partition informal Pukhtun settlement) situated at the western edge of Shah Faisal Colony. A newer and more heavily used access is via a flyover and connects the settlements directly to Shahra-e-Faisal. The third is the newly constructed Malir River Bridge that connects the colony from the south to the Korangi industrial estate.

Lines Area: despite being situated at the centre of the city and thus surrounded on almost all sides by major thoroughfares, this informal settlement is highly segregated as can be seen from the segment analysis, hence whilst there may appear to be many more means of access into the settlement as can be seen, navigation is difficult once inside unless the user is a regular visitor. The level of permeability of the area can be gauged by how deep public transport goes into the settlement with public transport only being accessible on peripheral roads and some tertiary roads being services by small three-wheel rickshaws³³. This has been used in the past when Lines Area was one of the city's no-go areas, its unintelligible spatial structure being used to the advantage of both political activists and criminals to disappear when being pursued by the police.

³³ This was information taken from the report generated for the Comprehensive Environmental Design project (CED) conducted as part of a 4th urban design studio at NED University's Department of Architecture in Karachi in 2010 on Lines Area.

Liaquatabad: Despite appearing to be very dense, Liaquatabad, like the other settlements discussed thus far, has a few controlled points of access from the surrounding main roads into the settlement. Primary entrances to the various neighbourhoods that make-up Liaquatabad are all located off of Shahra-e-Pakistan with secondary entrances located on streets to the north and south of the settlement. The peripheral blocks of the settlement are comprised primarily of medium rise, mixed-use buildings with city-scale specialist markets on the ground floor and apartments above, thereby creating a buffer of sorts between the residential settlement and the main road. Markets catering to the local population are located within the settlement.




Fig. 5.17a. Primary and secondary entrances into PIB Colony.




Fig. 5.17b. Primary and secondary entrances into Shah Faisal Colony.




Fig. 5.17c. Lack of identifiable entrances into Lines Area.




Fig. 5.17d. Primary and secondary entrances into Liaquatabad.

5.3.1.3 Employment & access to work

The degree of accessibility potentially has the ability to impact the degree of public engagement of residents; i.e. the ability/preference of residents to venture beyond the confines of their settlements, be that for professional or personal purposes. In this section, data pertaining to place of employment drawn from 243 questionnaires conducted on two sites – PIB Colony and Shah Faisal Colony³⁴ – was used to analyse and illustrate the relationship of accessibility and employment to economic integration. Figure 5.18 shows the location of the places of employment of respondents from PIB Colony and Shah Faisal Colony employed outside their respective settlements, points were located on streets the respondents named as their area of employment.

Whilst over 45% of all respondents in PIB Colony work outside the settlement, Shah Faisal exhibits a marginally lower value of 41%. Simultaneously whilst in the case of PIB Colony, respondents were working as far afield as Gulshan-e-Maymar, Gulistan-e-Jauhar and Gulshan-e-Iqbal to the north east and SITE to the west, respondents from Shah Faisal Colony were working primarily in either Malir- a *Muhajir* settlement just to the north of Shah Faisal Colony- or in the old city centre. Additionally, whilst respondents working in the city centre; localities such as the Saddar Bazaar, I.I. Chundrigarh Road and M.A. Jinnah Road, were ethnically mixed, respondents working in *Muhajir* strongholds such as Liaquatabad and Nazimabad were on the whole Urdu-speaking perhaps indicative of a *Muhajir* bias in strongly *Muhajir* areas. That being said, on closer analysis it can be seen that all four cases are at most two steps away from the nearest major thoroughfare.

Two things need to be noted here, firstly PIB colony is closer to a greater number of employment centres than Shah Faisal Colony simply by virtue of being closer to the city centre. Secondly, upon analysing the metric step depth of the work location of all respondents' employed outside of the settlement in which they reside, whilst the average metric step depth from the entrance of the colony shows that respondents from Shah Faisal colony travel further than

³⁴ A total of 243 questionnaires were completed; 119 in PIB Colony and 124 in Shah Faisal Colony.

those from PIB (Shah Faisal is 9649.18m whilst PIB colony is approximately half that distance at 4855.68m), the difference between the furthest and least distance travelled is greater in the case of PIB than in Shah Faisal. This is perhaps not surprising as PIB Colony by virtue of being located in the city centre is proximate to far more centres of employment than Shah Faisal Colony, thus respondents in the former had less distance to travel and a greater choice of places of employment. The analysis also shows that in both cases almost half the total number of respondents' were employed outside the settlement suggesting a reasonably high degree of economic integration.




Fig. 5.18. Relationship of employment clusters to closest high choice street segments.

5.3.2 External associations of commercial and political communal spaces

Whilst proximity and access to major thoroughfares, employment centres and public transport may impact the degree of socio-economic integration of a community, similar external accessibility of communal spaces within the settlement, i.e. their relationship to the point(s) of entry and exit and the space beyond, may impact the roles played by communal spaces within the settlement. This section analyses these spatial relationships in the case of commercial activity or shopping streets and the sector and unit offices of each of the four case studies.

5.3.2.1 Shopping Streets

Using a step depth analysis from the closest major road to local market spaces each of the 4 case studies brings to light certain similarities as well as highlights certain anomalies; in the case of the three planned settlements, i.e. PIB and Shah Faisal Colonies and Liaquatabad, the main local market spaces are no more than three tunings away from the closest major road, with the exception of the small market area around the roundabout in the Shah Faisal#5 neighbourhood - the southern-most neighbourhood of Shah Faisal colony - and the market space embedded at the rear of Commercial Area in Liaquatabad. Though on further investigation, the latter can be accessed from a secondary entrance on Shahra-e-Ibne Sina to the north of the settlement.

Upon first glance, Lines Area, due to its informal status, appears to be functioning a little differently in that the location of markets appear to be a more arbitrary and the form far less orthogonal. That being said, analysis shows that like the markets in the planned localities, these markets too are located so as to be easily accessed from a main road, again no more than 3 steps away; the market in Abyssinia Lines being accessed from Shahra-e-Faisal, those in Jacob Lines accessed from Shahra-e-Quaideen and the most extensive one in Jutland Lines being accessed from Mubarak Shaheed Road (though this road isn't picked up in the global choice analysis, street segments exhibit higher values at radii of 5000 and 3000m suggesting it has greater local value).

This shows that whether there are multiple entrances or only a few, access into the settlement is through its most public communal space; that of the market. This possibly provides the marketplace the exposure and access that the economics of the function require whilst maintaining the privacy of local residents from outside intrusion.




Fig. 5.19a. Location of local markets in PIB Colony.




Fig. 5.19b. Location of local markets in Shah Faisal Colony.




Fig. 5.19c. Location of local markets in Lines Area.




Fig. 5.19d. Location of local markets in Liaquatabad.

5.3.2.2 Sector Offices

As stated earlier, the Sector office sits mid-way within MQM's political hierarchy coming directly under Nine Zero and each managing a number of Unit offices. The role of the Sector office within the community it serves is that of complaint centre where residents of the area can bring all manner of problems ranging from access to services and utilities to legal advice and the resolution of neighbourhood disputes. The nature of its role as an area-wide complaint centre suggests that the institution should be reasonably visible and accessible.

Of the 4 sector offices analysed for this section of the study, offices overseeing units located in Liaquatabad and PIB Colony were actually located outside the settlement itself. Whilst this may sound peculiar, it should be noted that analysis of the complete set of Sector offices shows that the description of the catchment of the Sector offices is best illustrated at a radius of 2500-3000m as seen in Figure 5.11 earlier; at these radii, eleven of the twenty-seven sector offices are located on the highest 10% of NACH street segments and up to 50% of Sector offices are located on the top 15% of NACH street segments, therefore whilst these radii may describe the location and catchment of the majority of Sector offices, in some cases catchment exceeds the size of the settlement studied. Additionally, step-depth analysis shows that in the case of the four case studies, of the 36 unit offices considered - ten under the PIB Sector, eight under the Shah Faisal Sector, eleven under the Liaquatabad Sector and seven under the Lines Area Sector - only four units fall outside this 3km catchment of their respective sector offices; three in Shah Faisal and one under the PIB Sector suggesting that the Sector is functioning at this intermediary scale (Fig. 5.20). At this scale, as seen in section 5.1.4 where it was shown that over 50% of sector offices occupy the top 15% of street segments for NACH_R3000 adds to this notion of catchment and accessibility at an intermediary urban scale.




Fig. 5.20. Sector Catchment radius 2500-3000m.

5.3.2.3 Unit offices

Whilst the Sector office is an area-wide complaint centre, the Unit office is the neighbourhood point of contact of the MQM in most *Muhajir* majority areas, disseminating the party agenda at the grassroots level. Activists engaged within the unit are young men resident in the neighbourhood they serve, the logic of this familiarity being that residence provides intimate and vital socio-spatial knowledge of the area.

This particular analysis brought to light some unexpected results; whilst units in 3 of the 4 cases exhibited similar spatial patterns with regard to the location of unit offices relative to their proximity to the closest local commercial area, 1 case demonstrated what appears to be anomalous behaviour. In the case of Shah Faisal Colony, Liaquatabad and even Lines Area- the only informal settlement included in this study where the structure of the settlement itself is far from regulated- unit offices were located within 4 steps from a local commercial area. Those units that are situated deeper appear to compensate by exhibiting a lower angular step depth value- values of less than 1- as is the case with Units 105 and 108 in Shah Faisal Colony, or a lower metric distance as is the case for units 106 and 107 also in Shah Faisal Colony. Units in PIB Colony on the other hand appears to behave differently; all active units within the settlement (the unit located within Nishter Basti at the northern edge of the settlement is currently closed) appear to be embedded deep within the settlement at a distance of over 350m from the local commercial area (Fig. 21a-d).

That being said, informants resident in the area spoke of how PIB's local market served a much wider population than simply the residents of the settlement alone as is the case with the three other cases; the market caters to the adjacent localities of Martin Quarters and Clayton Quarters as well as Usmania and Hyderabad Colonies, all old *Muhajir* settlements. In addition to its wider catchment, PIB's main market is also known for speciality products catering specifically to the Hyderabad community (families migrating from Hyderabad Deccan), i.e. clothing, jewellery and food items thus extending the catchment of

the market to an even wider transpatial community. Perhaps this wider appeal has some bearing on the proximity and visibility of Unit offices in this locality.

As has been seen from the analysis above, whilst most Sector offices are found in relatively public locations functioning at an intermediary scale, i.e. 2500-3000m, Unit offices though proximate to the local commercial area are reasonably embedded within the neighbourhood they serve. Proximity of the unit office to the main commercial area of the settlement potentially allows for convenient access whilst simultaneously facilitating the policing of the settlements' most public spaces. Their location, often close to the entrance of the market place, allows for the monitoring of movement from the outside into the settlements as well as maintaining economic control within the settlement.

Type	Total	Park	Religious Institution	Educational Institution	Community Centre
Public non-commercial	35	22	5	7	1
Commercial	10				
Industrial	3				
Residential	58	1 is proximate to a park	5 are proximate to a religious institution		

Table 5.3 shows the type of locations MQM Unit offices are situated in.

Additionally as a Table 5.3 shows that of the 116 MQM Units offices for which locations are known and mapped – of which most were official addresses supplied by the party itself - a total of 48 (41.38%) were in non-residential locations of which 35 were in publically accessible non-commercial spaces like parks, religious and educational institutions and a community centre. Amongst those located in residential areas, several are located in close proximity to either a mosque or a park. This seems to be in keeping with both the idea of the MQM Unit as an embedded feature at the neighbourhood scale allowing for intimate knowledge of the area whilst monitoring for potential threats and discontent and simultaneously, as Verkaaik (2004) suggests, the selection of location targets spaces that are frequented by the young men of a neighbourhood optimising the organisations chances of local recruitment.




Fig. 5.21a. Location of MQM Sector and Unit offices and local markets in PIB Colony.




Fig. 5.21b. Location of MQM Sector and Unit offices and local markets in Shah Faisal Colony.




Fig. 5.21c. Location of MQM Sector and Unit offices and local markets in Lines Area.




Fig.5. 21d. Location of MQM Unit and Sector offices and local markets in Liaquatabad.

5.4 Discussion

The analysis thus far brings to light a number of themes pertaining to the occupation and adaptation of *Muhajir* space in the city and the community's interactions with a non-*Muhajir* Karachi both city wide as well as locally. Firstly, through a process of legalisation and development as seen in the case of the commercialisation of certain key streets and the development of Karachi's signal-free road network, the political elements of the community seem to have been able to bring major commercial activity and Karachi's major intra-city road links under their surveillance and strengthening their spatial control of central areas of the city. Whilst consolidating the centre, these processes also appear to have consciously attempted to improve the catchment radius of the political centre and improve the connectivity of various *Muhajir* satellites to the central hub of *Muhajir* presence as shown by the use of both step-depth analysis and Normalised Choice measures in this chapter. That being said, as seen through the presence of large Pakhtun and ethnically mixed settlements located at the edges of this *Muhajir* presence and at the termini of various major road links out of the city and the fact that Karachi's major areas of conflict lie at the interface between *Muhajir* and non-*Muhajir* space seems to suggest that the political strength of the centre dissipates as the distance from the political centre increases. The borderlands become more ethnically fluid and control of space becomes negotiable.

Though there is a certain degree of spatio-temporal continuity to *Muhajir* occupation as seen in the previous chapter, there appears to be a certain degree of differentiation between *Muhajir* cultural identity and *Muhajir* political identity. The mapping of *Muhajir* majority areas has shown that certain known *Muhajir* neighbourhoods do not appear to support the MQM, this is illustrated by the lack of MQM unit offices today in the various co-operative housing societies established early on by affluent *Muhajir* communities. Additionally it can be seen that the mixed and affluent areas of Defence and Clifton to the south too do not fall into the *Muhajir*/MQM's purview. What both these areas have in common is the affluence of the residents which begins to suggest that perhaps the affluent do not identify politically as *Muhajir*. Additionally, the analysis relating to plot

size and economic categorisation of settlements shows that *Muhajir* centres are primarily planned, lower-middle and middle income settlements. Hence through a process of elimination and categorisation it is possible to say that there is a certain economic specificity to politically active *Muhajir* areas; the community that identifies directly with the MQM today is composed of middle and lower-middle income Urdu-speaking Karachiites, occupying small to medium sized plots or medium-rise apartment buildings across Karachi's central and eastern areas.

These similarities extend beyond the broad socio-economic patterns of the community to the spatial organisation of the settlements; as seen by the initial analysis of the case studies, most *Muhajir* centres are in close proximity to at least one major thoroughfare if not more. Analysis of responses from a limited sample of residents in two settlements suggest that the greater the number of connections to the global spatial network of the city, the more likely residents are to venture beyond the confines of the settlement in search of employment, having access to both a greater number of employment centres as well as being able to travel further. Entrances into the settlement are often few but always off the main thoroughfares directly into the local market spaces of the settlement. This transition from the extreme public nature of a city scale thoroughfare to the relative privacy of the local market off of which the residential areas of the settlement are arranged is, in most cases, mirrored by a similar public to private arrangement of MQM Sector and Unit offices with Sectors located on high choice streets at an intermediary scale whilst the location of the Unit office is intimately tied to the location of the local commercial area. These locations provide a constant sense of surveillance in many of these areas where political activists appear to be placed so as to be able to monitor activity in the settlements' most public areas without risking too much exposure. This suggests that there may be something distinctly *Muhajir* about the spatial configuration of the settlement and the location and orientation of communal spaces, more so than just the economic and political classification of its residents.

5.5 Conclusion

The intention of this chapter was to analyse the impact that the *Muhajir* community's continued clustering has had on their relationship with the city; their impact on the major services of the city, the notion and nature of the socio-spatial interface between space they have claimed and those of other communities and the socio-spatial characteristics of *Muhajir* space. The findings of this chapter have shown that the community occupies what may be considered the heartland of the city today and, perhaps due to both the location and high population densities of these areas, these areas have become the natural focus for infrastructure development projects. That being said, with the increasing dominance of the MQM in city politics in the last 20 years, there appears to be a concentration and acceleration of development works primarily in *Muhajir* majority areas as seen by the location of recently built flyovers and the legalisation of commercial activity on key shopping streets within *Muhajir*/MQM jurisdiction. Thereby resulting in a consolidation and expansion of their space with a noticeable absence of such projects in the city's peripherally located, equally dense, disputed poorer settlements where *Muhajir* presence and power wanes.

With regard to the manner and nature of the community's interface with the city, whilst development and dominance continues in the city and community's heartland, the borderlands appear to be spaces of contestation. Interestingly, this contestation is both internal, between rival factions within the *Muhajir* community as well as with other communities living in the ethnically mixed peripheries of the city. At the scale of the settlement, these interfaces with the wider city are formed by the most public of communal spaces within the settlement; the shopping street.

This combination of infrastructure development and extensive political presence on the ground is demonstrative of the nature of Karachi's political character; development to appease and entice constituents whilst simultaneously monitoring the community at multiple levels for the purposes of both being able to identify the needs of their constituents at the area-wide scale of the Sector whilst policing the community from within at the neighbourhood scale of the unit.

Hence just as the community engages both economically and spatially with the city across varying scales, so too does their political presence.

Thus far the analysis has focussed on the city-wide presence of the community and the manner in which their spaces interact with the surrounding urban areas; in essence this has been an analysis of the public socio-spatial presence of the community. The following chapter shifts the focus from the externalities of *Muhajir* presence in the city to the internal socio-spatial dynamics of the *Muhajir* settlement addressing issues of sub-group clustering, boundary making and spatial co-presence.

6 ■

The ‘*Muhajir*-ness’ of space: The spatialisation of an ethno- political culture within the settlement.

6. 0 Introduction.

The previous chapters have shown that there are certain communal elements that appear consistently across most *Muhajir* settlements and identify them as *Muhajir* majority areas irrespective of the morphological or economic status of these settlements. Chapter 5 has also shown that there is a certain socio-economic profile, reflected in the morphology of these areas that seems to appear consistently across politically active localities occupied by this community. Additionally, we have seen that there appears to be a deliberate spatial logic to the manner in which the community has given its political presence a physicality in the city, influencing the development of infrastructure networks to the advantage of its majority areas as well as developing a network of political offices on the ground negotiating and monitoring the activities of their activists and constituents from the scale of the city to that of the neighbourhood. Whilst the analysis thus far has addressed the community’s city-wide presence, its socio-spatial profile and the interface between the community and the city, this chapter will address the socio-spatial patterns within the settlement. Hence the questions posed here are how are the various groups that comprise *Muhajir* majority settlements organised spatially? Are the various ethno-political entities spatially identifiable? What kind of spaces form the interface where these identities overlap and interact as well as help to build and maintain these discrete ethno-political identities, solidarities and divisions within the context of the *Muhajir* settlement? This brings the study of *Muhajir* presence and interaction across the changing scales of urban life down to the micro-scale of the settlement.

Earlier in the study, analysis of post-Partition Karachi showed that the manner in which it has developed and grown was, amongst other things, the outcome of the resettlement processes of both the various elements that made up the *Muhajir* community as well as the various waves of non-*Muhajir* in-migration. Whilst this analysis helped to define the *Muhajir* majority areas in the city, and subsequently *Muhajir* centres that have then become the micro-scale focus of this study, it brought to light the fact that Karachi broadly is very much a patchwork of migrant communities interspersed by small 'native' settlements. What this broad scale analysis perhaps overlooks in an effort to give *Muhajir* presence a mappable form is the fact that the *Muhajir* community itself was initially an amalgam of communities and that *Muhajir* majority areas have been defined as *majority* areas as exclusivity was difficult to confirm by the processes used thus far. Thus, using information taken from a range of sources including in-depth interviews, municipal maps and on-site documentation of political propaganda, this part of the study will engage with the socio-spatial complexities of the *Muhajir* settlement. Additionally, using space syntax methodologies to analyse the accessibility and clustering of various communal spaces, most of which have played a role in the analysis thus far, the discussion will focus on the social roles these communal spaces play within the community. The intention being to address how accessibility and clustering are reflective of the role these communal features play within the community, investigating whether there are consistent spatial patterns across the settlements with regard to the location, accessibility and use of the various communal spaces? And, whether location and accessibility impact the role played by the communal space within the community, and whether this is indicative of social hierarchies within the settlement? The hypothesis being that upon closer analysis of individual settlements, despite majority *Muhajir* presence, each settlement is a microcosm of the city; a patchwork-like composition of communities both *Muhajir* as well as non-*Muhajir*, where some communal spaces define and segregate, maintaining sub-community boundaries, whilst others play the role of an interface, allowing for various communities to come together as spaces of dialogue.

As stated earlier, this chapter explores the spatialisation of ethno-political identities within the context of what to this point has been termed ‘the *Muhajir* settlement’. In order to do so, this chapter has been divided into 3 sections; the first deals with the internal ethno-spatial structure of the settlement and attempts to establish that these settlements are not homogenous and are therefore ethno-politically far more complex than earlier anticipated. Due to the complex ethno-political composition of the settlements, the second section addresses the idea that such settlements must have spaces of communal overlap and social interface and argues that such spaces are to be found in the form of the settlements’ commercial areas. Whilst the second section addresses spaces of overlap that allow the various communities to be at the very least co-present in the public realm, the third section investigates spaces that help to build ethno-religious identities and assist in the perpetuation of socio-spatial divisions within the settlement. This layered socio-spatial means of analysing the spaces occupied by the *Muhajir* community, assist in building a more accurate picture of the community through the structure of the spaces they occupy and their spatial behaviours.

6.0.1 Data and methodology

It should be noted that this chapter will continue to focus on the small number of case studies introduced to the discussion in the previous chapter; the localities of PIB Colony, Shah Faisal Colony, Lines Area and Liaquatabad, each selected, as stated previously, on the grounds that they are demonstrative of the 3 broad *Muhajir* settlement types as defined by the analysis of the previous chapter. As stated earlier, due to the uncertainty of the security situation in Karachi at the time that fieldwork was carried out; a para-military operation targeting ‘criminals’ and ‘terrorists’ was initiated in September 2013 with much of the focus it appeared, on MQM held areas of the city, it was only possible to complete a series of in-depth interviews and questionnaires for only two of the four case studies, i.e. PIB Colony and Shah Faisal Colony, as these were considered safer and easier to access whilst Lines Area and Liaquatabad were more “sensitive”, volatile and historically notorious as flashpoints of politically motivated aggression. That being said, some on-site documentation was

possible in the case of Liaquatabad. In the case of Lines Area, some off-site interviews were conducted with residents of the area and some information pertaining to the location of markets and settlement accessibility has been taken from the CED report on the area compiled by the students of NEDUET's Department of Architecture (2010).

In an attempt to unpick the intricate composition and inter-dependencies, the study thus far has been a systematic process of layering of elements related to the *Muhajir* community in order to achieve a finer grain of detail and understanding of the manner in which this community occupies space as the scale of the analysis becomes more detailed. Building on this process, at the intimate scale of the settlement, this chapter too will utilise this process of layering information on the space syntax model of the settlement to construct a more comprehensive view of the settlement and its residents.

In order to analyse the sub-communities and the establishment of possible sub-community clusters within the settlement, a combination of both qualitative and quantitative data sources were used. These consisted primarily of municipal maps showing official neighbourhood boundaries and names (see Appendix A for these reference maps) as well as information drawn from on-site in-depth interviews and questionnaires pertaining to the location and nature of sub-community clusters within the settlements. In-depth interviews consisted of semi-structured discussions with long-time residents of the areas about how and when the spaces of the settlements had changed and evolved and what forces they felt propelled these changes, whilst the questionnaires, amongst other things, asked respondents to indicate on a map where they lived and localities within the settlement where they felt threatened. Whilst very few respondents agreed to answer the last of these questions claiming that Karachi as a city is unsafe and one can only be truly safe in one's own home, answers from those who did have been used as part of this study (See Appendix B for questionnaire and interview sheet used).

Although interviews have been a great source of local information, events, communities and boundaries needed to be rigorously tested. This led to the inclusion of political propaganda in the array of identity-markers mapped in this

study. Due to the overly political nature of Karachi's population, political propaganda is encountered, in one format or another, across the city irrespective of the area's political affiliations. It has become a real-time visual marker of the city's changing political landscape as residents move through the city, providing an insight into spaces of dominance, dispute, and dialogue. Hence to further analyse whether ethno-religious boundaries overlap with political boundaries in the context of the settlement and in a way corroborate the interconnectedness of language, ethnicity and politics in the context of Karachi, on site documentation of political propaganda within the settlements was carried out. This included the mapping of the type of propaganda, i.e. graffiti, billboards and posters, flags etc. as well as the party to which it was dedicated. This process has been outlined in the methodology chapter of this study.

In the context of spaces of communal overlap and interface, the local shopping street or *bazaar* will be discussed, not only with regard to its location and spatial structure but also with regard to the role it plays as a communal bridge; a space that allows for the co-presence of the various communities that make up these settlements. This section too utilised both municipal maps, space syntax methodologies and the researcher's own on-site observations of the settlements to analyse how the location of the shopping street within the settlement and the various communal elements along them assist in making the shopping street a place of communal overlap. In addition to analysing the shopping streets as a complete entity in themselves, this section also discusses the mapping and significance of the location and accessibility of the *chai-khana* (South-Asian tea house) and bus-stops within and around the settlement and how they contribute to this notion of spaces of communal overlap and interface.

These elements are an interesting off-set to elements used thus far to identify these case studies, i.e. religious buildings and political party offices, in that both religious buildings and MQM Unit offices have prescribed behaviours and encourage if not demand certain religious or political affiliations of their users. The *chai-khana* in South Asia on-the-other-hand is today similar to the local 'café' or pub in the British context in that it is most often a working-class establishment, serving a limited menu to a wide range of regulars who live

and/or work in the area. The *chai-khana* became popular in Karachi with the arrival of the *Muhajireen* at Partition as these were considered the real tea drinkers of the sub-continent (Ansari, 2005). Historically, the old tea-houses in the Saddar area of the old city-centre were spaces frequented by intellectuals and members of the political left, many of which have closed down in recent years. Today, the *chai-khana* is far more working class as an institution, often owned and run by a member of the Pakhtun community (Khan, 2010) and not a *Muhajir*. It is perhaps this ethnic overlap of proprietor and user that makes this a space that is far less discerning with regard to ethnic, religious and political beliefs and thus is a communal feature found in most settlements irrespective of the ethnic-political leanings of the area.

The locations of *chai-khanas* as well as the mapping of internal political propaganda for three of the four case studies- PIB Colony, Shah Faisal Colony, and Liaquatabad- were obtained through first-hand documentation carried out on site during fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2013 and winter of 2015 and as such, especially in the case of political propaganda, may be influenced by the most recent political/religious events at the time and hence should be considered a snapshot of sorts.

The last section of this chapter reverts to data used earlier in this study, i.e. the location of Barelvi mosques, Shi'a *imambargahs* and MQM unit offices. As stated earlier, these communal institutions demand a degree of ethno-political or religious specificity of their members and users, quite in contrast to the informal inclusiveness of the shopping street, *chai khana* or bus stop. One could say that there is a degree of 'programmed', exclusivist formality to these spaces, where they not only exclude the 'other' but also, build and maintain community identities and solidarities, many of which, as has already been seen at the city-scale, connect to a much wider trans-spatial network.

Due to the uneven nature of the data used across the four case studies, Table 6.1 shows the type of data collected and used in each section of this chapter and the case study for which this data was available.

Feature	Case Study	PIB Colony	Shah Faisal Colony	Lines Area	Liaquatabad
6.1.1 Ethno-religious community clustering		Complete data set	Complete data set	Sufficient data for discussion	-
6.1.2 Political propaganda		Complete on-site mapping	Complete on-site mapping	-	Complete on-site mapping but not referred to.
6.2.1 Shopping streets		Complete on-site mapping	Complete on-site mapping	Complete mapping – data drawn from CED report 2010 NEDUET	Complete on-site mapping
6.2.3 <i>Chai-khanas</i>		Complete on-site mapping	Complete on-site mapping	-	Complete on-site mapping
6.3.1 Religious institutions - Barelvi mosques		Complete mapping – on-site and google maps.	Complete mapping – on-site and google maps.	Complete mapping – google maps and municipal drawings.	Complete mapping – on-site and google maps.
6.3.1 Religious institutions - <i>Imambargahs</i>		Complete mapping – on-site, municipal maps and google maps.	Complete mapping – on-site, municipal maps and google maps.	Complete mapping – google maps and municipal drawings.	Complete mapping – on-site, municipal maps and google maps.

Table 6.1. shows the array of data that was available and used per case study across the sub-sections of this chapter.

In this chapter, through a process of overlaying specified identity markers on the space syntax model of the individual case studies, the intention has been to relate the social behaviour of the community to the spatial configuration of the individual settlements. This will in turn assist in describing the socio-spatial hierarchies of communal spaces within the settlement and through them, the social hierarchies of the sub-communities that occupy these areas.

6.1 Internal ethno-spatial boundaries.

As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the *Muhajir* community themselves are an amalgam of smaller communities all hailing from a diverse geo-linguistic background, thrown together by a shared faith and belief in the ideology of a post-colonial homeland for the Indian Muslim community. Secondly, whilst Karachi rapidly became a pre-dominantly *Muhajir* city, due to the development of the port during colonial rule, it was home to a diverse array of ethnic and religious communities, the stratification far more complex both socially and spatially than a simple demarcation of British and native quarters. In Pre-

Partition Karachi Goan and Parsi housing societies near the Saddar Bazaar, Sindhi and Balochi quarters in Lyari and *goths* (villages) in peripheral areas of the city, and quarters in the inner city areas of Kharadar and Meethadar defined by trade as well as ethnicity, all developed alongside the gridded layout of the Civil Lines areas of the British administration. Hence upon their arrival in the city, the refugees had to fit themselves into this diverse pre-existing ethno-religious landscape of the city both socially as well as spatially (Hasan 1999, Ansari, 2005).

As discussed earlier in this study whilst much early settlement was dependent upon where migrants found vacant land or property, a lot of subsequent settlement was driven by locational solidarities or place based communities in that families from the same cities or localities in Pre-Partition India tended to cluster. The wealthier of these communities established co-operative housing societies, whilst the economically less fortunate set up informal settlements often named after the city, town or village they had left behind. Thus in Karachi today we see the proliferation of neighbourhoods named after places in Pre-Partition India such as CP & Berar Society, Delhi Colony, Hyderabad Colony, Shah Jahanabad, and Sikanderabad (Ansari, 2005).

This process of clustering based on ethnicity, religion and trade has been perpetuated by each subsequent wave of migration. Clusters have often developed through a process of chain-migration with kinsmen being housed either with or in close proximity to their more established brethren whilst simultaneously often being inducted into the same profession or trade. This process has led to, in some cases, not only ethnic clustering but also to the emergence of trade monopolies. Access and proximity to the city's services and employment has often also meant that, unless facilitated by the State, such clusters will develop as an infill of sorts within the existing urban fabric of the city, similar to the manner in which the *Muhajireen* initially occupied the spaces of Karachi at Independence. Hence in Karachi today, one often finds different ethno-linguistic clusters of varying political affiliation and economic definition side-by-side, all part of the patchwork like definition of the ethno-spatial fabric of the city.

It should be noted that as competition for resources increased with each subsequent wave of migrants and, as State-sponsored support moved from one ethno-religious group to another depending upon the allegiances of policy makers, ethno-religious tensions in the city have risen and waned. This has resulted not only in the politicisation of ethnicity in the context of Karachi but, with each political group engaging in violent and targeted paramilitary activity, there has been a change in the ethnic definition of the city's various neighbourhoods. In a number of interviews respondents spoke of the *hungamay* (public disturbances and riots) of the 1980s and 90s that resulted in the movement of families out of one locality to another for 'security' reasons. This may have led to greater ethno-religious homogeneity of neighbourhoods and an unconscious concretisation of both social and spatial boundaries between communities.

6.1.1 Ethno-religious community clustering.

In light of this process of settlement and growth, this section seeks to analyse this 'patchwork' in the context of the case studies identified. As stated earlier, whilst these settlements are situated within *Muhajir* majority areas, many of them being *Muhajir* centres, upon closer analysis, they appear to be far more complex both socially as well as spatially than earlier representations of these areas suggested. Using information taken from fourteen in-depth interviews conducted on site in PIB Colony and Shah Faisal Colony, as well as municipal maps of the two study areas analysed for this part of the study, certain sub-community clusters are identifiable and some similarities across settlements begin to emerge.

Figure 6.01 is a map of PIB Colony showing areas identified by interviewees, as well as local municipal maps, as neighbourhoods belonging to sub-communities that may be identified as *Muhajir*. These include the localities of 'J' Block (named after Jabalpur, a city in Madhya Pradesh), 'N' Block (named after Nagpur, a city in Maharashtra) and Aynabad within PIB as well as Hyderabad Colony, Usmania Muhajir Colony and Bihar Colony; all *Muhajir* localities in close proximity to main PIB Colony. In the case of blocks 'J' and 'N', plot numbers were used to identify the extent of the block, i.e. plots were numbered using the

block as a suffix, e.g. J37 and N40. Block edges were defined by where such numbering patterns changed.

PIB's 'J' and 'N' Blocks have an interesting social history; these localities were claimed and named shortly after Partition by the Gujarati-speaking communities that originally settled here; i.e. people from Jabalpur and Nagpur. But respondents in the area claimed that many of these early settlers have today moved out, their properties being bought by two other Gujarati-speaking communities; the Khatri community in J Block and members of the Ghanchi community in the N Block area, both business communities with a significant presence on PIB's main shopping street. In fact the Khatri community's presence in 'J' Block is further confirmed by the establishment of the Khatri *Masjid* within the block, whilst a Ghanchi community centre has been established just off of the shopping street, near the bus stop.

Whilst movement into or out of other settlements has been attributed to the political turmoil in Karachi in the 1980s and 90s, in the case of PIB Colony respondents claimed this shift in occupation came about in the 1960s with the establishment of the old *Sabzi Mundi* (wholesale vegetable market), situated close to PIB Colony as seen in Figure 6.01. This brought an influx of Pakhtun traders and transporters from Pakistan's north-western province; single men who set up bachelor accommodation in Nishtar Basti, an informal settlement north of PIB Colony. Wealthier residents in the settlement's J and N blocks moved out as the character of the settlement began to change due to its proximity to the wholesale market and their properties were bought up by other communities looking to 'move-up'.

Whilst some post-Partition neighbourhoods saw this kind of turn-over, others have persisted such as the Ismaili neighbourhood of Aynabad. Though the settlement has persisted, with many of the original families still resident in the area, the neighbourhood has undergone a transformation too. Due to a rise in the incidence of burglaries and the uncertain security situation in the city – the Ismaili community being a minority Shi'a sect - in recent years the community has erected a boundary wall around the settlement and a security check-post at the entrance to monitor all those entering the neighbourhood.

Though large sections of PIB consists of sub-groups that may be considered to be *Muhajir* as is the case with the afore mentioned Gujarati-speaking communities, not all ethnic clusters belong to communities that may be seen as such suggesting that whilst these 'centres' are high concentration areas, they are not ethnically homogenous. In the case of PIB Colony we see two such clusters; Nishtar Basti, a Pakhtun settlement to the north of PIB that developed in the 1960s as an informal settlement of Pakhtun transporters and vegetable traders, and the Baloch *Para*, a pre-Partition Baloch settlement around which PIB was laid out.

Similarly, in Shah Faisal Colony, as can be seen in Figure 6.02, the *Muhajir* neighbourhoods are flanked by a pre-Partition Pakhtun settlement to the east known as Natha Khan *Goth*. This developed due to its proximity to Drigh Road Station, one of pre-Partition Karachi's main railway stations, and Green Town and Rifah-e-Aam Society, primarily Punjabi settlements to the west, developed in the 1970s to accommodate migrants from the Punjab. As mentioned earlier, interviewees in Shah Faisal colony spoke of how in the past when ethno-political tensions were high in the city, Punjabi families moved out of *Muhajir* localities, relocating to Green Town and vice versa with *Muhajir* households settled in Punjabi majority areas selling up and moving to *Muhajir* localities they considered to be 'safe' due to their ethnic homogeneity and lack of exposure to an 'other'. Other respondents claimed that reputable families had moved out of Shah Faisal Colony due to the social stigma attached to the use of the term 'colony' in Karachi which is often used to refer to lower and lower-middle income localities. Additionally, several respondents referred to the increasing presence of the Bihari community, with members moving in and buying up properties and businesses in the area whilst displacing older residents.




Fig. 6.01. Sub-community clusters in PIB Colony.




Fig. 6.02. Sub-community clusters in Shah Faisal Colony.




Fig. 6.03. Sub-community clusters as identified through interviews in Karachi's Lines Area.

The limited data obtained with regard to this aspect of the study in the context of both Liaquatabad and Lines Area from a very small sample of interviews conducted off-site, suggests that similar sub-community clusters do exist within these settlements as well. Respondents claimed that clustering in Lines Area was dictated by both ethnicity and occupation, where occupations were often synonymous with ethnicity; e.g. people of Rajput and Mughal descent were known to be *dhobis* (washer men), taking in and doing people's laundry for a living, and the Qureshi community who were known to be butchers or *qasaiis*. These were communities that were built around both ethnic and trade based solidarities where both social and spatial clusters appear to have persisted perhaps due to the space specific nature of these professions. Neighbourhoods and local landmarks are named after these occupations even today, e.g. one of Lines Areas major commercial streets is known as *Qasaii Galli*, whether there were butchers' shops on this in the past is not known, similarly many of the *dhobi ghats* (areas used for laundering clothes) still exist today and are located in close proximity to what used to be the main source of water in the area, the *Tanki* Ground – a large open space that housed the areas main water reservoir also known as a *tanki*.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter at the time of Partition, the Saddar areas of the city was home to the Parsi and Goan communities of Karachi and Lines Area was the munitions depot located at the edge of the city, abutting the Saddar bazaar at its western edge. Thus, the Parsi community – a Gujarati-speaking community originally of Persian decent - not only had residential complexes located in close proximity to Lines Area (see Katrak Hall on Fig. 6.03), but also their social club the Karachi Parsi Institute (KPI) situated on the western edge of the settlement, where it is still located today. As Lines Area has grown and densified, peripheral areas of the KPI's cricket ground have been encroached upon by the residents of Lines Area (Figure 6.03), with the aging and non-confrontational Parsi community being unable to reverse this encroachment. In the case of Liaquatabad, respondents claimed that some clusters have persisted on the grounds of locational solidarities, e.g. neighbourhoods like Shah Jahanabad, but this could not be verified as access to this particular settlement was limited.

This seems to suggest that thus far three types of sub-clusters exist within these settlements that seem to mirror the migrant-based growth of the city: small pre-Partition 'native' communities, majority *Muhajir* sub-groups comprised of place or trade-based community clusters, and growing non-*Muhajir* domestic migrant clusters. Whilst these categories address groups that exhibited specific ethnic solidarities in these *Muhajir* majority settlements, on further investigation it can be seen that sub-clusters within the settlement may actually be of two types; ethnic as described above, and religious.

As the figures show, each sub-cluster has a religious building embedded within it or proximate to it, serving the inhabitants of the locality, this seems to suggest a neighbourhood scale of accessibility for these religious centres, an aspect of this type of communal institution that has already been implied by the cluster analysis of religious buildings presented in chapter 4 where the most descriptive radius for such institutions was 800m. The locational and accessibility aspect of these centres and the role this plays in articulating the internal hierarchy of sub-groups within the *Muhajir* spectrum will be discussed in greater depth further in this chapter. But, what is important to consider at this point in the discussion is that whilst the neighbourhood mosque is often quite generic in nature, in the

case of minority groups, religious buildings are generally quite distinctive. This can be illustrated in the case of the settlements studied; Aynabad mentioned above is an Ismaili gated community with a *Jama'at khana* – prayer hall and community centre – along with other communal facilities situated within the settlement, the Karachi Parsi Institute and its adjoining residential complex Katrak Hall in Lines Area are situated in close proximity to the Zoroastrian Temple shown in Figure 6.03 and, in all three *Muhajir* settlements, a cluster of *Imambargahs* is situated within areas that have been identified as Shi'a localities. Many of these faith-based neighbourhoods have been named thereby suggesting a local acknowledgement of the religious specificity of their residents; e.g. Plot *Chowdah* (Plot 14) and Aynabad in PIB, Pak Sadat Colony in Shah Faisal and Baltistani Society and KPI in Lines Area.

Whilst the faith-based groups identified above seem to have distinct boundaries to their localities, the Barelvi community despite appearing to have an identifiable presence in *Muhajir* settlements as seen by the abundance of their distinctive mosques in these areas, the community's boundaries are perhaps a little more fluid than the definite edges of the sub-groups discussed above. Although this Sunni sub-group is primarily a religious sect, their urban presence identified by the sects green domed mosques and its male adherents are often also seen in green turbans, the community formed the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek (PST), a religio-political organisation established to advocate for the Barelvi community's interests in the political arena in 1990. So although religious buildings within the settlement indicate a Barelvi presence, as in the case of the Shi'a *imambargahs*, in order to identify potential spatial boundaries, it is the political aspect of this community that can potentially provide an additional layer of information in the form of political propaganda that can be utilised to map this community's occupation of space.

6.1.2 Political propaganda and the articulation of ethno-political boundaries.

As discussed earlier in this study, language, ethnicity and politics are intimately connected in Karachi; the various *Muhajir* communities (primarily Urdu and Gujarati-speaking communities) vote for the MQM, Sindhis and Balochis

historically have voted for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Punjabis vote for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and Pakhtuns have until recently voted for the Awami National Party (ANP) (Hasan, 2005). In recent times, Karachi has seen the aggressive re-emergence of various right-wing Sunni groups such as the Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat (ASWJ), the Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek (PST) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). These groups have been using their base in the city for the purposes of recruitment and raising funds for their various operations (Yusuf, 2012). The TTP appears to have made inroads into the Pakhtun community basing their presence in Pakhtun settlements and using these as places of recruitment (Rodriguez, 2010), whilst the PST and JI are looking to break into the *Muhajir* vote base (Khan, 2012). This section will show that political propaganda found within the study areas often reflects these trends as well as assists in demarcating political territories within the settlement.

As stated earlier, in the context of Karachi, graffiti, billboards and banners located on the main arteries of the city are quite common place. Walls lining main roads, especially in commercial settings, have long been used as free advertisement space in the Indian Sub-continent as described by Urdu satirist Ahmad Shah Bukhari Patras in an essay about Lahore written in 1927 (Dadi, 2007) in which he claims: "The wall is initially erected with brick and lime, over which a plaster of advertisements is placed that slowly continues to increase in thickness." This ethos of appropriation of public space for the purposes of all kinds of public announcements has also permeated the realm of political propaganda. Graffiti, billboards and flags are often used to express a sense of political solidarity. Their festive nature is useful in generating a sense of community identity (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2007), whilst simultaneously demarcating urban territories (Ley, 1974) as a show of power and ownership in the public domain. It is this aspect of political territoriality and spatial demarcation embodied by political propaganda that this section of the study will utilise.

In the case of the individual settlements the content, political mix and type of propaganda used varies from settlement to settlement depending upon the communities' resident therein as the study will show. Additionally, political

groups appear to be utilising the natural qualities of public spaces to their advantage; billboards and flags are primarily used on the approach to the settlement as well as on flyovers and dual carriageways. These broad and bright landmarks serve to indicate the main political players in the community and are meant to be viewed by fast moving traffic. The main thoroughfares through the settlement and the local commercial areas appear to be 'prime real-estate', with multiple parties vying for space and representation. These spaces are often festooned with banners and flags, with billboards or large banners located at the end of important visual axes.

In residential neighbourhoods, the primary form of political propaganda found is graffiti, and in most cases this will be representative of one or two parties active in the neighbourhood. This generally consists of familiar slogans and icons that are often territorial in nature. Where two or more groups mark-up residential areas, the manner in which these graffiti are displayed is often indicative of the nature of the relationship between the groups. If the graffiti of both groups exist intact in simultaneity, there is generally an 'understanding' between groups as seen in a number of neighbourhoods between the MQM and the Barelvi group the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek. Where markings have been overwritten, plastered over or erased, this may be indicative of a space that is disputed with groups engaged in some kind of turf battle. This was seen to be the case between the MQM and the Jamaat-i-Islami, long-term political rivals in *Muhajir* areas (Fig. 6.04).



Fig. 6.04. Political propaganda encountered on the approach to a *Muhajir* settlement.

In the context of identifying potential spatial boundaries for the Barelvi community in the study areas as mentioned in the previous section, figures 6.06 and 6.07 illustrate how Barelvi neighbourhoods in both PIB and Shah Faisal Colony are defined through a combination of mapping religious buildings as described earlier, as well as political propaganda. Whilst graffiti, billboards and banners are a common occurrence on both the city's and the settlement's main arteries, walls marked with the PST's ensign in residential neighbourhoods may be viewed as an expression of the organisations stamp of ownership. This notion is reinforced especially in the case of Shah Faisal Colony where the two neighbourhoods that showed the highest concentration of PST graffiti are known locally by Barelvi specific names; Qadri *Mohalla* in Shah Faisal Block#2 (Qadri being a common last name amongst Barelvis) and Bareli Colony in Shah Faisal Block#5 (Fig. 6.07).

In the case of PIB Colony, graffiti and fliers are to be found on streets closest to the Barelvi mosques in the area as well as those streets that connect the main Barelvi mosque, Faizan-e-Attar at the end of the main shopping street to

Faizan-e-Madina, the Barelvi community's HQ, a complex housing offices as well as the studios for their cable channel.

Even though, as was to be expected, the dominant presence in all the case study areas, especially in residential neighbourhoods, is the MQM, there is a significant presence of other political parties especially on commercial streets and thoroughfares. These range from representatives of right-wing Sunni parties such as the Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jammat (ASWJ) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) to small ethnic parties such as the Punjabi Students Association (PSA) (Fig. 6.08 & 6.09). This variation in the number of political actors present in the various spaces of the settlement from the commercial areas to the residential neighbourhoods perhaps suggests a difference in the ownership and occupation of these spaces; commercial spaces with a diverse array of political presence seem more neutral whilst residential areas are spaces 'claimed' and monitored by a particular group making them 'safe' or 'no-go' zones depending on the affiliation of those accessing the space. Thus this means of marking spaces provides both residents and visitors with visual cues, helping them to read and negotiate potentially volatile environments.

Two cases demonstrate this articulation of ethno-political boundaries particularly effectively; Thana Street, this is the double road that separates Green Town, a Punjabi neighbourhood from Shah Faisal Block 3, a predominantly *Muhajir* neighbourhood and the route to the Baloch *Para* from the main shopping street in PIB Colony. In the case of the former, unlike Shah Faisal's other double roads which are primarily commercial, this particular street, along which a wide storm drain has been constructed, is seen to be primarily residential. It is poorly maintained with most street-facing facades being largely blank in that there are a limited number of door and window openings. These long blank facades provide the perfect surface for graffiti, both political as well as general advertising, with both sides of the street reflecting the affiliations of the settlement beyond; i.e. MQM on the side that backs onto Shah Faisal Block#3 and Punjabi parties on the Green Town side. As figure 6.06 below shows, PIB Colony is predominantly MQM with pockets of PST and JI activity, yet the streets that provide access from the main shopping street to

the Baloch *Para* are the only spaces that PPP graffiti is to be found in the settlement. As stated earlier, the Baloch have traditionally voted for the PPP.



Fig. 6.05. Left to right: PPP graffiti located on the approach to Baloch *Para*, PSA graffiti on one side of the street dividing Punjabis areas from *Muhajir* areas with MQM graffiti on the other side.

What this wide range of political representation shows is that there are two types of political parties active in these settlements; ethnicity-based groups like the MQM and the PSA as well as religious groups with a political presence such as the Jamaat-i-Islami, PST and the ultra-right-wing Sunni ASWJ. This increasing visibility of right-wing Sunni groups in the public realm of the settlement is indicative of the rising sectarianism in the city which in turn appears to impacts how religious minorities locate and safeguard their neighbourhoods and religious institutions.




Fig.6.06. Location of Barelvi graffiti in PIB Colony.




Fig. 6.07. Location of Barelvi graffiti in Shah Faisal Colony.




Fig. 6.08. Political groups claiming and negotiating space through the use of graffiti, PIB Colony.




Fig. 6.09. Political groups claiming and negotiating space through the use of graffiti, Shah Faisal Colony.




6.1.3 Internal ethno-political boundary, an overview.

What can be ascertained from the analysis thus far is that there appears to be two broad kinds of community sub-clusters within the settlement; those defined by ethnicity and those defined by religious affiliations, with political representation present for both types of communities. Within the former especially there are further sub-groups of *Muhajir* and non-*Muhajir* clusters. Using both the formal (municipal maps) and the informal (political propaganda) as a means of demarcating space, space syntax analysis has been used to measure the relative accessibility (NAIN) and location of the various sub-group clusters with PIB Colony, Shah Faisal Colony and Lines Area. Additionally, the location of political propaganda within the settlement was compared to the likelihood of various streets being used as routes through the settlement at various local scale radii (NACH) to assess whether there is a correlation between high movement potentials and political visuals.

Graphs 6.01-6.03 show the average NAIN values for all identifiable sub-clusters within PIB Colony, Shah Faisal Colony and Lines Area. The Analysis in all cases illustrates that Pakhtun and Shi'a settlements are both quite segregated, where the Pakhtun clusters appear to be even more segregated than their Shi'a counterparts. Time, or the age of the sub-cluster, should potentially be considered as a factor in the relative integration of sub-community clusters into the larger system at least in the case of PIB Colony where the oldest parts of the settlement are the Baloch *Para* and 'J' Block, both exhibiting the highest local integration values, followed by Aamnabad and 'N' Block, both of which were established early in the settlement's history, and finally Plot 14 and Nishter Basti, the latter emerging in the 1960s. A similar pattern can be seen in Shah Faisal Colony, where Shah Faisal Blocks 1-5 are the oldest parts of Shah Faisal Town, followed by Green town in the 1970s and then Punjab Town and Gulfshan Society. The anomalies in this case are Pak Sadat Colony which saw an influx of people in the late 1970s and early 1980s and therefore places its expansion and development contemporaneous to that of Green Town (the Punjabi settlement) and Natha Khan Goth which is a Pre-Partition Pakhtun settlement and therefore one of the oldest localities of the settlement.

The graphs begin to illustrate that there may be some kind of internal socio-spatial hierarchy within the larger settlement showing that smaller minorities and non-*Muhajir* community clusters exhibit lower integration values or accessibility. The segregated nature of these sub-community clusters can be more expressively articulated through the syntax maps for each settlement as shown. Figures 6.10 and 6.11 show that smaller ethnic and religious minorities not only occupy the more segregated areas of both PIB Colony and Shah Faisal Colony as illustrated by the graphs, but that they appear to be located towards the peripheries of the settlement as well. This is particularly apparent in the case of both the Shi'a and Pakhtun settlements, both of which also appear to take on the form of an informal settlement; a noticeable departure from the gridded formality of the main body of the settlement.

As discussed earlier, the boundaries of these sub-clusters are often highlighted by the use and change in the political graffiti displayed. By comparing the location of sub-community clusters and political graffiti to NACH values of street segments in these areas – where high NACH values identify street segments exhibiting the highest potential to be used as part of routes through the settlement – , some interesting patterns begin to emerge. Political graffiti appear to be working at two scales within the settlement; that of the wider settlement indicated by the clustering of political graffiti along market streets and major thoroughfares, and that of the individual neighbourhoods where artists/activists instinctively appear to be choosing locally significant streets that may be frequented by residents for internal, neighbourhood scale movement. These scales appear to vary depending on the size, density and block size of the settlement as a whole. Hence, whilst graffiti targeting the wider settlement scale audience in both PIB Colony and Shah Faisal Colony is found primarily on streets that exhibit high choice values (NACH) at 2500m and 3000m respectively (Figures 6.12b and 6.13b). Local area graffiti – MQM graffiti in the back streets of Plot 14 in PIB Colony and PSA/PML graffiti on the twisting streets of Green Town – are highlighted at 800m and 1800m respectively illustrated (figures 6.12c and 6.13c).



Graph.6.01- 6.03. NAIN values for sub-community clusters, PIB Colony, Shah Faisal Colony and Lines Area.




Fig. 6.10. Sub-community clusters overlaid on NAIN R2500m, PIB Colony.




Fig. 6.11. Sub-community clusters overlaid on NAIN R3000m, Shah Faisal Colony.




Fig. 6.12a. Graffiti, Shah Faisal Colony.




Fig. 6.12b. Top10% NACH R3000 of street segments appear to correspond to political propaganda located on major local thoroughfares, Shah Faisal Colony.




Fig. 6.12c. Top15% NACH R1800 of street segments appear to coincide with political propaganda located on significant neighbourhood roads, Shah Faisal Colony




Fig. 6.13a. Graffiti, PIB Colony.




Fig. 6.13b. Top 10% NACH R2500 of street segments appear to coincide with political propaganda visible on main roads, PIB Colony.




Fig. 6.13c. Top 15% NACH R800 of street segments appear to coincide with political propaganda visible on important neighbourhood roads, PIB Colony.

6.2 Spaces of overlap and interface: shopping streets and *chai khanas*

As can be seen in the previous section, '*Muhajir*' settlements are complex spaces where a myriad of communities and political players exist and exercise varying degrees of control over sections of society and space in simultaneity. Although the spatial structure and relative segregation of residential neighbourhoods facilitates the maintenance of ethno-cultural homogeneity and the perpetuation of religious and cultural practices and political control, there are still spaces within the settlement that allow for the overlap and co-presence of the various sub-groups that make up these communities. As the distribution of political propaganda across the settlements has shown in the previous section, these spaces are to be found in the public domain in the form of the settlements' major thoroughfares and commercial areas, which are essentially spaces that are occupied and utilised by all sub-groups. The overlap in these areas of graffiti, billboards and fliers belonging to the different political players active in these settlements may suggest a competition for ownership but it also reflects an understanding that these are spaces that allow for a relatively peaceful, and at times mutually beneficial, co-presence of the various elements of these so-called '*Muhajir*' settlements.

As stated above, the relative segregation of residential neighbourhoods helps in maintaining and perpetuating ethno-religious cultures, this is generally orchestrated through mosques, community centres, and in this particular case, political party offices. The rituals and markings of these communal institutions give a certain local spatiality to these cultural institutions that also speak of connections to larger trans-spatial, imagined, or virtual communities. Local commercial areas on the other hand are very much of the space they occupy and the day-to-day interactions and practices of the inhabitants of the settlement and the relationships and networks that are built between shoppers, traders, neighbours and the generally co-present.

In addition to the shopping street as a complete entity, this section analyses the occurrence and role played by the *chai-khana* within the settlement. The South Asian *chai-khana* is not dissimilar to the British pub or *caffe* though more closely associated to the Turkish coffeehouse in that it is a space for lower and lower-

middle income men to congregate outside of the home and, like the commercial area of the settlement, is a space where male members of the community mix irrespective of their religious and ethnic affiliations. Although their rise in Karachi is attributed to the arrival of the *Muhajir* community in the city at Partition, today these outlets are often owned and run by members of the Pakhtun community, serving sweet tea and *parathas* (fried flatbread), both staples of most truck depots menus. It should be noted that both inter and intra-city transportation in Karachi is primarily owned and managed by the Pakhtun community hence their monopoly on such associated functions should not be surprising.

6.2.1 The Shopping Street.

Local commercial areas in these settlements are complex spaces both in the variety of commercial activity and the kind of ethno-political presence in the space. The street is generally lined by formal shops, shopkeepers often extending the display of their wares to encroach on the pavement thereby effectively extending their commercial space into the public realm of the street. These may be replaced in the evening by seating, or a barbeque grill organized by restaurateurs in the vicinity. Hawkers and their stalls then line the edge of the street selling a range of goods from fresh fruit and vegetables to plastic containers and cheap children's toys (Figure 6.14). Though these stalls may appear to be mobile with hawkers often choosing locations that take advantage of high footfall within a settlement; e.g. near entrances to public institutions fronting on to the commercial street or bus stops, spaces where people naturally tend to gather, in actuality their places in the commercial area are generally fixed by virtue of them paying some form of 'rent' or protection money on a weekly or monthly basis to local enforcers who in turn are associated with one of multiple political groups functioning in the area.

As has already been seen in the previous chapter, market spaces within the settlements are generally located in close proximity to the main points of access into the settlements thereby facilitating the easy transportation of goods into the settlement. Additionally the proximity of MQM unit offices to the market place seems critical to the party's monitoring of the economic transactions of the community facilitating the 'shutter down' strike - an often used means of political

protest. Keeping its placement within the spatial network of the settlement in mind as well as the manner in which all political parties adorn and utilise this space to communicate their presence, the market place may be considered the most public of the settlements' communal features with many of the community's everyday activities organised on or near it. It should be noted that this public space, due to its commercial nature, has become the stage for the reasonably peaceful coming together of both outsiders and residents which, in an environment where ethnic and sectarian groups lay claim to space, makes it in a respect a 'neutral' space to be shared by communities.

Keeping this in mind, this section will first briefly describe the distribution of markets within each settlement followed by a syntax analysis of these locations and a discussion on the structure and role these commercial areas play within the settlement and, goes on to add the *chai-khana* and its relationship with the settlement and the neutrality of the market.



Fig. 6.14. Various kinds of commercial occupation on commercial streets in Karachi.

6.2.1.1 PIB Colony

This is a linear market with a bus terminus located at the entrance end of the settlement and market whilst the other end disappears north into the settlement. The area surrounding the bus terminus is probably the most public area of the settlement hence it is here that one finds the settlement's Jamia Mosque, local clinic, police station, post office and the local girls' college. In addition to these communal facilities, in the immediate vicinity of the bus terminus are facilities that may be termed as support functions to the transporters whose routes terminate at PIB Colony. These include *chai-khanas* and 'hotels', barber shops, public toilets, newspaper stands and street corner board game facilities. Across the road is the access to the area's fresh produce market located in a narrow alley that runs perpendicular to the main market street leading away from the main market street to the back of the settlement towards EssKay Lines.

It should be noted that whilst PIB Colony as a settlement itself is quite small, its market, due in part to the availability of speciality goods particular to the Hyderabadi community³⁵, serves a much larger area; i.e. the adjacent areas of Hyderabad Colony, Usmania Muhajir Colony (also Hyderabadi settlements) and other neighbourhoods along Jamshed Road as seen in Figure 6.16.

³⁵ Migrants from Hyderabad Deccan in India.



Fig. 6.15. Left to right: View of fresh produce market, PIB bus terminus, kiosks at the terminus.




Fig. 6.16. Map showing location of shopping streets in PIB Colony.

6.2.1.2 Shah Faisal Colony.

Shah Faisal colony unlike PIB, is made up of multiple neighbourhoods, amongst them are Shah Faisal Block # 1-5 that are the primary area of study for this particular locality. Each 'Block' or neighbourhood has its own local commercial area consisting of neighbourhood staples such as general stores (the equivalent of a corner store), milk shops – these sell milk, bread, eggs and yoghurt, bakeries and *chai khanas*. Larger, shared amenities are situated on the 'main market' located at the entry point of the settlement. Here one can find the local hospital, boys' undergraduate college, sports club, playing field, cinema, petrol pump and large 'shopping centre' for women's wear.

It should be noted that, similar to PIB Colony there is a separation of fresh produce and dry goods in commercial areas. In this case the area's fresh produce can be bought at *Sabzi Galli* (vegetable alley), a street that runs almost the entire length of the settlement, connecting neighbourhood to neighbourhood. Similarly, running parallel to this is *Resham Galli* (Silk Alley) so named as this is where the locality's ladies tailors are to be found along with small outlets selling buttons, laces, ribbons and other tailoring products. Eateries and *chai-khanas* are often found at the various roundabouts in the settlement. The widening of the street at these intersections allows for users to park their vehicles close to the eatery of their choice and order their meal, often eating in their parked vehicle. The roundabout in the settlement at the centre of Shah Faisal Block#5 like PIB Colony, is a transport terminus where minivans (often known in Karachi as 'yellow devils' due to their yellow paintwork and the speed at which they are driven) and rickshaws end their routes. Again as in the case of PIB Colony, one sees the clustering of a number of *chai-khanas* around this roundabout possibly for the purposes of providing a cheap meal to drivers and conductors between routes.

The neighbourhood nature of commercial activity having been established, it is important to note that the market in Shah Faisal Block#1 is actually the oldest market in the locality more so than the 'main market' and thus appears more developed than the other neighbourhood commercial areas. Vendors here sell a wide variety of products ranging from gold jewellery to electrical goods.




Fig. 6.17. Left to right: View of ShahFaisal Block#1 Market, view of *Sabzi Galli*, Parked 'yellow devils' in Shah Faisal Block#5.




Fig. 6.18. Map showing location of commercial areas in Shah Faisal Colony.

6.2.1.3 Liaquatabad

Liaquatabad, like Shah Faisal Colony, is composed of multiple neighbourhoods. For the purposes of this study, the focus will be primarily on four areas, the neighbourhoods of Bundhani Colony and Qasimabad to the east of Shahrah-e-Pakistan and Commercial Area and Supermarket to the west of the same thoroughfare (Figure. 6.20). Due to its location; i.e. proximate to some of the city's major thoroughfares as seen in the previous chapter, peripheral blocks fronting on to these thoroughfares house city-scale furniture and electrical goods markets but internally, similar to Shah Faisal Colony, each of these neighbourhoods have their own local commercial streets. The area's main meat

market is located in Bundhani Colony, a narrow street lined with butchers on both sides just past the neighbourhood library and primary school. One block away, running parallel to this is the dry goods market.

Across the main road in the neighbourhood known as Supermarket (named after the purpose built supermarket complex commissioned by Z A Bhutto at the entrance to the neighbourhood), the same format is applied as that found in Bundhani Colony; two market streets, one for fresh produce and a parallel market street for dry goods. It should be noted that whilst commercial street widths are consistent across the four neighbourhoods in Liaquatabad, fresh produce market streets appear far narrower and poorly maintained as compared to their dry goods counterparts. This is often due to the encroachment by vendors of the edge of street for the purposes of both display as well as the storage of their produce. This casual encroachment of the public realm seems to suggest that vendors view the street and its environs as an extension of their private space. These streets either do not have pavement areas or these spaces have been extensively encroached upon hence pedestrians, motorised vehicles and carts used to transport goods utilise the road in an unintentional form of shared use.

Whilst other neighbourhoods in Liaquatabad Town are old informal settlements, the localities being studied are high density planned settlements hence at the centre of each neighbourhood is a school, playing field and mosque/*imambargah*. These services are located on the main commercial street for each neighbourhood. Interestingly, as seen in the previous chapter, it is within these public facilities situated on the commercial streets and at the centre of the neighbourhood that MQM unit offices can often be found particularly in Liaquatabad.



Fig. 6.19. Left to right: A market street in Commercial Area, Central communal area, Fresh produce market in the Supermarket neighbourhood.




Fig. 6.20. Map showing location of commercial areas in Liaquatabad

6.2.1.4 Lines Area

Information pertaining to activities within this particular settlement is limited due to lack of access during the fieldwork period hence the analysis here is based on a study carried out by students of the Department of Architecture at NED UET in Karachi in 2010. The data presented as part of the study was broad, indicating only where commercial streets are located but giving no indication as to the kind of products sold therein. Lines Area is an informal settlement composed of seven smaller neighbourhoods; Central Jacob Lines, Jacob Lines,

Jutland Lines, Tunisia Lines, Abyssinia Lines, Fowler Lines and Bizerta Lines, established at Partition on the site of a colonial arms depot. For the purposes of this study, the part of the settlement formed by the first five neighbourhoods will be analysed.

Speciality markets dealing in antique and renovated furniture, compressors for refrigeration units and motor mechanics are located primarily on Mubarak Shaheed Road on the southern edge of the settlement along with a large hypermarket. Whilst these are city-scale speciality markets, as can be seen from the Figure 6.21, each of the named neighbourhoods appears to have their own local commercial area located deep within the settlement. It should be noted that the streets of the settlement are narrow with bus routes restricted to travelling along main roads at the peripheries of the settlement. Travel into to settlement is either by privately owned transport or by foot thereby limiting through movement in the settlement and thus probably necessitating separate commercial areas for each neighbourhood.




Fig. 6.21. Neighbourhoods and local commercial areas in Lines Area.




6.2.2 Comparative spatial analysis of shopping streets

What can be seen from the discussion so far is that each settlement is a composition or patchwork of neighbourhoods, some more ethnically or religiously specific whilst others are more generically *Muhajir*. The previous chapter saw the discussion touch upon the shopping street as an interface between the settlement and the city. This section will argue that the spatial role of interface extends further to include the manner in which the shopping street behaves within the settlement.



As can be seen in Figures 6.18 and 6.21 previously, in the case of both Shah Faisal Colony and Lines Area, shopping streets appear to be located at the physical interface between neighbourhoods, i.e. the streets that form the municipal boundary between neighbourhoods. Whilst this may be seen as a planned urban intervention in Shah Faisal Colony, this is clearly not the case in Lines Area simply by virtue of the fact that the settlement is unplanned and informal. Hence this occurrence seems intriguing. This can perhaps be explored through a syntactic analysis of all shopping streets in the study areas. Graphs 6.04 to 6.08 show Normalised Choice (NACH) values for shopping streets within the case study settlements across the changing radii at which this study has been conducted compared to the average Normalised Choice value for each settlement as a whole. This kind of comparative graphical analysis of syntax values makes it possible to identify and isolate the radii at which each shopping street exhibits the highest NACH value whilst simultaneously illustrating how the shopping streets behave relative to the settlement as a whole.

Beginning the discussion with shopping streets located in Shah Faisal Colony and Lines Area, in both cases we see that the shopping streets exhibit higher choice values than the average value of the settlement with Shah Faisal Colony exhibiting a peak at a radius of 3000m whilst Lines Area exhibits a similar peak at 1800m. Figures 6.22 and 6.23 show syntax maps of Shah Faisal Colony and Lines Area at 3000m and 1800m respectively, these figures illustrate how at these radii, NACH identifies the local commercial streets. This can be further highlighted by isolating all street segments above a particular value. In the case

of Lines Area by isolating the top 15% of NACH_R1800m street segments – the peak radius indicated in Graph 6.06 for this locality - most of the shopping streets are highlighted whilst in the case of Shah Faisal Colony, isolating the top 10% of NACH street segments at a radius of 3000m, shopping streets and high Choice street segments seem to coincide here too. This seems to suggest that in both cases local commercial areas naturally gravitate towards high Choice street segments and that, in these two cases, these high Choice streets seem to coincide with neighbourhood boundaries suggesting that the ethno-political neutrality of the shopping street may be partially dependent upon its strategic positioning within the structure of the settlement.



Graph 6.04-6.06. Average NACH values for shopping streets and the settlement; PIB Colony, Shah Faisal Colony & Lines Area



Graph 6.07 & 6.08. Average NACH values for wider area shopping streets and the settlement, Liaquatabad.



Fig. 6.22. NACH R3000m, Shah Faisal Colony, Karachi.



Fig. 6.23. NACH R1800m, Lines Area, Karachi.




Fig. 6.24. Top 10% of street segments, NACH R3000m, Shah Faisal Colony, Karachi.




Fig. 6.25. Top 15% of street segments, NACH R1800m, Lines Area, Karachi.

In the case of PIB Colony, the smallest and oldest of the four settlements, the shopping street appears to be embedded within the settlement as opposed to being located at the edge of a neighbourhood; the market is situated in such a way that it appears to be equidistant from most parts of the settlement, with blocks adjacent to it appearing to not ‘belong’ to any one sub-group as can be seen in the previous section. Graph 6.04 shows that the shopping street not

only has a higher Choice value than the average for the settlement but that it appears to peak at a radius of 2500m. Similar to both Shah Faisal Colony and Line Area, upon isolating the top 10% of street segments at NACH R2500m, it can be seen that most of the commercial spaces within the settlement are highlighted (Fig. 6.27). In PIB Colony similar to Lines Area, the commercial area developed organically over time as the settlement matured and was not a space earmarked for commercial activity when the settlement was first laid out. This seems to suggest that commercial activity in these settlements naturally gravitates towards street segments with the highest local choice values.

Whilst this may not be particularly unexpected, what is intriguing though is the relatively large radius at which PIB's commercial area seems to peak for such a small settlement. It should be noted that at its inception PIB Colony sat at the edge of the city, at a distance from the city's commercial district and, over time other *Muhajir* settlements (Usmania Muhajir Colony, Hyderabad Colony, Bihar Colony) developed in close proximity to it. Additionally due to the large number of Hyderabad residents to be found amongst its earliest residents and in proximate localities, the commercial area has developed a reputation as a speciality market selling Hyderabad jewellery, formal clothing and food. These elements seem to speak to the wider catchment to which this market appears to be statistically catering.

Liaquatabad seems to be a combination of the two shopping street types outlined above; the 'edge market' and the 'embedded market'. Simultaneously it appears that some neighbourhoods within the settlement are highly integrated at mid-range radii whilst others are quite segregated causing the shopping streets to behave in a varied manner. Shopping streets located one step away from main thoroughfares exhibit reasonably stable, high Choice values – values above 1.3 – between NACH R800 to NACH R2000m as seen in Graphs 6.07 and 6.08, with NACH R1000m capturing this one-step process most successfully as seen in figures 6.28 and 6.29. These high choice streets generally house markets that cater to the wider area whilst shorter, more segregated commercial areas embedded within the settlement appear to cater to a much smaller catchment area; these street segments appear to be highlighted as the top 10% of NACH R200m street segments.




Fig. 6.26. NACH_R2500m, PIB Colony, Karachi.




Fig. 6.27. Top 10% of street segments, NACH_R2500m, PIB Colony, Karachi.




Fig. 6.28. NACH_R1000m, Liaquatabad, Karachi.




Fig. 6.29. Top 10% of street segments, NACH_R1000m, Liaquatabad, Karachi.

As can be seen from the discussion thus far, the radii at which each set of shopping streets exhibit their peak values vary from settlement to settlement. It should be noted that block sizes, densities and spatial configuration vary across the four case studies.

6.2.3 Chai-Khanas

It is important to note that the *chai-khana* is a common feature of lower-middle and lower-income areas and is not dissimilar to the coffeehouses of eighteenth century Istanbul in that often due to the lack of space within the domestic realm, the coffeehouse became an extension of the domestic space for men, whilst the home was the social sphere of women (Mikhail, 2007). This is reflected in the manner in which the pavement and street outside the *chai-khana* is often appropriated by the proprietor as an extension of the shop to accommodate patrons as an urban lounge of sorts. This appropriation of outdoor space blurs the boundaries between the inside and outside of the shop thus opening up the view of the street from within whilst simultaneously allowing passers-by a view into the depths of the *chai-khana* making it very much part of the happenings of the street.



Fig.6.30. The front façade of a *chai-khana* is often open to the street allowing for a casual occupation of the street.

When addressing this issue of location and accessibility, two features of the *chai-khana* come to light upon closer examination of the detailed maps of the study areas (Figures 6.31-6.33): it can be seen that *chai-khanas* are situated primarily on the main market streets of the settlements and that they tend to cluster. The markets streets as has already been seen, generally occupy the most integrated street segments at the neighbourhood scale – most often the top 10% of NACH street segments - and are easily accessible from city level major thoroughfares outside the settlements along which access to public transport is available. This proximity to main thoroughfares and access to transportation seems particularly important to the location of *chai-khanas*; of the

98 *chai-khanas* plotted in the 3 settlements, 67% were situated on street segments with a NACH Rn higher than 1.3 and, there appears to be a higher concentration of *chai-khanas* on streets that are closer to a bus stop (indicated on the maps below as orange squares) than on those that are not. This is particularly evident in the case of Liaquatabad and PIB Colony: there is a noticeable clustering around the bus stop at the entrance to the settlement in PIB whilst in Liaquatabad commercial streets closest to the Nairang and Number 10 stops show a clustering of *chai-khanas*.

The second point of them appearing to cluster is also interesting as they seem to cluster specifically at intersections; with a number being located either at a roundabout as in the case of Shah Faisal Colony or at either end of the market streets as seen in the case of PIB Colony. In the case of both PIB Colony and Shah Faisal Colony, these intersections are the termini of bus routes in which case these *chai-khanas* are supported by the presence of these locations and this particular function seems to play the role of an interface between varying degrees of public and private within the settlements whilst simultaneously taking advantage of the increased footfall required of their commercial nature. The fact that it caters to a wide range of ethnic and sectarian groups adds to its role as an interface or a possible place of dialogue.




Fig. 6.31. Location of *chai-khanas* and bus stops in PIB Colony.




Fig. 6.32. Location of *chai-khanas* and bus stops in Shah Faisal Colony







Fig. 6.33. Location of *chai-khanas* and bus stops in Liaquatabad.

Graphs 6.09-6.11 show that when plotting the average NACH values of *chai-khanas* with the average values for shopping streets and the average of the settlement, in all cases both *chai-khanas* and shopping streets out-perform the average NACH values for the settlement. In the case of PIB, the *chai-khanas* appear to out-perform the shopping street possibly due to the fact that they are primarily located at the entrance of the settlement, proximate to the bus terminus.



Graph. 6.09-6.11. Average NACH values for *chai-khanas* for 3 case studies.

6.3 Spaces of identity and social solidarity: Religious institutions

Whilst the shopping street becomes a space of overlap bringing together the various elements that make up the broader community that is resident in these settlements, there are spaces and institutions within the settlement that assist in maintaining, perpetuating and developing community identities. The establishment of these institutions is all part of a process of migration and resettlement as outlined by Vertovec (1995); migration, followed by the establishment of cultural and religious institutions, which in turn leads to the political mobilisation of the community. These institutions often become places of negotiation between communities as illustrated by the role played by the Sector office as the community complaint centre, but just as often, depending on the nature of the institution, these may be used to build and maintain very specific community identities and thereby help to establish and perpetuate communal divisions.

This section will argue that religious institutions are one such communal space. As part of the study questionnaires were conducted on site in PIB and Shah Faisal colonies, and as part of the process, participants were asked what kind of community or social activity they participated in. Results from this illustrate the central nature of religion to the socialisation of the community in these settlements and reinforce the idea that this is a valid path of inquiry in the context of the neighbourhood scale. Of the 117 respondents³⁶ 49.57% stated that they participated in some form of religious activity, 23.08% participated in some form of community service whilst only 12.82% participated in political activities as part of their social or community engagement. For a community known for its political activism, the level of involvement in religious activities as opposed to political activities was a little surprising.

In this section an additional category of religious institutions has been added; that of 'other mosques'. This includes all mosques other than those of the Bareilvi and Shi'a sects within the study areas and does not differentiate between them on the grounds of sect or denomination. The intention for this inclusion is two-fold: as an acknowledgment of the other denominations present

³⁶ Of the 243 participants of the area questionnaires only 117 responded to the question 'What community/social activities do you engage in?'.

within these settlements and that this non-denominational 'other' can be used as a point of reference for the behaviour of the Barelvi and Shi'a institutions.

6.3.1 Barelvi Mosques, Imambargahs and other mosques


In Pakistan since the early 1970s with the onset of State-sponsored Islamisation policies, *madaaris* (religious schools) and mosques have been at the forefront of rising sectarianism and religious extremism (Nasr, 2000, & Zaman, 1998), with a number of religious groups stepping into the political sphere to legitimize their presence in a Post-Zia³⁷, democratic society. Earlier in the study mosques belonging to the Barelvi and Shi'a sects were used to broadly identify areas of the city occupied by the *Muhajir* community. In this section, the fact that these sects are small sub-sects within the Islamic faith can be used to further test whether there are identifiable spatial patterns by which these groups occupy spaces within the settlement and whether this is reflective of some kind of internal *Muhajir* social hierarchy.

Graphs 6.12-6.15 illustrate that there is a notable variation in the kind of street segments each of these religious institutions occupy. Barelvi mosques appear to occupy street segments with higher NACH values than those occupied by *imambargahs* whilst simultaneously marginally out performing all *other mosques* as well except in the case of Liaquatabad where all other mosques exhibit the lowest NACH values of all three categories by a considerable margin. This anomalous behaviour perhaps confirms Liaquatabad's status as not just a *Muhajir* majority area but in fact a *Muhajir* 'stronghold' where minority groups such as the Barelvi and Shi'a communities that have been used to identify the presence of the community take on a dominant status, an inversion of power of sorts.


The higher NACH values associated with the Barelvi mosques perhaps suggests a more public positioning of the built form within the settlement. This public-ness of the Barelvi mosque is reflected in Figures 6.34-6.37 where they appear to be situated on the more integrated street segments; often being

³⁷ Though Z.A.Bhutto began the process of the marginalisation of minority groups in Pakistan by legally rendering the Ahmediyya community as non-Muslims, General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation policies gave impetus and support to the rise and infiltration of the Islamic right-wing into government agencies.


located on local market streets as can be seen in the case of PIB Colony, Liaquatabad, and Lines Area. In the case of Shah Faisal Colony, at first glance these mosques appear to be behaving differently in that they do not appear to be situated at spatially significant locations such as the main market streets. In this particular case it is important to consider that the four cases studied this is the only one in which sections of various neighbourhoods have visibly been commandeered by this sect as can be seen in the image below in the case of Bareli Colony in Shah Faisal#5 (Fig. 6.35.) and Qadri Mohalla in Shah Faisal#2.




Graph. 6.12. Average NACH values for Shi'a *imambargahs*, Barelvi mosques, and 'other' mosques in PIB Colony.



Graph 6.13 Average NACH values for Shi'a *imambargahs*, Barelvi mosques and 'other' mosques in Shah Faisal Colony.



Graph 6.14 Average NACH values for Shi'a *imambargahs*, Bareilvi mosques and 'other' mosques in Liaquatabad.



Graph 6.15 Average NACH values for Shi'a *imambargahs*, Bareilvi mosques and 'other' mosques in Lines Area.

It should be noted that the *imambargah* differs in its role within the community from that of a mosque in that it is more a community centre where religious rites such as those associated with the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussain and his family in the month of Muharram are practiced as well as being a place where religious artefacts are stored. Often there is a prayer space attached to this community space. It is a space where the community comes together, this includes women, members who are generally excluded from the mosque in the South Asian context.

As has already been seen in the case of both PIB Colony and Shah Faisal Colony earlier in this chapter, this sub-group's clustering seems more apparent than in the case of the Barelvi community. This sense of clustering is heightened by the fact that these sub-settlements have locally been named giving them an identity of their own; Plot *Chowdah* (Plot 14) in PIB Colony, Pak Sadat Colony in Shah Faisal Colony and Baltistani Society in Lines Area. Local Shi'a *imambargahs*, as opposed to the public positioning of Barelvi mosques, in three out of the four case studies are found to be embedded deep within these well-defined sub-settlements. Whilst this kind of relationship is not identifiable in Liaquatabad, there is a noticeable absence of *imambargahs* outside the Commercial Area neighbourhood suggesting a possible clustering of the community in this particular locality of Liaquatabad (Figs. 6.38-41).




Fig. 6.34. Location of Barelvi mosques in PIB Colony, NACH R2500m



Fig. 6.35. Location of Barelvi mosques in Shah Faisal Colony, NACH R3000m.




Fig. 6.36. Location of Barelvi mosques in Liaquatabad, NACH R1000m




Fig.6.37. Location of Barelvi mosques in Lines Area, NACH R1800m.




Fig. 6.38. Location of *Imambargahs* at NACH R2500m, PIB Colony.



Fig. 6.39. Location of *imambargahs* at NACH R3000m, Shah Faisal Colony.




Fig. 6.40. Location of *imambargahs* at NACH R1000m, Liaquatabad.



Fig. 6.41. Location of *imambargahs* at NACH R1800m, Lines Area.

The spatially segregated nature of the Shi'a sub-settlement, and the introverted form of the *imambargah* within the settlement is perhaps indicative of the social space this religious group occupies within Pakistan. The Shi'a community is a group that has been persecuted as a by-product of State-sponsored Islamisation that was formally instituted in the early 1970s. Over the years, there has been a systematic targeting of the community's intelligentsia and well positioned professionals, a trend that is changing in recent times to more 'rank-and-file members of the society' (Khan, 2012). These attacks are carried out primarily by right-wing Sunni factions such as the ASWJ and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (L-e-J). In recent years there has been an escalation of sectarian violence where since 2009 a number of religious buildings and events have been bombed to devastating effect. These kinds of targeted nationwide attacks of the community are perhaps partially responsible for their preference for segregated, defensible localities where *imambargahs* are located deep within the settlement and, if they appear to be located with higher accessibility – and therefore greater vulnerability to attack - entrances are often turned away from the main street thereby limiting direct access. Additionally, in recent years, there has been an increase in the amount of security and surveillance measures put in place by the community in the vicinity of *imambargahs*, a change visible across the city with barricades and metal-detectors erected around entrances and police mobiles on patrol on the run up to high and holy days.

The obvious difference in the location of Barelvi mosques and Shi'a *imambargahs* as discussed above is potentially indicative of the place these communities occupy within Pakistani society; in a country where the majority is Sunni and extremism is on the rise, the very public location of Barelvi mosques against the embedded nature of the *imambargah* seems to suggest one community that is growing in strength (both political and militant) whilst the other is threatened, facing a growing number of challenges as society becomes less and less tolerant and secular.

This analysis has shown that broad community identities appear to be useful for political mobilisation at the city scale as seen in the previous chapter, enabling the community's political representatives to appropriate space and manipulate urban development in the city to their advantage. But at the


settlement/neighbourhood scales, it appears that people revert to specific ethnic and sectarian solidarities.

6.4 Comparative analysis of communal institutions.


When all communal spaces similarly arrayed for each settlement are studied, certain similarities emerge with regard to the location and spatial behaviour of each communal space within the spatial structure of the settlement.

The Graphs 6.16-19 show that the average NACH values for shopping streets in each of the case study areas are higher than the average NACH value for their corresponding settlement. *Imambargahs* consistently appear as the least accessible of communal institutions across settlements, whilst Barelvi mosques and *chai-khanas* appear to be located on higher choice streets. This brings to light a consistent gradation of accessibility of communal institutions within the settlement with *imambargahs*, and Shi'a settlements by extension, being highly introverted and segregated, whilst Barelvi mosques are almost as public as *chai-khanas* and local shopping streets. This seems to suggest that the Barelvi community is perhaps more confident in their occupation of space where they have a religious presence in the most public of communal spaces within the settlement; the main commercial area, and a political presence in the form of graffiti displayed in the back streets of the settlement and close to their religious centres. This perhaps suggests a significant religious confidence but also a slow political emergence that at present is not perceived as a real threat to the political dominance of the MQM as suggested by the simultaneous presence of MQM slogans and PST graffiti in the back streets of the settlements.


Interestingly MQM Units show no settlement scale consistency, spatial behaviour changing from settlement to settlement, the only consistency being that they appear to exhibit higher NACH values than even the local shopping streets at higher radii. This is perhaps not so surprising, as this suggests that despite proximity to the shopping street in most cases as seen earlier, the statistical distribution of the political structure of the party seems to relate more to the city-scale occupation and dominance of space than to the local scale of the neighbourhood.




Graph. 6.16. Average NACH values for all communal institutions in PIB Colony.



Graph. 6.17. Average NACH values for all communal institutions in Shah Faisal Colony



Graph. 6.18. Average NACH values for all communal institutions in Liaquatabad .



Graph. 6.19. Average NACH values for all communal institutions in Lines Area.

6.5 Discussion

Through a process of mapping and analysing the presence and location of religious institutions, political propaganda and sub-group clusters, this chapter has brought to light is the fact that these '*Muhajir*' settlements are far from ethnically or even politically for that matter, homogenous. Whilst the *Muhajir* community is by far the largest ethnic group resident within these settlements, other ethno-political communities also reside within these areas and have been

resident there for quite some time, forming an integral part of the socio-spatial culture of these areas with some communities being resident on these sites well before the arrival of the *Muhajireen*. This process of mapping and analysis has also shown that the *Muhajir* community itself is an amalgam of sub-groups defined by their place of origin and/or religious affiliation. that the spatial network analysis of ethno-religious enclaves within the settlement and the location of religious buildings therein has shown that smaller minorities within the *Muhajir* spectrum like the Shi'a and Ismaili communities choose to almost cloister themselves in peripheral areas of the settlements.

With regard to spaces of communal overlap and interaction, the shopping street not only plays a role in shaping the local interface between the city and the settlement as seen in the previous chapter but, along with the *chai-khana*, acts as an interface between communities within the settlement: operating as a mediator between the politically monitored private realm of the residential neighbourhood and the relatively neutral space of the public realm of the settlement and beyond. This has been seen by the manner in which commercial areas often occupy spaces between neighbourhoods, thereby catering to more than one neighbourhood. Where shopping streets are embedded within the settlement, these spaces appear to be equidistant from all identifiable sub-community clusters, thereby essentially placing them in the neutral spaces of the settlement. This has been further illustrated by the variety of political parties that have a visual presence on these streets, ranging from small ethno-specific groups to large right-wing religious outfits.

Of the spaces of identity building and social solidarity, mosques and *imambargahs* appear to be more neighbourhood-based, on average serving an area within an 800m radius as seen in chapter 4. This has been further substantiated by the fact that each identifiable ethno-religious sub-cluster seems to have its own religious building situated within the enclave. These religious buildings appear to be more neighbourhood-based than the Unit offices discussed in the previous chapter, which appeared to be serving a larger catchment of 1800m. Between the *imambargah* and the Barelvi mosque, the *imambargah* appears to be more inward looking than the Barelvi mosque despite the fact that both represent smaller sub-sets of the Islamic faith.

Imambargahs were generally found to be set deep within the settlement and often embedded within an acknowledged Shi'a sub-settlement that in turn appeared to be highly segregated whilst community boundaries around Bareilvi mosques appeared to be more fluid generally indicated simply by the presence of graffiti supporting the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek. This perhaps speaks of an internal *Muhajir* hierarchy whereby smaller minorities either choose or are pushed to both the spatial and social peripheries of the community, the main space of both identity and the settlement being occupied by more main-stream sub-identities.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter sought to investigate the internal ethno-spatial structure of the settlement and examine the spaces of ethno-political overlap and interaction, as well as spaces that build and maintain discrete ethno-spatial identities within the settlement. Though the term *Muhajir* has been used to describe this community as a whole from very early in their history, giving the impression of a homogenous entity, the above analysis has shown that despite over 60 years of spatial proximity, political marginalisation and a political re-awakening built around their common experiences as migrants, internal sectarian and ethnic sub-divisions have persisted and manifested themselves in the spaces of the settlement. This suggests that whilst political rhetoric and public opinion projects this community to be monolithic, the everyday spaces they occupy are far more nuanced; here sub-divisions are manifest and maintained spatially through the strategic positioning of ethnic, religious and political institutions that monitor the everyday occurrences of the settlement. The simultaneous existence of communal and spatial sub-divisions of both *Muhajir* and non-*Muhajir* groups as well as spaces of mixed use such as the market, the *chai-khana*, and, in some cases, the local bus stop or transport terminus, all within the same settlements suggests that despite externally perceived ethnic homogeneity and a degree of political cohesion, dialogue and negotiation between communities is a daily event at the micro-scale of the settlement.

7. ■

Discussion and conclusion

7.1 Introduction:

The purpose of this study was to analyse the spatial presence of the *Muhajir* community; a unique ethno-political entity that is a minority group at a national scale whilst forming the local majority in the city of Karachi, and the primary question this study sought to investigate was **‘What has been the nature and the dynamics of spatial, social and political interactions between the *Muhajir* community and the city in Karachi?’**. The intention was, through an analysis of the development of the community’s identity and spaces over time, to investigate the impact their presence has made on the space and spatial politics of the city and vice versa. The formulation of this overarching question was based in an instinctive understanding as a ‘Karachiite’ that the spatial organisation of the city and the manner in which it functions was intrinsically linked to the ethno-politics of its myriad migrant groups. But this subjective observation had to be systematically investigated across the various scales of the city to truly understand and articulate the spatial nature of ethno-politics in the city. Hence, this broad research question was further refined into sub-questions that facilitated a diachronic, multi-scalar approach to the analysis. These questions are as follows:

- Are the *Muhajir* community clustering, as minority communities tend to do, in Karachi? If so, is there any significance to where they are clustering? And, how have these spaces and the community’s identity been transformed through time and their changing socio-political and socio-economic circumstances?

- How has continued spatial clustering in the localities that the community has claimed impacted their relationship with the city? And, as these *Muhajir* areas of influence interface with the city, what form do these spaces of interface take and are there identifiable socio-spatial characteristics to the spaces beyond these interfaces that the community occupy that defines them as *Muhajir*?
- How are the various groups that comprise *Muhajir* majority settlements organised spatially? Are the various ethno-political entities spatially identifiable? What kind of spaces form the interface where these identities overlap and interact as well as help to build and maintain these discrete ethno-political identities, solidarities and divisions within the context of the *Muhajir* settlement?

By charting the various elements of the *Muhajir* experience, this thesis has shown that there is a clear political element to their ethno-spatial identity. This can be deconstructed into five distinct socio-spatial phases: their arrival and initial spatial clustering, followed by a period of socio-political and spatial marginalisation by the state resulting in a political re-imagining and spatial expansion to appropriate adjoining areas to their initial settlements, at which point state sponsored political suppression resulted in spatial fortification and socio-political militarisation, and finally political domination and spatial control. Simultaneously, this multi-scalar, diachronic, socio-spatial analysis has shown that within this process of *Muhajir* migration, resettlement and re-imagining, a few broad themes have emerged; the role played by clustering in the emergence of an ethno-political identity, the re-imagining of Karachi as a promised/homeland for the *Muhajireen*, the nature of spaces of interface as zones of both dispute as well as dialogue in an evolving migrant environment and, the key role played by communal institutions in building and maintaining the ideological as well as the spatial nature of communal identities. These themes will be discussed in further detail in the following sections.

7.2 Clustering and establishment of a community

This particular theme relates to the questions posed in chapter 4 pertaining to issues of spatial clustering, whether there is any significance to where the community is located and the temporal transformation of the community and their spaces. The analysis in chapter 4 has shown that the *Muhajir* community clustered and have continued to cluster through its Post-Partition history as shown by the overlapping of initial *Muhajir* settlements and today's demarcation of *Muhajir* majority areas. The driving force behind this clustering has varied across the community's various economic brackets and through the community's history in the city. Their earliest settlements were a combination of choice and enforced clustering depending on the economic bracket; the wealthy were able to negotiate the allotment of centrally located real estate with the state (Ansari, 2005) whilst the lower and lower-middle income groups were cleared out of the inner-city and forcibly relocated to the then peripheries of the city. As has been discussed earlier, this displacement took the form in some cases of planned housing schemes for civil servants etc., whilst others were relocated to far flung industrial estates as their dissatisfied presence close to the civic and administrative centres of the fledgling government proved to be un-nerving for the state. Over time, economic constraints in the form of rising real estate values and diminishing access to public sector education and jobs for Sindh's urban residents, and self-preservation have become the primary motivation behind the persistence of clustering. Low and lower-middle income areas have densified as families have grown and been unable to move out and, as the community's cultural identity has become synonymous with their political identity, this in turn has been systematically targeted by the state, resulting in wealthy *Muhajir* communities moving away to distance themselves from the city heartland, their places quickly taken by those eager for the protection and sense of belonging this affiliation provides.

These socio-economic limitations appear to be mirrored by spatial constraints within their settlements. The dense street networks, small plot sizes, limited number of points of entry and the location of major thoroughfares or topographical features (Large scale obstacles in the urban fabric) (Vaughan

and geddes, 2009) that make it difficult to integrate their settlements into the wider locality seems to have created a socio-spatially closed environment.

As discussed earlier, it has been posited that spatial proximity facilitates not only the consolidation of identity but also gives greater clarity to belief structures (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006, Sennett, 1996). In the case of cities like Belfast, such a close system not only leads to the realisation of various cultural and religious ideologies, but allows for the emergence of paramilitary cultures as well (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). In the case of the *Muhajir* community, this enforced spatial proximity has in part facilitated the emergence of the *Muhajir* phenomenon; the concretisation of an ethno-political *Muhajir* identity and its subsequent militarisation are in part the result of a closed system where communities from disparate geo-cultural backgrounds that have been similarly marginalised by the state have been forced into close proximity. The idea that enforced proximity and spatial densities facilitate the militarisation of ethnic identities is further supported by the fact that the MQM as a movement found its greatest traction in the dense Urdu-speaking neighbourhoods of Lines Area, Golimar and Liaquatabad (Baig, 2005), localities that the cluster analysis identified as areas exhibiting high densities of *Muhajir* identity markers as well as being some of the oldest informal *Muhajir* settlements and the areas highlighted as flashpoints of violent activity as shown in chapter 5.

As stated above, the reasons for continued clustering have changed as the community and its identity have matured. Similarly, as described by the spatial transformation of the city in chapter 4, as the city has grown, the geographical location of the spaces allotted to the *Muhajir* community too have changed whereby today they no longer occupy the peripheries of the city. In fact, as can be seen through this analysis, *Muhajir* majority areas today occupy the geographical centre as well as the integration core of the city making them not only centrally located but easily accessible and highly connected as well. By mapping the chronological development of the community both spatially as well as politically a correlation between political strength and physical presence becomes apparent. The analysis has shown that as newer migrants have arrived or as communities in inner-city squatter settlements are displaced and relocated, the result of ongoing infrastructure development projects in the city,

the highly segregated peripheries are moving steadily inland and further away from the city centre, and being occupied by these newly displaced migrant communities. Simultaneously, many of the affluent communities earlier situated in close proximity to the highly integrated city centre have now relocated to the spatially segregated, ethnically and politically mixed southern peninsula of Defence and Clifton. The latter is an area comprised of a patchwork of military managed housing schemes and affluent gated communities. This relocation and reorganisation of the city's various socio-economic groups speaks of two kinds of ghettoisation; that of the ghetto for the urban poor and the exclusivist enclave for the affluent (Marcuse, 1997). Both whilst equally segregated are the result completely different processes and have different socio-economic implications for their residents. The peripheralisation of affluent communities was a process of choice, the movement out of the old city centre and segregated nature of their areas allows these communities a degree of security and protection from the ethno-political upheavals associated with the central areas of the city. On the other hand, the state imposed peripheralisation of poor inner-city communities has had a negative impact on accessibility to employment and education – up to 50% of working women in relocated communities have lost their jobs and young men have had to give up their education to find work so as to compensate financially (Sattar, 2012) - as well as added cost of a longer more complicated commute to and from work.

These socio-spatial urban inequalities where the two ends of the economic spectrum occupy the segregated peripheries of the city helps to reconfirm the economic definition of the areas occupied by the *Muhajireen* as middle-income localities. It is important to note that these centrally occupied middle-income areas are not only *culturally Muhajir* but more specifically, as illustrated by the presence of MQM units and electoral results since 1988, are *politically Muhajir*. These socio-spatial features demonstrate the transition of the community from its rag-tag refugee status to that of a middle-income, politically active, urban entity, and speak of an inversion of power whereby a national minority, through spatial proximity and densities has capitalised on its local majority status. What impact this power politics has had on the space of the city will be discussed in the following section.

7.3 Re-imagining the Promised homeland.

As posited by Coakley (2003), minority groups go through a three part self-actualisation process; i) asking for the rights of the individual, ii) official acknowledgement of the distinctiveness of the group from the host community, and iii) demanding the right to 'territory'. The *Muhajir* community are no different in that State sponsored clustering of this community led to a self-awareness whereby the definition of the label '*Muhajir*' has evolved; from migrant or refugee to connoting an 'ethnicity' that in turn has evolved into a formidable political entity eager to stake their claim on land and votes in the city.

As discussed in the literature review, one of the most commonly used means of breaking with old colonial patterns and reclaiming the post-colonial city has been the renaming of city streets and public spaces to commemorate local heroes, leaders, and events. Karachi was no different; Queens Road became Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan Road, Victoria Road became Abdullah Haroon Road and Lawrence Road became Nishtar Road to name but a few examples. In the case of the *Muhajir* community we see a similar desire to stake a claim whilst simultaneously establishing a connection to the towns and cities they had left but still considered 'home'. This they did in the initial phase of their settlement by naming their newly occupied areas after these towns, hence Karachi saw the emergence of settlements named Hyderabad Colony, Bangalore Town and Bahadurabad (Ansari, 2005), and continues today in the form of *Muhajir* monuments commemorating 'martyrs' of their cause and the use of political propaganda to mark 'their space'.

This demand for territory has at various points in recent times surfaced as a literal demand for sovereignty in the form of 'Jinnahpur', a *Muhajir* breakaway state for which documents were allegedly recovered during paramilitary raids in 1992 on Nine Zero, and more recently in the call for the secession of Karachi and other urban centres in Sindh from Pakistan in one of Altaf Hussain's telephonic addresses to MQM activists. But, perhaps the most effective manifestation or interpretation of this notion of a demand for territory is the consolidation, adaptation and control of *Muhajir* occupied space in Karachi's central and eastern districts as has been seen in this study. This in part

responds to the questions posed in chapter 5 regarding the impact the continued spatial clustering of the community in certain localities has had on their relationship with the city.

The spatio-temporal continuity of *Muhajir* clusters as the community's political strength increased has meant that as the city has grown and sprawled inland, the community has colonised contiguous localities. Thus this once marginalised community now occupies the strategic geographic centre allowing them access to and control of all major routes connecting the port – the city's main economic draw - to the peripheries of the city. Access to political power has meant that they have been able to consolidate this centrally located stronghold, strengthening transport links within the main *Muhajir* block as well as addressing the global accessibility of their peripherally located satellites. Whilst this process may not have been able to holistically integrate the *Muhajir* satellite areas to the east, the comparative analysis between 1974 and 2007 has shown that it has extended the physical access from Nine Zero – their political hub - considerably. Within the confines of this strong core, the MQM are able to erect and maintain barricades and look-outs with impunity, call for strikes - shutting down all major commercial centres within their jurisdiction and commandeering major thoroughfares for protests and rallies - effectively bringing the city to a standstill. This manoeuvring of both the political and planning will of the city has essentially established the centre as socio-economic citadel for the community.

This consolidation of resources at the centre becomes even more apparent when juxtaposed against the lack of state sponsored development and provision of services to the outer limits of the city, home to newer, poorer migrants. This lop-sided treatment of migrant areas is not uncommon where residential exclusion is often accompanied by limited access to services and facilities (Legeby, 2009) only heightening the sense of isolation and disregard by the state. In some cases the local government has taken it one step further where, by the strategic location of flyovers and by-passes as seen by the construction of a flyover at Bachcha Khan/Banaras Chowk and the Qasba North Nazimabad Link Road, two connections between North Nazimabad and Orangi town, there has been a concerted effort to not only serve their own community but to by-pass other migrant communities in the vicinity altogether, thereby

isolating these areas further and making them the perfect incubators for extremist/separatist activities. This brings Shirlow and Murtagh's notion of highly spatially segregated and ideologically divided communities becoming the perfect breeding ground for paramilitary identities full circle, whereby those that were marginalised now impose this marginalisation on others and thus establish a vicious cycle of militarised politics as seen in Karachi today.

7.4 Spaces of interface: dialogue or dispute

This multi-scalar analysis has shown that not only does the nature of the *Muhajir* cluster change across the various scales of the city, the nature and scale of the interface between the community and the city changes as well.

The historical analysis showed that the *Muhajir* majority areas seemed to be formed through the development of mostly contiguous neighbourhoods with a few outlying satellites, all generated outwards from the earliest *Muhajir* settlements located at the edges of the old city. As has been seen through the spatial network analysis in chapter 5, today the centre of this *Muhajir* block appears to have shifted both geographically as well as ideologically further north of the old centre closer to Nine Zero and its environs. This political shift is significant when discussing how and where the community interfaces with the rest of the city and its residents.

At the scale of the city, as has already been seen, the interface lies at the peripheries of the *Muhajir* block; these are spaces of potential conflict as seen by the clustering of violent incidents in chapter 5. As already discussed, these violent incidents are the eventual outcome of an ongoing process of migration and settlement. The continued in-migration of both domestic and international migrant groups resulting in the spatial clustering of these dissimilar ethnic groups in segregated peripheral areas which in turn has led to increasing competition amongst these groups for a limited supply of space, employment and access to services, resulting in the subsequent emergence of ethno-political identities to facilitate access to the above. As competition has become tougher, these identities in turn have been militarised, a process made easy through the ready access to arms and ammunition in the city since the 1980s.

The concentration of violent incidents in certain areas of the city – many of which are areas that have been historically troubled regions of the city with both *Muhajir* and non-*Muhajir* communities - seems to suggest that the greater the distance from the 'centre' –in this case it is the political centre of the community – the higher the probability of inter-community tension. This shows that as distance from the political centre increases, political power diminishes and the borderlands become spaces of contestation and conflict. It should be noted that this contestation of space and votes is primarily of two types, the first being internal *Muhajir* political conflicts between the MQM and other political groups vying for the *Muhajir* vote such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and the MQM-H, with the second being communal tension between the MQM and other ethno-political entities, the Pakhtun community in particular. Whilst this is fundamentally an issue of land, votes and power, in the case of inter-community conflict, it is important to note that this clash of communities is not only of space and resources but also of conflicting societal structures; *Muhajir* urbanism clashes with rural, tribal migrant social structures.

The intermediary interface, where the individual settlement meets the city, is an interesting strategic combination of proximity to major through movement streets and an underlying sense of control. As discussed in chapter 5, most *Muhajir* settlements are proximate to - up to 2 turnings away – from a main thoroughfare or a street most likely to be used for movement through the city, this allows them easy access to both the city-wide street connections as well as to public transport. The work/home analysis also showed that whilst the community tends to cluster in the residential neighbourhoods they originally occupied (with some of the newer contiguous areas thus being quite introverted at the residential scale), economically they are quite integrated, with residents venturing out into the city's many commercial centres for work.

With respect to the issue of control mentioned above, whilst these settlements are proximate to high choice streets (close to major through movement routes across the city), as has been seen in chapter 5, the numbers of entrances or access points into the settlements are limited and provide access to the main commercial area of the settlement, shielding the residential spaces from direct exposure to the city. Additionally, through the strategic positioning of the MQM

Sector offices near or on main roads close to the primary point of entry to the settlement, there is a constant, underlying sense of surveillance and potential for control at this point of transition and interface between the city and the settlement.

This study has shown through the mapping and analysis of distinct sub-group clusters and the presence of political propaganda belonging to multiple ethno-political groups that even at the scale of the settlement, these localities are complex ethno-spatial entities where a multiplicity of communities, both *Muhajir* as well as non-*Muhajir*, live and work. Thus here too, within the 'Muhajir settlement', critical spaces of interface are to be found primarily in the form of the shopping street and its various elements, i.e. *chai-khanas*, tobacconists and other commercial activities. It should be noted that these are complex spaces not only commercially with all manner of products and ethnicities present, but also politically diverse, as has been demonstrated in chapter 6 by the presence of an array of graffiti and political propaganda representing everyone in the local political arena from small ethnic parties to pan-ethnic, extreme right-wing religious groups.

Again, much like the intermediary scale interface, these spaces are a combination of supposed peaceful co-presence with an underlying sense of control and surveillance. Whilst the shopping streets provide a sense of egalitarian concurrent occupation, the location and proximity of the MQM unit offices situated either on or just off of the settlements' main shopping streets are a constant reminder of the presence and power of the Party in the area.

In summation, whilst the borderlands are places of potential dispute, markets, urban gathering points such as *chai-khanas* become spaces of potential dialogue, although, as can be seen by the proximity of the unit and sector offices to these spaces, this is not the complete story. This shift from dispute at the peripheries to dialogue in the heartland may have something to do with the play of numbers; where the community feels they have the numeric advantage they are open to 'dialogue' or amicable co-presence whilst covertly safeguarding their turf. On the other hand, where this numeric advantage is either marginal or does not exist, these spaces become zones of potential

dispute where each community is looking for an opportunity to muscle out the other both spatially as well as politically.

7.5 The role of communal institutions in boundary building.

Like so much else in this study, the role of communal institutions is multi-scalar; at the scale of the city, the institution was seen as indicative of *Muhajir* presence and the greater the concentration of institutions, the higher the density of the *Muhajir* community as it is this presence and density that makes communal institutions such as those used in this study, viable (Waterman and Kosmin, 1987). Simultaneously, whilst they helped to identify high density areas, they were also used to capture the geographical spread of the community across the city making it possible to generate a mappable boundary to the *Muhajir* majority areas in the city. And finally, at the scale of the settlement, in a situation where return to an ancestral homeland is not an option or possibility as is the case with the *Muhajireen*, and with the rise of the political facet of *Muhajir* identity, the neighbourhood embeddedness of communal institutions such as the Unit or the mosque/*imambargah* provide social, political and religious connections to a physical and ideological 'centre'. This process of establishing a centre to periphery network appears to be very similar to the role played by migrant churches in England, connecting Congolese and Polish migrant communities in turn to 'home' (Eade and Garbin, 2007), thus establishing a sense of continuity and history.

Within the settlement as the earlier analysis has shown, location is critical to the role the institution plays within the community. Analysis has shown that the MQM Unit is generally located on or proximate to the main commercial area of the locality or in a public park. This facilitates not only surveillance and control of the settlement's commercial space but, in the case of the park, recruitment of young *Muhajir* men (Verkaaik, 2004). The *chai-khana* needs to be located in politically neutral, publically accessible spaces with high footfall simply because they function as the locality's community notice-board where everything from employment to a quick cup of tea on the way to work can be found.

Whilst there was a certain degree of consistency pertaining to location and social role played by commercial and political institutions, religious institutions provided the most diverse array of results. The study showed that whilst religious institutions function very much at the neighbourhood scale, the extent of the 'neighbourhood' differed from community to community. Where the community was under threat, as is the case with the Ismai'li and Shi'a sects, these institutions tended to be embedded within the neighbourhood, organising the community around them and generally exhibiting definite boundaries. Where the community appeared confident of both its ideological and spatial security, institutions were located in more public spaces and the edges of the neighbourhood became harder to define. Hence spatial accessibility seems to be directly related to social acceptability and security.

This study has shown that the purpose, the stake holder as well as the nature of the public space being appropriated or commandeered are all of significance; it may be a case of simple residential functions spilling out into the street due to the small size of dwellings (Madanipour, 2004) in these areas as in the case of women using the porch or men congregating at street corners thereby using public space as a social space and yet remaining close to home. Conversely appropriation may become a means of establishing dominance or showing defiance (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006); this includes the appropriation of local public parks or street corners by MQM activists for the purpose of public meetings and rallies, erecting barricades and lookouts without official consent such as those found around Nine Zero in Azizabad, or conducting processions and rituals along publicly accessed routes through both the city as well as the settlement on high and holy days especially in the case of the Shi'a community.

As this discussion suggest, the impact of the communal institution is not restricted to the physical limits of the institutions themselves but in fact they impact the community's collective consciousness in that the institutions and the spaces they occupy form a repository of communal myths, beliefs and practices (Rossi, 1981). They impact and alter the spaces around them whether it is the spill-over of the *chai-khana* into the street or the cordoning off of a thoroughfare for the purposes of a political corner meeting or a religious procession or the organisation of a sub-settlement around a religious building. Thus, the space

around a communal space becomes a zone of negotiation, where the internal power politics of communities are played out on a daily basis. And, whilst the market and *chai-khana* allow and facilitate co-presence and dialogue between communities, the analysis has shown that communal institutions like the Unit office or the mosque/*imambargah* perpetuate socio-cultural distinctions and appear to encourage the persistence of spatial boundaries. In the guise of protection and cultural preservation, they perpetuate the surveillance and control of members from within.

Whilst barricades, look-out posts and physical encroachment of space form recurrent features of the increasing militarisation of Karachi's urban landscape, it can be said that this kind of urban fortification is further assisted by the demarcation of softer more permeable boundaries or edges in the form of political propaganda. In the context of Karachi this may be seen as an interpretation of Lynch's notion of physical characteristics forming thematic continuations within the urban fabric that distinguishes one district from another (Lynch, 1960). These visual cues, whilst more permeable than the Peace walls of Belfast and Separation Barriers of Jerusalem, They are no less indicative of the boundaries that separate communities and the ownership and control of spaces by distinct ethno-political entities, functioning as a visual narrative for those familiar with the city's ethno-political landscape. As Ley (1974) suggests, 'the visible walls articulate in-visible sentiments'.

This exercise of space and identity brings to light a few key points: whilst the term *Muhajir* may today be an acknowledged ethno-political entity, this study shows that it is an umbrella term that encompasses and simplifies a far more complex and nuanced coalition of sub-groups, most often for political gain. Today, to a degree, many of these sub-groups exhibit identifiable spatial patterns and boundaries that speak of internal social hierarchies within the *Muhajir* amalgam based on specific religious, political and linguistic affiliations.

7.6 Implications of the limitations of the data

This multi-scalar diachronic analysis of the social, spatial and political relationship of the *Muhajir* community and the city of Karachi has brought to

light a number of interesting issues and whilst this multi-layered process has made it possible to analyse the community in considerable detail, it is necessary to acknowledge that the limitations of the data will have had some impact on the outcome of this study. As stated earlier, the mapping of communal institutions was by no means exhaustive and, especially in the case of the religious institutions; these spaces serve religious communities and are expressions of religious solidarities where most members may identify as *Muhajir*, to be *Muhajir* is not an essential requirement for congregants.

Additionally, even though this process of mapping and the subsequent cluster analysis provided a means of identifying the denser clusters of institutional activity, areas of the city for which documentation of communal institutions was either sparse or missing altogether were excluded from the analysis by default and therefore this dataset should be considered incomplete. Although multiple additional measures were used to confirm whether the areas identified in this study truly had a high potential for *Muhajir* presence – census language data, electoral results, anecdotal and newspaper references etc., despite this multi-layered process of verification, the incompleteness of the communal institution dataset used to generate a mappable boundary to *Muhajir* space has meant that this boundary potentially misses some of the finer grain nuances of defining *Muhajir* clusters in the city.

The use of political propaganda and politically motivated acts of violence as ethno-political features in this study was in part for the purpose of beginning to describe the presence and places of occupation of other communities in the city. A shortcoming of this particular approach is that these features only describe inter-community interactions in the realm of competition and conflict and define the presence of other communities relative to their relationship with the *Muhajireen*/MQM and not as discrete independent entities with a unique set of socio-spatial patterns. Had the data been available to map and analyse the post-Partition settlement trajectories of other migrant communities resident in the city today, this study would have benefitted from the comparative aspect. This additional data would have made it possible to compare and contrast *Muhajir* socio-spatial patterns to those of other communities making it possible to truly ascertain whether their process of socio-spatial occupation and ethno-

political evolution is unique or anomalous in the context of Karachi or whether these are processes that all migrant communities have gone through.

7.7 Conclusion

The study has shown that the *Muhajir* community does indeed cluster and has continued to do so throughout their presence in the city. This spatial clustering has been critical to the emergence of their political persona and equally important to their geo-political dominance of the city's central districts. In recent times, through increased access to political power and funds, and by virtue of their majority presence, they have been able to adapt the various spatial, economic and political features of the city to their advantage, in a way refashioning Karachi to suit their needs and claiming an ownership that is contested by most other migrant groups present in the city. This contestation is political and economic as well as spatial, where spatial dominance implies access to a sitting vote bank that facilitates both economic and political power in any given area of the city.

Whilst much media coverage has been given to spatial contestation that involves various forms of violent ethno-religious encounters, especially in spaces where two or more communities come together, there is also an uneasy realisation that despite their numeric dominance, and their desire for political control, the economic fortunes of the *Muhajir* community are tied to those of the myriad other communities present in the city. This economic interdependence has been illustrated by the presence of multiple ethno-political groups in the various commercial spaces of the *Muhajir* settlements studied as well as the fact that a large proportion of *Muhajireen* find employment and utilise services outside their settlements, in the city's multi-ethnic central commercial areas. This seems to illustrate the spectrum of socio-spatial interface between communities in Karachi; from zones of social-economic monopolies and spatial dominance and dispute to spaces of socio-economic interdependence and spatial dialogue.

The study shows that the task of building and maintaining the identities of these distinct ethno-political and sectarian communities falls to the various communal

institutions functioning in their constituent areas. The institutions not only provide a connection between the population of the settlement and the wider transpatial community but also provide a socio-spatial centre to the community within the settlement, managing and monitoring interpretations of identity as well as organising communal and residential spaces around themselves. In short, the communal institutions ensure the persistence of both sub-community identities and spatial clusters within the larger settlement. This seems to illustrate that whilst the *Muhajir* community may claim to be Pakistan's fifth ethnic group, they are in fact a coalition of communities that come together for a larger political purpose but, at the scale of the settlement, this constructed *Muhajir* identity disassembles into its original socio-spatial parts with an in-built hierarchy.

This perhaps then begs the question 'what next for the *Muhajir* community?' In an environment where there is a growing recent trend towards non-ethnicity based parties in the political realm in the form of the re-emergence of right-wing religious groups or the rise of the pan-ethnic Pakistan-Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) fronted by one of Pakistan's most beloved cricket captains both of which have received significant traction in the city, the relevance of an ethnicity-centric political group is perhaps questionable. The MQM's significance currently as a national political player lies in that it is today still the dominant presence in Karachi, and the city is the country's premier financial hub. But, if as extrapolated, by the 2020s 50% of Pakistan's population will live in cities (Kugelman and Hathaway, 2011) this has the potential to shift the central role of both Karachi and the dominance of the *Muhajir* community away from both these entities to an urban power sharing situation with greater ethnic equality. Currently the *Muhajir* vote bank is a finite one where there will be no further in-migration from India in the foreseeable future thereby impacting the community's ability to retain their numeric advantage. That being said, perhaps the fact that the *Muhajir*/MQM phenomena being an urban one and that it is a coalition of communities can be turned to their advantage in a rapidly urbanising society. Should their agenda and appeal cater to a wider definition of urban resident, the potential to remain relevant to political and developmental discourse in the city would potentially greatly improve.

Whilst this study places Karachi within the discourse around divided cities and contested space where the iconic examples are cities with long histories of communal and sectarian violence such as Jerusalem, Belfast, and Beirut, it has shown that i) the contestation of space is nuanced and manifests not only in the socio-spatial realm but has political and economic implications, ii) that where ethno-religious differences persist, spatial segregation seems to persist as well, iii) that the contestation of space is very much an everyday lived occurrence that goes beyond acts of sectarian or ethno-politically motivated violence and iv) that in parallel to contestation, life in Karachi continues to be a matter of negotiating life in a normative way, just as is the case in the aforementioned cities which are supposedly in conflict. This seems to place Karachi within Robinson's discourse of 'ordinary cities' (2006) where she argues that labels such as 'global cities' and 'world-class cities' diminish the richness and importance of everyday lived experiences and negotiations that all cities bring to the discourse of urbanism to a point that we are only conversing about and learning from a few choice examples most of which are placed in the west.

Spatial segregation is often the result of perceived differences between communities and socio-spatial boundaries are often maintained by the communities themselves but, analysis in this study suggests that in the case of Karachi, the State should also be considered as an active third party in the perpetuation and persistence of communal difference and ethno-political violence. The State's involvement whether formal or informal, places itself 'outside the law to practice development' (Roy, 2009, p. 81). In Karachi, the role of the State in the city's current ethno-political strife ranges from a distant patronage of one or more communities from the political centre, as was found to be the case of the Pakhtun and Sindhi populations in the past or, as has been the case of the *Muhajir* community in recent times, where the political representatives of the community become the local representatives of the State, manipulating and manoeuvring the machinery of the State to their advantage, leading to an uneven distribution of services. It should be noted that this process of patronage and intervention is a reciprocal one and cannot be termed as either top-down or bottom-up in that access to resources is a reward for political loyalty but simultaneously political loyalty is dependent upon at least the

partial fulfilment of election time promises. The work of Roy (2009) and Simone (2004) show that these are not unique processes of urban development but in fact issues common to many cities of the Global South.

Additionally, this exercise in spatially mapping identity has shown that whilst ethno-political clusters persist in the urban context and edges and boundaries take on a more concrete form, in many cases over time resulting in heightened securitisation and urban fortification and the emergence of entities such as gated communities, yet the identity that they enclose and claim to protect is an entity that is in a state of flux and constant negotiation. To claim a *Muhajir* association in the city today no longer implies that one is the descendant of Urdu-speaking, north Indian migrants; the definition today includes Gujarati-speaking business communities, repatriated Bihari migrants and anyone who identifies as the urban *other*. And, in the same way as identity is negotiable, including and excluding as it suits the greater objective of representation, power and land, so too are ethno-political rivalries; depending on what each party has to offer or gain from a coalition or an alliance, communal rivalries are renegotiated and spatial delimitations redrawn.

Whilst this study places Karachi within the discourse around divided cities and contested space, it also addresses these issues of ethnicity, politics and space within the context of accelerated urban growth and the emergent post-Colonial megacity. The processes of socio-spatial mapping used show that the relationship between urban development and the evolution of ethno-political identities in these emergent economies is a synergistic one, where ethno-political agendas impact development and vice versa and often results in a very real, everyday forms of uneven urban development and socio-economic marginalisation of migrant groups. This process, if left unacknowledged and unaddressed, has the potential to result in extreme forms of socio-spatial marginalisation which in turn have the potential of evolving into highly divided volatile environments. This we are seeing being played out most recently in the form of riots coloured by issues of ethnicity, religion and deprivation in marginalised communities in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in 2001 and the banlieues in Paris in 2005 and again in Tottenham in 2011. Media coverage emphasizes such places as 'spaces of the threatening "other"' (Laachir, 2009,

p. 102) and they are today perceived by the authorities as breeding grounds for fundamentalist activity and their residents as potential terrorists, when in fact perhaps efforts at greater integration should be made.

What this state sponsored socio-economic marginalisation and portrayal of the *threatening other* fails to acknowledge or deliberately overlooks is the inherent adaptability and resourcefulness of migrant and minority communities and their determination to survive in their new environments. This study has shown how an otherwise marginalised national minority turned their *otherness* to their political and economic advantage, mobilising politically to dominate and control one of Pakistan's key economic hubs. This is a testament to their creativity and ingenuity and has become a means of safeguarding their role in national politics.

In the context of the current refugee crisis in Europe, this ability to adapt and determination to survive is apparent and something to consider when discussing refugee/migrant resettlement and rehabilitation. Studies exploring the nature of the multi-ethnic high street in the UK today show that migrant and minority groups exhibit similar industrious qualities; through their experiences of the processes of migration, settlement and in some cases resettlement, migrants acquire a wealth of knowledge and a variety of skills (Hall, 2013, Hall, et al., 2016). Most are multilingual, the result of multiple migrations, many have acquired some knowledge of visa/asylum/business regulations and, due to exclusion from or limited access to conventional forms of employment, they have learnt to quickly identify niche markets for their particular skillsets thus either being absorbed into existing ethnic businesses or establishing their own. Hence while these socio-spatial margins may be commonly viewed as spaces of discontent and social malaise often forgotten by the infrastructure of the state, they are also the site of robust informal economies as well as spaces of competition, cooperation and social support (Hall, et al., 2016, Vaughan, 2015).

As stated earlier, this study would have benefitted from a comparative angle to the analysis placing the *Muhajir* community's socio-spatial response within the spectrum of migrant spatial patterns in Karachi. Similarly with respect to future works, this is a study that would benefit from being part of a larger comparative

analysis that would place it within a spectrum of urban environments that may be culturally diverse but simultaneously similarly ethnically complex as well as dealing with the multiple traumas of post-Colonial development. This would not only allow for a systematic means of identifying the socio-spatial commonalities but also the cultural differences in the evolution of these complex urban environments through the processes of spatial appropriation, adaptation and contestation. This in turn could inform policy and planning decisions pertaining to the rehabilitation and resettlement of refugee communities that are currently either resident in or making their way to Europe as a result of the political upheaval in the Middle-East and North Africa.

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
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
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Appendix A: Source Maps


Master plan maps




Doxiades' Greater Karachi Resettlement Plan-1958.



Karachi Master-plan 1974-85. Land use plan. Source: arifhasan.org



Karachi Master Plan 2000. Source: Karachi Development Plan 2000- KDA Master Plan & Environmental Control Department.



Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020, Proposed Land Use. Source: Karachi Master Plan 2020.


List of Group of Localities, Karachi			
Lower-Income	Lower-middle Income	Middle-Income	Upper-Income
Korangi	Model Colony	North Nazimabad	Clifton
Scheme:33	North Karachi	Gulshan-e-Iqbal	Defence
Aleemabad	Liaquatabad	F.B. Area	KDA Scheme No. 1
Bostan-e-Raza	Ahsanabad	Nazimabad	PECHS
Gulistan-e-Rafiq	Firdous Colony	Rizvia Society	Garden East & West
Kauser Town	Al-Falah Society	Unions Area	
Orangi	Lyari/Naval Personnel Housing Society	Jacob Lines	
Qasba/Sultanabad	Malir Colony	Gulistan-e-Jauhar	
Surjani Town/Scheme No. 41	Malir Extension	Rafah-e-Aam Society	
Baldia	Drigh Colony	KACHS	
Metroville I, II, III	Mehmoodabad	PIB Colony	
	Malir Cantt	PIAC Society	
	Shirin Jinnah Colony		
	Landhi/Shah Latif Town		
	Delhi Colony		

Table showing economic classification of settlements in Karachi. Reproduced from 'Karachi Land and Housing Study: Final Report, June 1989'.


Guide Maps from the Survey of Pakistan.



Karachi Guide Map 1949. Source: Survey of Pakistan




Karachi Guide Map 1972-74. Source: Survey of Pakistan




Karachi Guide Map 1984. Source: Survey of Pakistan

Source maps from newspapers.




Location of Karachi's flyovers and underpasses. Source: Fall sick with the healing: The 'killer' history of Karachi's first flyover. *The Express Tribune*. 2nd December, 2013.




Location of Pakhtun settlements. Source: Shahi Syed: Rise of a political rookie. *The Express Tribune*. 29th July, 2015.

As the police and Rangers put on their boots and prepare to march into some of the most dangerous areas of the city after the Supreme Court's orders, The Express Tribune explores what the law enforcers and residents of the troubled spots have had to deal with.




Where law enforcers fear to tread

Location of no-go areas due to either ethnic violence or the presence of militants and/or gangsters in Karachi. Source: Where law enforcers fear to tread: The entry fee for these spots of Karachi may be your life. *The Express Tribune*. 23rd March, 2013.




Areas of TTP influence and presence in Karachi. Source: Karachi: Enter TTP. *Dawn*, 9th March, 2014.


Municipal areas maps from the Population Census Organisation.




Liaquatabad Town. Source: Population Census Organisation.




Commercial Area, Liaquatabad Town, UC-8




Bundhni Colony, Liaquatabad Town, UC-6




Supermarket, Liaquatabad Town, UC-3




Qasimabad, Liaquatabad Town, UC-5




Shah Faisal Town. Source: Population Census Organisation




Natha Khan Goth, Shah Faisal Town, UC-1



Drigh Colony, Shah Faisal Town, UC-3



Morio Khan Goth, Shah Faisal Town, UC-5



Pak Sadat Colony, Shah Faisal Town, UC-2

Appendix B: Questionnaires, interview sheets, on-site documentation

Questionnaire:

Date:

Do you live locally?

Respondent #:

Gender:

Area:

1. Age
 - a. Under 18
 - b. 19-35
 - c. 36-65
 - d. 65+
2. What is your highest level of qualification? _____
3. What is your occupation? _____
4. Name the area in which you work/go to study?
5. Were you born in the area?

Yes**No**
6. If “No”, when did you move into the area? (i.e. PIB, ShahFaisal etc)
7. Where did you live previously?
8. List your **primary** and **secondary** reasons for moving? E.g. marriage, work, security, financial.
9. How many generations back has your family been in Karachi?

10. What city did you/they move from?

11. Do other members of your community/*biradari* also live in your current neighbourhood?

Yes

No

12. What language do you speak at home?

13. What newspaper do you read?

14. What community/social activities do you engage in?

15. How often do you participate in these activities

- a. More than once a week
- b. Between a week and a month
- c. Less frequently, please specify

16. On the attached map, please mark the following;

- a. Your street,
- b. Your “neighbourhood” (*Mohalla*)
- c. Where you shop regularly
- d. Your preferred mosque
- e. Cultural/Social Hubs
- f. Areas you avoid.

Resident Interview Questions

Respondent name:

Designation:



Area:

Date:

- i) How do you think the community's identity, and cultural and political practices have evolved over time?
- ii) What are the main factors that may have contributed to and/or instigated this evolution?
- iii) Who do you think are the main actors in orchestrating this evolution of community and identity?
- iv) How has the physicality of the "colony" changed over time?
- v) Please identify the forces that you believe to be the main agencies both instigating and facilitating these changes.
- vi) In your opinion, who were the people who first settled in this colony?

- vii) Where had they migrated from?
- viii) Have there been subsequent waves of migration both into and out of the colony?
- ix) If “Yes”, when and why did these take place?
- x) By what process; e.g. “chain migration”?
- xi) Are there areas within the settlement that you may consider to be the jurisdiction of sub-communities within the Muhajir fold?
- xii) If so, where are they situated and what sub-community is settled there?
- xiii) Is there an aspirational movement out of the settlement or are people investing in the settlement and consolidating the holdings here?

On-site documentation.



Examples of on-site mapping *chai khanas* and political propaganda, PIB Colony. October 2013.

[illegible][illegible]

 - food.
 11 - Barricade
 SCHOOLS
 GO LIBRARIES
 → LANGUAGE CENTERS
 VEGETABLES / MEAT.

[illegible]
$$N_0 = \mathcal{O}(\gamma_0) \subset G/F.$$

Mrs. NASREEN JAMIL.
ABYAZ HASSAN BHAI.

Examples of on-site mapping of commercial streets, *chai khana*s and religious institutions, Shah Faisal Colony. September, 2013.

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

Respondent#	1	2	3	4	5	6
Gender	F	F	F	F	F	F
1	2	2	1	2	2	1
2	4	4	3	5	5	4
3	beautician	Housewife	Beautician	Housewife	Salon Owner	Student
White vs. Blue	B		B		W	
4	PIB	PIB	PIB	-	PIB	PIB
5	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
6	-	7 yrs ago	-	-	20 yrs ago	-
7	-	Malir	-	-	Hyderabad, Sindh	Liaquatabad
8	-	Marriage	-	-	Father's Business	-
9	1947	1948	1947		20 Yrs Ago	19 yrs
10	Wazirabad, Sialkot	India	-	Dehli	Hyderabad	Hyderabad
11	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
12	Punjabi	Urdu	Urdu	Urdu	Urdu	Bihari
13	Digest	Any	-	Sunday Magazine/ Akhbar-e-Jahan	Jung	Akhbar-e-Jahan
14	Park w/Friends	Milaad	-	-	Eating out w/Friends	-
15	3	3	-	-	2	-
	Housewife		54 outside 45%			
	Own Business					
	Teacher					
	Skilled Labour					
	Sales					
	White Collar					
	Nursing etc.					
	Unskilled Labour					

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

PIB Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

Respondent#	1	2	3	4	5
Gender	F	F	F	F	F
1	2	3	3	1	1
2	5	5	6	3	3
3	Teacher	Teacher	Teacher	Student	Student
WHITE Vs BLUE	W	W	W		
4	Shah Faisal	Shah Faisal	Shah Faisal	Shah Faisal#2	Shah Faisal#2
5	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
6	1998	-	-	-	-
7	Islamabad	-	-	-	-
8	Marriage	-	-	-	-
9	40 yrs	1948	1956	1947	1947
10	Islamabad/Rawalpindi	-	Lucknow	India	India
11	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
12	Urdu	Urdu	Urdu	Urdu	Urdu
13	Jung/Ummat	Jung	Jung	-	-
14	-	Shaadi/Milaad	Local Mohalla activities	Milaad/Qurankhwani/Tuition	Milaad/Qurankhwani/Tuition
15	-	3	3	3	2
	Housewife		52 Outside 41%		
	Own Business				
	Teacher				
	Skilled Labour				
	Sales				
	White Collar				
	Nursing etc.				
	Unskilled Labour				

Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

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Shah Faisal Colony: Questionnaire Tabulation

[illegible]

Date	Socio-Political	Planning & Development	Housing	Transport & Road Networks	Development Maps
1947	Partition: Arrival of over 600,000 refugees in Karachi from 1947-51. H.A. JINNAH DIES. 1st Govt with India. OVER 100,000 REFUGEES OVER KARACHI TERRITORIES. LIABILITIES AND KHAMAS GOVT. FORM. SIE KHANATA NAZIMUDDIN AS P.M. GOVT. FORM.	Refugee settlements: Cantonment Transit Camps, Gulshan Housing Scheme, Old Haji Camp, Bazar Bait Camp, as well as occupation of all open spaces in the city and buildings vacated by leaving Hindus and Sikhs.	Cooperative Housing Societies		
1948		Job: Pir Elahi Bhabha Colony started. July. Sindhi Gov allows Co-operative housing schemes; more than 14,000 plots distributed between 1948-53. FEDERAL CAPITAL TRANSFER OF PAKISTAN (UNANNOUNCED AGREE.) Ministry of Rehabilitation formed.			
1949		Jan: Karachi Co-operative Housing Society (KCHS) established (community driven). Our Nationalist movement (Neighbourhoods, 1000 acres, north of Gulshan (Gov Scheme)). Ministry of Rehabilitation formed.			
1950	Genl: Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's 1st PM announced at a public meeting in Karachi.	Karachi Improvement Trust (KIT) est. 1st. KIT to determine allocation of 11,000 acres (Neighbourhoods, 1000 acres, north of Gulshan) announced to develop Lalshah.			
1951		MBY Plan, 1st Comm. People allowed to move into Lalshah development.			
1952	Student riots supported by the protesters' house it was decided that the university should be moved out of the city centre as it was too close to the federal capital, administrative and legislative hubs. Also questioned the close proximity of the refugee settlements to the administrative centre.	25 housing societies had received land.			
1953		North Nazimabad			
1954	Dec: Introduction of the 'One Unit' Pakistan; all provincial boundaries abolished, replaced by East and West Pakistan by PM Muhammad Ali Jinnah.	Drigh Colony: gov scheme on the 'vacation' of the city. CLASSY KHAMAS AS SINDH PAKISTAN COLONY. EXP: ARIK HANAN presentation "Evolution of Karachi".			
1955	Constitution of Pakistan's first constitution.	Lahshah to possibly the largest refugee settlement in Karachi.			
1956	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Green Revolution and industrialisation policies implemented. Karachi: 2nd Masterplan (CKRP). Refugees forcibly removed from city centre and relocated to new sites (Lahshah & New Karachi). Inner city quarter settlements built out as to encourage rebuilding. Industrialisation drive to take off hence limited or no employment for relocated persons.			
1957	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1958	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1959	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1960	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1961	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1962	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1963	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1964	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1965	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1966	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1967	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1968	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1969	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1970	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1971	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1972	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1973	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1974	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1975	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1976	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1977	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1978	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1979	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			
1980	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).	Genl: Khwaja Nazimuddin (1956-59).			

Date	Socio-Political	Planning & Development	Housing	Transport & Road Networks	Development Maps
1981	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1982	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1983	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1984	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1985	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1986	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1987	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1988	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1989	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1990	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1991	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1992	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1993	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1994	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1995	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1996	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1997	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1998	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
1999	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2000	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2001	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2002	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2003	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2004	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2005	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2006	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2007	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2008	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2009	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2010	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2011	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2012	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2013	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			

Date	Socio-Political	Planning & Development	Housing	Transport & Road Networks	Development Maps
2014	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2015	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2016	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2017	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2018	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2019	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2020	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2021	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2022	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2023	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2024	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2025	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2026	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2027	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2028	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2029	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			
2030	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).	Genl: Zia-ul-Haq (1978-84).			